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# West Europe Report

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2 January 1986

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## ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS OF FLEMISH PARTIES

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 16 Oct 85 pp 12-18

[Article by Marc Reynebeau: "It Will Simply Be the Martens VI Administration"]

[Text] Two big winners, two big and a whole series of small losers: since 13 October the political map of Belgium has fallen so much into the old fold that Wilfried Martens can calmly continue to work on the road.

It looks like a replay of 1968: a Christian democracy slightly over the threshold of 30 percent, socialism supported by about 28 percent of the people, and next a good 20 percent liberalism. This way the traditional political parties once again gathered four-fifths of the votes behind them, which is always a significant scale from which to read the continuity of the Belgian body politic. The year 1968 was the precursor of a period thus far unique in the recent political history of Belgium, in which the continuity and in a sense also the stability of the relationships was altered by a short-lived moment of hesitant decline of the pillars, a process from which the People's Union [VU], as the challenging anti-establishment party, gathered the fruits.

An opposite movement seems to have developed last Sunday with election results which so much resemble those of 17 years ago. Following a great deal of electoral rumbling, with a socialism that is caving in, a strong liberal success which fluctuates according to moods and election promises, and especially a Christian democracy which has gotten to know the limits of its natural support (approximately one out of three Belgians), affairs are being put back in order now. The pillar partitions are once again being put up. It is particularly typical that since last Sunday it has become unthinkable that more or less non-traditional parties like the People's Union and especially AGALEV [Live Differently] might count on being called to government responsibility. VU Minister Hugo Schiltz can drive any illusion of even becoming a member of the Flemish Executive, which is so dear to him, from his head. Experiments such as the one under Prime Minister Leo Tindemans (CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)]), with the VU, the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] or the RW [Walloon Rally] in the government, have become unthinkable.

This process of setting up pillars was completed through essentially a particularly simple process. As a matter of fact, the voters did not have a large variety of alternatives at their disposal last Sunday. The choice on the other hand was very simple: the voters were repeatedly invited to vote yes or

no, for or against the policy which has been conducted over the last 4 years, for or against the prime ministership of Wilfried Martens, with the added request to state plainly whether the Roman catholic-liberal policy should be continued.

The rebound necessarily had to create a polarization, a juxtaposition of two camps, each one with a clearly outlined position. Because Martens specifically wanted to depict himself as the figurehead of the government policy -- and in the process had no hesitation about a clear continuity between his government announcements and his election propaganda (even if only with the image of a metronome) -- that policy would automatically be identified with the prime minister's party. The CVP in Flanders and the PSC [Social Christian Party (Walloon)] have experienced the remarkably positive effects of that evolution.

#### Correctives

An equally obvious effect of such a bipolarization expressly desired by the majority -- reversal or not -- was the fact that the socialist opponent was also very well able to present himself as an opposite of what the government was offering the voters. Hence, Christian democrats and socialists became automatically one another's sparring partners, a process which was summed up in the two slogans which were brought into the discussion: "no reversal" as against "if you want things to change." Moreover, both antagonists had a distinct figurehead: Prime Minister Martens on the one hand, SP [Socialist Party (Flemish)] President Karel van Miert, who had remained very popular since last year's European elections, on the other hand.

That the other parties would be sandwiched between the two antagonists was inescapable.

It became a particularly painful matter especially for the People's Union. Given that the stakes of the electoral struggle were completely monopolized by the socio-economic debate -- it was the government which had chosen the terrain for the confrontation and only the socialists were able to accept the challenge with equal weapons -- the federal options of the People's Union had little chance of success. That, in the view of the VU, the economic crisis could be fought best through an enforced federalization of the country was an idea which entailed too many intellectual assumptions and uncertainties really to be played out in the campaign. Furthermore, VU President Vic Anciaux felt compelled, especially toward the end of the campaign, to state at every moment that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the essence of Martens' policy, that his party's opposition to it only involved a number of "social correctives."

Hence, the result of all this could only be that the People's Union did not succeed in distinguishing itself from the majority. Actually, the community themes, which are peculiar to the VU, did not play the slightest role in the campaign even though the government itself had provided quite a bit of potential gunpowder: the lamentable Happart affair, the military compensations, the behavior of PSC Minister of Foreign Affairs Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb which was not very community oriented, and especially the sabotage by the PSC of every constitutional amendment in general and of the communitarization of education in particular.



When the average VU voter, who is certainly not the worst, is invited to vote on the socio-economic policy, then he will naturally vote for Martens and the CVP and thus return to the old stable, which he had left during the wave of depillarization.

Moreover, the People's Union backed down on the missile issue by refusing to commit itself to a calendar for the withdrawal of those nuclear arms. The fact that the right wing within the party was placated this way however also meant immediately that the pacifist VU parliamentary party could immediately get better value with the SP.

The reverse of the polarization idea also meant that the CVP in particular could sweep its electoral opponents onto a single heap. Consequently, that party did so very specifically by simply cataloguing all those who did not agree with the Martens program right away with "the leftists," together with the SP and AGALEV, an identification which in Flanders still carries a pejorative connotation among the great majority of the people and certainly does not sit well in VU circles, given that this party, like the CVP, also adheres to a social order of class reconciliation and solidarity.

#### Rival

The PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress (Flemish)] was not able -- albeit in a different manner -- to impose itself in the polarized electoral fight either. First of all, the liberal party suffered a great deal from the fact that the campaign was focussed completely on Prime Minister Martens and thus on the CVP. PVV Minister Guy Verhofstadt added another measure to that by playing on the indirect effect in a manner nearly impossible to understand: vote for the PVV in order to support CVP member Martens ("our prime minister").

In addition there was the fact that the PVV did not succeed in developing its own accents in the electoral fight as such. The liberals were unable to do anything but defend a project symbolized by someone from another party, with achievements which had been realized by a collective government body. The PVV even had to remain quiet about the typically liberal issue of taxation: not only did the PVV not succeed in making its famous electoral promise of 1981 about a drastic tax decrease ("not you, but the state..") a reality, on the contrary even, the extremely modest tax reduction for citizens enacted in August cannot be felt in the pocketbook yet.

However, the picture of the electoral results of the PVV is distorted by the fact that in 1981 the party had reached a nearly unnatural strength with its anti-tax program, which coincided with the landslide to the detriment of the CVP. At that time the right wing of Christian democracy had unquestionably abandoned the old maternal lap to find its salvation with the PVV (and partly also with the RAD-UDRT [Respect for Work and Democracy (Flemish) - Democratic Union for Respect for Work (Walloon)]). With the broad unity which existed between the liberals and the Christian democrats during the current campaign, the antisocialism of the CVP leaders and the firm will of the Christian democrats to pursue the strongly neoliberal-colored Martens policy, there was no longer anything to prevent the return of that conservative CVP wing to the mother party.



From the moment last Sunday when the first electoral results became known and the scope of the PVV defeat became clear, the problem of leadership within the liberal party immediately arose. Guy Verhofstadt's leadership has indeed been a gamble, which was possible only because it so happened that the party lacked an intermediate generation to take over the helm from stars such as Herman Vanderpoorten who has since died, Willy De Clercq who has since disappeared into the European Commission, or Frans Grootjans who actually prefers being a newspaper director by far. The sole pretender to the throne could have been Herman de Croo (who did not do all that brilliantly on 13 October in his Brakel fief either) whom some people considered either too young or too fickle.

In this context the PVV was particularly ambivalent in the way it went into the Verhofstadt interregnum. On the one hand, based on a great deal of reading he had fashioned a type of ideology full of principles which no right-minded liberal could be opposed to; on the other hand, it is equally clear that specifically the PVV mandataries in parliament and in government never took much heed of Verhofstadt and happily went their way, as they had always done. And Verhofstadt's ideological background actually sounded like dramatics to them.

Influential figures such as member of parliament Ward Beyssen and even Minister De Croo unconsciously emphasized that ambivalence, perhaps even schizophrenia, when on the eve of 13 October they expressed criticism of the too radical statements made by their young president, who was actually only consistently pursuing what he had pushed down the throats of the PVV congresses in Kortrijk: a consistent liberal ideology, which was virtually adopted by the congresses as a matter of form, but which was apparently never intended to be implemented as well. But in the meantime, Guy Verhofstadt, consistent with himself, continued to say that in his opinion there was no reason for the existence of anything like national education and that the state as a whole with its nearly 1 million civil servants is in fact a perfect "horror."

Sooner or later such statements inevitably had to clash with the more pragmatic people in his party -- Guy De Witte of the liberal civil servants union VSO [expansion unknown] for example, who has quite a number of members among that army of civil servants, or the traditional anti-clericals and other masonic brothers, who know full well that public education must in fact function as a counterweight to the all powerful catholic education.

What is taking place around Verhofstadt is virtually a classic drama, in which there are conspiracies and knives are ready to carry out the ritual regicide; and Verhofstadt may well to his own surprise discover a Brutus among his murderers. Nevertheless, he did win one battle. In his own Ghent, where he headed the PVV parliamentary list, he held his ground convincingly against his rival and pretender to the throne Yannick De Clercq, son of his father, who competed with Verhofstadt in a nearly embarrassing manner in the news and who hoped to be able to drive Verhofstadt as successor to his father as PVV leader out of the market with a strong show of votes (as first successor on the parliamentary list). In spite of a circus of advertising never seen before, De Clercq obtained barely one-third of the preference votes won by Verhofstadt.

## Deserters

In the end the dominant fact remains that the two antagonists in the battle of the titans drew everything to themselves and thus came out of the battle as major victors. The SP undoubtedly lured a part of the VU voters and quite a number of potential AGALEV sympathizers away, while the so-called small leftist parties disappeared virtually into nothing, undoubtedly because of a "wasted vote" reasoning. We are even going to experience the fact that the next parliament will no longer include a single communist. Only in the area of Antwerp was the Labor Party able to hold its own somewhat, and if the trend continues it may hope to win a provincial chamber seat next time around.

And the CVP can once again breathe with relief. Christian democracy apparently controls a "hard core" of about 35 percent in Flanders. Through a massive mobilization of its ranks it managed to pull the deserters back in and convince the doubters to remain loyal anyhow. Last Sunday the labor wing of the CVP affirmed its trust in the party and in Martens, and at the same time let it be known that it wanted nothing to do with half-and-half solutions like PAKS [Progressive Agreement of Christians and Socialists] (as fourth on the SP list in Ghent, "deserter" Paul Pataer did not really score well) or with the courageous but disquieting doubts of someone like Luk Dhoore in Genk, who suffered a serious loss. Hence, the so-called ACW [General Christian Workers Association] Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene noted with satisfaction on Sunday that the Walloon Christian labor party SeP [Solidarity and Participation] did not even get off the ground.

Consequently, if any kind of breakthrough operation, a transfer of ACW votes to socialism, is to be successful it will take its time and inevitably become a process of a "sociological" and not of a political nature. It is true that Karel van Miert can take comfort in the thought that those districts where people fought longest and hardest against the renovations in the SP which he advocates, have done rather poorly and their voter gain lies substantially below the Flemish average (2.2 percent in Antwerp and barely 0.3 percent in the city of Mechelen).

However, with the recovery of the CVP, chains are primarily placed around the Christian pillar, an operation which could be carried out only through the polarization model. The largest party in Wallonia, the PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)], is experiencing a similar evolution and is maintaining a high level status quo. As a matter of fact, it is particularly striking that among the Walloon socialists, Walloon extremism has become a guarantee for success, which is proven by the success of "Mister Wallonia" Jean-Maurice Dehousse and of the Happart brothers, while the results obtained by the much more moderate party President Guy Spitaels were far from brilliant. The PSC in particular was rewarded well for the services the party was able to render to Wallonia from the national government.

The PRL [Liberal Reform Party (Walloon)] of Minister of Justice Jean Gol was able to recapture convincingly an old, pillared power position in Brussels by pulling the very pragmatic French speaking inhabitants of Brussels from the swiftly shrinking FDF back in, among other things thanks to the presence on

the lists of the very controversial mayor of Schaarbeek, Roger Nol, and that other Brussels baron, former socialist Henri Simonet.

There is no longer anything to prevent a restoration of the Christian-liberal administration, led by the big winner Wilfried Martens, which will be able to count on expanded majorities in parliament and in the regional and municipal councils. The Martens VI administration will perhaps be able to get going quickly, although the PVV will certainly ask for guarantees so that last Sunday's blow would not be likely to be repeated, while the ACW will also demand a reward for so much loyalty. VBO [Federation of Belgian Enterprises] President Andre Leysen said it already: given the target breaking government finances, the time has come now to really curtail government spending: in the spring of 1986 the Belgian franc may well experience a European monetary readjustment, the economic growth indicators do not provide a uniformly favorable image of the immediate economic situation, and the C-5A transport plane, which will fly 32 additional cruise missiles to Florennes, has already been ordered in California.

And the CVP has taken new heart. On Sunday evening, President Gaston Geens of the Flemish Executive, quickly hurried to his militants in the triumphant Louvain CVP, not only to congratulate them on the beautiful result they achieved, but especially to put them back to work: "All those town halls we were thrown out of, Tienen, Aarschot, Kortenberg... that has to change."

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## FRG POSTPONEMENT OF SDI DECISION ANALYZED

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 11 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Rolf Zundel: "Much Ado and No Decision. The SDI Decision Has Been Put Off Till the End of the Year"]

[Text] Late last week the coalition in Bonn seemed to be moving toward a basic agreement with Washington on German participation in SDI. In the meantime, it has changed its course again. The government continues to have difficulty dealing with the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Bonn, October--Whenever truly fundamental controversies take place in Bonn, the moment always comes where government spokesmen in exaggerated innocence and reporters in quiet resignation ask the question: did something happen? For one or two days it appeared as if the decision had been made in Bonn concerning the involvement of the FRG in the American SDI--contrary to the presumed desires of the foreign minister and for reasons which contradict the judgment of the research minister. By week's end, however, after many damage control and good-will missions--the chancellor had spoken with the foreign minister, his department chief with FDP caucus chairman Mischnick, who had previously publicly rebuked the "civil servant" ["official"]--everything was back where it started.

Following the meeting of the Federal Security Council (a cabinet committee of those ministers who are concerned with security questions) came the announcement that the matter would continue to be studied. The decision is to be made, if at all, at the end of the year. Perhaps, thus one learns without prompting from many experts, the Reagan/Gorbachev meeting in Geneva will cause the whole thing to appear in a different light. And what, after all, is meant by a "decision re SDI," thus the second communication, when the only matters being debated are the conditions under which a number of firms are to take part in the basic research of the Americans for their space defense program. There have been no negotiations on development and production, to say nothing of strategy. It is at most a question of giving the firms legal-technological assistance; there was no trace here of high-level politics.

At least one thing is shared by the protagonists in this controversy, the department chief in the chancellor's office, Teltschick, who on the occasion of a recent address on the subject of SDI was introduced with the remark that his

official title did not do full justice to his political significance, and the foreign minister: both wish to dedramatize. Genscher is telling everyone not to pour oil on the fire; Teltschick considers himself misunderstood as an SDI fan. Did nothing happen?

#### Somersaults of the Imagination

From the beginning, ever since Reagan announced his program, the controversy has been hard to follow: is it a major shift in strategy, which with the aid of new defensive weapons will, following its realization, offer a trude defense against missile attacks and will finally put an end to the deterrence doctrine, or is it only another round in the arms race? The only thing that seemed certain at the beginning was that this program, provided with \$26 billion for the first 5 years, signified a tremendous technological thrust for the United States. Aside from this, much could be read into it, and this did in fact happen.

The bait for the FRG was probably the hope of being able to latch on to a project which in its dimensions is comparable to the Manhattan and the Apollo projects, so as not to fall behind in modern technology. Proponents of FRG involvement point this out already at the outset of their argumentation; many, including the chancellor, have clung to this view to this day. And the imagination turned souersaults, ran wild; there was talk of billions that would go to West German industry, and there were dreams of financial participation and of taking over whole subsystems of the research. Several members of parliament, fascinated by military strategy, already saw themselves at a laser cannon in a spaceship, sighting in on the onion towers of the Kremlin. And in North Rhine-Westphalia, Bernhard Worms [CDU chief in that state] well-meaningly but without success brought to life the expectation among the populace that SDI would mean new jobs.

A second factor insured that SDI became a major topic of domestic politics. Washington does indeed attach some importance to European and German support. The statement heard later, that participation was not a touchstone of loyalty to the alliance, was by no means so clearly voiced at the beginning, and even today basic criticism and quibbling over details are not especially welcome. But whenever German-American relations are affected, the reactions in the FRG quickly grow beyond all bounds. Part of the CDU/CSU caucus in the Bundestag was of the opinion anyway that the faster and more of SDI, the better. The great majority, who gave less thought to the program, felt that a clear signal of loyalty to the alliance was necessary in any event. In addition, the program provided the CDU/CSU caucus with the opportunity to pillory the SPD, which had rather quickly agreed on rejection in principle of SDI. For many a CDU/CSU strategist, SDI became welcome proof of the anti-Americanism of the Social Democrats. And Minister for Youth, Family and Health Geissler even went so far as to make a vote in favor of SDI a question of political morality.

In this phase the chancellor's office almost appeared to be the homestead of doubters. In the spring, when German and American experts were meeting in Dallas, the Social Democrats were still praising the circumspect and restrained argumentation of Teltschick, who at that time did not by any means speak of approval, but of studying and evaluating and of the need for additional information. Defense Minister Woerner, on the other hand, after an initial phase of



skepticism, had by that time long since avowed his support publicly. Already at that time it became evident that SDI was destined to become a matter to be dealt with by the chancellor. The CDU/CSU would probably not have permitted Kohl to put the controversial issue on ice in one of the ministries, least of all in the foreign ministry.

Here a third element in the decision-making process becomes evident: the growing displeasure of the CDU/CSU with the foreign minister. One can safely assume that Strauss, who bet on SDI from the outset, and whose critical remarks stemmed only from concern that the transport of the technology could be hindered, will use every opportunity to find fault with the foreign minister. But in the CDU as well the feeling is widespread that Genscher is making a name for himself, at the expense of the CDU/CSU, as an authority on foreign policy reason: never entirely comprehensible but yet discernible--and, as the CDU/CSU suspects, thanks also to skillful background talks--at an annoying distance.

Where Genscher says No, as in the maritime law convention, for instance, the Yes of the CDU/CSU is significantly advanced. Where he pleads for restraint, as with SDI, even those Christian Democrats who basically feel the same way are put in a difficult position. One's career aspirations are not helped by being caught agreeing with Genscher in a matter of controversy.

The situation is further complicated by two factors: For one thing, by the fact that Horst Teltschick, department chief in the chancellor's office, has more than any of his predecessors attained political stature of a special kind. The dangerous dualism which for a long time marked American politics--the rivalry between the security advisor and the secretary of state--is now also no longer completely unknown in Bonn. Teltschick is power-conscious, and he has been sent forward on several occasions by the chancellor as his foreign policy spokesman, especially with respect to SDI. This is a situation which does not exactly facilitate the smooth decision-making process.

For another thing, the CDU/CSU, and sometimes the chancellor's office as well, has deliberately circulated the notion that Genscher's tenure as foreign minister is not permanent. One hears accounts that the chancellor treats FDP [national party] chairman and Minister for Economics Bangemann with particular amiability in the cabinet, there are no problems as far as he is concerned. And one can learn without asking in CDU circles that, actually, the economics minister felt destined for other things--as foreign minister, for example. However, the problem will take care of itself if the FDP returns to the Bundestag in the same strength as today, or perhaps even stronger. The FDP will not drop Genscher. And as far as SDI is concerned, the party is, if anything, more obstructionist than the foreign minister.

#### Power Struggles in the Coalition

All these things, the emotional domestic reaction to SDI as well as the subtle power struggles within the coalition, were responsible for making an objectively difficult decision even more difficult--a situation which is strongly reminiscent of the days before Bitburg.



Basically, a very simple course of action could have been taken: To deal with the SDI project as noiselessly as possible, to leave it with the foreign ministry, to wait and see what the project actually offered, to avoid fanfare: business as usual, as in the other European countries as well. For the time being, all that is at stake, as has meanwhile become evident, is that the Americans are interested in awarding individual contracts to German firms in the basic research area. No one can prevent this, otherwise the government would have had to pass an "anti-SDI-law" which would have been difficult to reconcile with our interpretation of the constitution, and not even the SPD is demanding this.

Opposing this were the dynamics of the SDI discussion in the FRG. We have tried, thus the chancellor's office--and the line of reasoning is not false--to keep the discussion objective, to guide it into sensible channels. These efforts, however, were accompanied by an increasing commitment to the project. This is the one trend, which has been discernible since spring. The other trend, probably found more in the foreign ministry, attempts to relativize the motives for SDI and to narrow down the foreign and security policy conditions for its acceptance. It is clear that these two political courses can be reconciled only with difficulty, if at all.

The commitment to SDI, in principle already contained in the first reaction of the CDU/CSU, increased the moment an interministerial working group chaired by Teltschick was formed. An institution such as this, to put it into political German, generates a "need for decisions." The expectation that results and unequivocal decisions would soon be forthcoming increased. Added to this was an intense information and promotion exchange between the United States and the FRG, which finally culminated in the dispatch of a high-level and much publicized delegation to the United States. This delegation was additionally tasked by the chancellor to study the possibilities for a basic agreement. How else could this delegation have been expected to return but highly impressed by the willingness of the Americans to release information, with positive feelings about the possibilities for German participation, and satisfied by the fact that the Americans considered a basic agreement, which was desired by the industrial representatives of the delegation, to be possible.

Teltschick's public report of this trip as well as the positive assessment of its results--a rather unusual occurrence--marked the end, for the time being, of this policy of commitment. It was supplemented by a political assessment by Teltschick, nicely wrapped in the empty rhetorical phrase that the FRG must make up its mind whether it wants to be the subject, or the object, of developments. The chancellor will have difficulty backing away from this formulation, assuming he even wants to.

The second course of development, the relativization of SDI, began initially with the primary argument of its proponents, namely that SDI represented a major opportunity to enter the technology of the future. Genscher does not deny that, for the Americans, SDI means a tremendous technological effort utilizing enormous government resources. His doubts, however, begin where the scope and the value of the technology transfer for the FRG are under discussion. The scope of possible German involvement can be expressed in terms of

thousandths of the overall program and the proportionate relationship of this participation to the overall state-sponsored promotion of research in the FRG is similar.

The technology transfer, which is tied to American laws anyway (for the contracts will be paid for by Americans), is on a modest scale. Here the foreign ministry is of the same opinion as the research ministry. Minister Riesenhuber stated this for the record even more clearly than Genscher: "SDI cannot be justified on the basis of the civilian research-political benefits to be derived therefrom." For the foreign ministry, the far more promising method of accomplishing the technological leap is the "Eureka" project, which offers the additional advantage of bringing the Europeans together.

#### Open to All Interpretations

The second relativization--in the form of a limiting condition--was the argument that the FRG must stay in the European commune and that above all the sensitivities of the French must be considered. "No singularity" is the formula, which means: The FRG cannot participate in the SDI program in the form of a state-level agreement as the only, and as the first, country to do so. A condition that is difficult to fill if it is strictly interpreted.

The third relativization consists of the conditions which the Federal Security Council established in March already for a German SDI involvement, and which Federal Chancellor Kohl explained in the Bundestag--among them: no arms race, no variable security zones, no strategic instability. The conditions are so formulated that a national German participation is actually impossible. It is highly improbable that these conditions can be met, at least no one can safely predict that they will be.

In the chancellor's address to the Bundestag on 19 April, the two courses of action--commitment [to SDI] and a skepticism armed with conditions--met in an astonishing way. Kohl agreed with the limiting conditions and nevertheless asserted that the FRG supported "in principle the American program for strategic defense." Small wonder, therefore, that Bonn's position admits of all possible interpretations.

The logic of Genscher's argumentation suggests concluding--he himself has never said this, however--that the foreign minister views very skeptically the commitment of the FRG to SDI in the form of an agreement with the United States. At any rate, he stands opposed to the trends expressed in a draft of the agreement, whose authors probably sit in the defense ministry, the preamble of which sounds as if the Americans and the Germans together had to invent NATO all over again.

Not only European irritation, above all in France, could result from a surging forward by the West Germans. And this irritation has been clearly evidenced already, at least during the time of the economic summit meeting in Bonn. Even in the CDU one takes note of unpleasant warnings from the East: an agreement will be taken as a political signal and answered accordingly. There is even talk of Honecker's visit being jeopardized. The assessment of these signals

within the CDU/CSU varies, but one can safely assume that careful note is taken of them in the foreign ministry.

And now? Basically, the whole problem has been condensed down to the question whether the FRG concludes a politically inconspicuous agreement of a technical nature with the United States or renegotiates the security agreement, which the foreign ministry as well does not rule out--or if, as would probably make the most sense, nothing at all happens.

Again the question thrusts itself upon the mind: Did something happen?

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## SHELL STUDY SHOWS MAJOR CHANGES IN YOUTH, ADULT VALUES

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 10 Oct 85 p 12

[Article by Axel Hacke: "The Balance of Power in the Family is Tottering" / Shell Study Shows that Adults are More willing Today to Learn from Their Children/ Parents React More Understandingly, but also More Helplessly/ Youth of the 1950's and 1980's]

[Text] "They face the world impudently, defiantly and challengingly; they are sure, even overbearing and full of bold pride when they appear in groups. They have no respect at all, they don't even know fear, and are therefore almost immune to punishment."

Question: When was this written? Counter-question: Is that important? Always and in every generation, adults have said that about youngsters, in this case someone named Muchow "On the Psychology and Pedagogics of Rowdy Teens" in the year 1956. But it could just as well have been 1985. Because this is the same old generational conflict, right? Is there really something new to be said on this subject?

Let's turn the question around: How could one learn something new? In the age of public opinion polls, the answer must be that polls alone won't do it. It does not say much if youngsters, perhaps, have many fights with their parents, whether they like to study or prefer to bask in the sun. What would be important to learn is whether they have more fights with their parents than preceding generations, whether they are learning more, or if they bask in the sun more often. Thus it would be more important to have studies over longer periods of time rather than quick snapshots.

This has never been done before, mostly because the science of polling is not a very old discipline yet. And now there are three works at once that introduce the "time" factor into the studies of youth. At the beginning of the year, the study "Youth without Future?" was published (Serie Piper 433, DM 12.80; see SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG of 16 March), in which Frankfurt scientists Klaus Allerbeck and Wendy Hoag compared attitudes, values and life perspectives of young people in the years 1962 and 1983. Somewhat in controversy with this work is the new study by Arthur Fischer, Werner Fuchs and Juergen Zinnecker, financed by the youth welfare work of Deutsche Shell (Leske und Budrich, DM 39), which makes no fewer than four comparisons on more than 2,000 pages in five volumes: young people in

1984 and young people in the 1950's (according to Shell and EMNID studies between 1953 and 1955); youths of 1984 with adults of 1984; young people of the 1950's with adults of today (the very same generation who were youngsters 30 years ago); and lastly, a comparison with the last Shell study of 1981. In addition, there is another work just published which is sort of an interim survey of young people since World War II, a mosaic of contemporary history, put together by the Deutsche Jugendinstitut in Munich ("Always these Young People!", Koesel Publishing Company, DM 36).

Actually, do such scientific bombardments still provide insights? Do they themselves not create even greater distance between the generations, a tendency described by Allerbeck and Hoag: namely, where young people and adults do not do badly at all when they know each other personally, but become increasingly alienated on a different level, as representatives of different generations? Walter Hornstein, professor of pedagogy in Munich, studies this in the Jugendinstitut volume and claims that studies of youth can also have a differentiating effect if they avoid labels and do not melt the varieties of young people into one "youth" pot. It should be added here that one should also focus attention on the youngsters' daily life, that one should ask them about their view of life; the Shell studies were the first to do so. Only in this manner could the mistake of polling young people be avoided, i.e., simply projecting adult fears of the future onto young people. Then they are anti-technology, spoiled and whining, and maybe don't even want to finance pensions--a continuation of the generational conflict with different means.

Reality is more complicated, and the most important element of youth in 1985 is the fact that this concept of "youth" is fading, if it means a uniformity of life style. For example, the longer young people go to school, the longer the period of youth is extended, but it also becomes more indistinct. At age 28, one can be a student--or a master craftsman. And who of the two is a "youth?" Comparing generations also means sharpening one's observation of new developments. One of the most astounding results of the Shell study is how much "the traditional balance of power between younger and older family members is tottering."

In the light of comparison it appears that parents sometimes are more helpless than their children, that it is they who don't know their way around the world. Even in the 1950's they were role models for only a minority, for 16 percent of the 15 to 24-year-olds. Today, only 3 percent of all young people cite their parents as their models. Forty-one percent of parents think they have changed under the influence of their children; one-third of them believe they have become more understanding and more tolerant. Forty-one percent of parents can discuss "all" their worries and concerns with their children, 42 percent "most of them." The Shell authors write: "We are surprised by the great extent to which parents of 1984 seem to be willing to discuss personal problems with their children."

Naturally, it is trite to say that the family has changed fundamentally in industrial society, that parents today compete with public and secret educators. But the extent of change is surprising, nevertheless. In the



1950's, between 18 and 27 percent of youngsters stated the intention to raise their own children "differently" or "very differently" from the way they themselves were raised. Today it is 48 percent. In 1954, 28 percent of adults talked about a break with traditional upbringing, today it is 54 percent. Many who, 30 years ago, did not think they were being treated badly, have broken away from the same methods. "The growing number of those who deal critically with parental upbringing is an indicator that parents have become more open to attack," the Shell researchers write.

Two examples by way of illustration: for one, there is the change in meaning suffered by the word "strict." In the 1950's, "strict" was still considered a quality sign of good upbringing (even by the young people themselves). Today, among those polled, the word almost always has the connotation of "too strict." A majority of those who in 1955 considered that they had had a strict upbringing, intended to treat their own children the same way. Those who today think their parents are too strict, would act the same way only in rare cases. A second example: in the first study in 1953, youngsters were asked to criticize one of the authority figures of their daily life. Fifty-five percent had no answer at all to this question--such a challenge was simply too much for them (as the Shell authors note).

The most important results of this youth study do not really concern youth, but rather adults. Not only are 88 percent of youngsters of the opinion "that adults can learn something from young people," but also 76 percent of adults. The study notes that "the understanding of daily life by today's adults has made the age of adulthood a period for learning."

Nowhere else has the change of a generation of adults and of an institution such as the family been described as clearly as in this Shell study. Compared to 30 years ago, a decisively larger number of adults have abandoned the position of unassailable authority in favor of partnership with their own children, in which they themselves no longer have a monopoly on the power of emotions. The authors write, "increasingly, problems of the relationship between parents and their children come to the fore. It is the parents who (must) fight for the love of their children; they need young people as substitute partners; they cannot detach themselves from their growing-up children." Thus adults do not live with unchangeable attitudes; they themselves are willing to learn. And further: they "have moved farther away from their own youth than have today's young people from the youth of that past era."

Is this really true? On political questions, the change in attitudes of young people is at least as great, so that the Shell study states: "Compared to the youth of the 1980's, youngsters of the 1950's were authoritarian." Answers to the question: "In your opinion, what were Hitler's characteristic traits?" can serve as an example. In 1953, 26 percent of young people listed positive traits, in 1984 it was only 7 percent. From these results, the scientists come to the conclusion that today's West German youth are a "generation of tolerant democrats with a liberal bent."



Of course, more important than such statements (which appear in most serious youth studies in similar form) is something else, not easily captured in figures, concerning the political understanding of this generation. The Shell study also contains a volume of literary and artistic self-expressions of youngsters, selected from 15,000 samples sent in response to an appeal. The authors conclude from them that political action forms in the narrower sense, such as voting or collecting signatures, are truly meaningful to a minority only.

Instead it can be observed that increasingly more young people imbue private actions with socio-political meaning--a dimension which is overlooked only in studies of a political science nature. Young people also see their private way of life in political terms. Whether someone drives a large or small car, how he raises his children, whether he likes to talk to his fellow men--all this has for many of them also a "political" aspect in the sense that they consider it very important for a better future.

It is possible that this new vagueness of the concept is simply a new form of a non-political consciousness; but it is not simply a variant of withdrawal into private life. Both generations share the social orientation pattern of "privacy," the wish to maintain and build up one's own little world. But in addition, there is also a new element which was not yet there among the youth of years past. It is the desire for "self-assertion" of the young who "call for assertion of the individual against the social world, who see the chance for their own vitality and perhaps also their self-assurance in resisting social orders and dictums, in eluding the social 'dragon,' by fighting it in small and large matters" (Shell study). For example, 83 percent of the young rate as good or very good the sentence, "I want to live and not just swim in the wake of others;" the sentence, "I am little concerned with things outside my private world," is approved by only 22 percent.

To break out of the restrictions of society, not live according to plan, not become a small cog in an indeterminable mechanism--these are for many young people self-evident thoughts about their life plan. If one were to ask what is different about the young generation of the first half of the 1980's compared to other young generations, one would probably have to answer that there are not a few among them who define "life" as did a 17-year-old highschool girl: "Life is when I know that I disengage, that I do what I want to do, really, and that I am doing it for myself! And not for some state that I supposedly serve!"

And then, there are still a lot of young people who think quite differently about it. And as for the eternal generation gap, which is always the same: most adults would probably define "life" somewhat differently.

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## CP CHAIRMAN AALTO ON INTERNAL PARTY DISPUTE, TIES TO CPSU

Sees Strengthened CP, SKDL

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Oct 85 pp 8-10

[Article by Tuomo Lappalainen: "FCP Is Not A Penitentiary"]

[Text] The party sections operating in the area of the minority districts expelled from the Communist Party will be faced with an important decision in the next few months: whether to continue separate activities according to the old model or whether to return to the fold of the mother party. "People join us voluntarily and leave if they are dissatisfied," states controversial Chairman Aalto in advising his comrades.

Aalto is establishing a new party. Aalto torpedoed the discussions. Aalto has divorced himself from the movement. How can Aalto continue? Aalto is disqualified. Aalto is responsible for the dissolution of the party. Aalto has broken away from Moscow. Aalto's path is the path of destruction. Aalto initiated the slide into the chasm...

Those are a few of the titles from around the middle of October in the mouthpiece of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] minority faction, from the week when the Taistoites [Stalinists] commented on the expulsion of the TIEDONANTAJA districts by the Central Committee and began to make preparations for their own national October meeting. The texts are such that even the attacks directed against the worst class enemy pale in comparison.

"I have not been able to take TIEDONANTAJA's articles seriously for several years already. They reveal a journalistic morality subordinated to only a pure expediency. As far as the SKP's internal issues are concerned, their own arguments cannot be made into facts merely by continuously repeating them," commented the much maligned chairman himself. His voice is serious and quiet, the words come forth at a deliberate pace.

"When I was labor minister, I received the impression that a more difficult task than this society cannot be found. But it has not been any easier for me now.

"I experience the resignation of each section and each member with a heavy heart. There is no cause for joy in it. The fact that I for my part have had an influence on the clarification of the SKP's internal situation is based on a long and serious deliberation. Also in the conviction that the attempt to continue in the previous manner would certainly have resulted in disaster. There is more than enough concrete evidence of this.

"I have not dealt and do not deal with these matters from the point of view of what will be attributed to me personally in the history books. By these measures I have most seriously and responsibly acted so that history will show evidence of a Communist Party formed by Finnish Communists and which has more to give to the Finnish nation and people than any other single political faction."

#### The Idea Is Safe

The SKP's 20-year civil war has over a period of time created numerous trends personified in the names of individual communists. There are Saarinenites, Taistoites, Kemppainenites, Kajanojaites, Aalto's men, and the Kainulainen clique. The spectrum is so great that at times one cannot help but receive the impression that it is not the issues that are in conflict but the men.

The chairman, however, is of a different opinion. Mere personality differences are not sufficient to explain the conflicts. Dissolution would not have been possible without profound ideological differences.

"When the conflict broke out, in the background was a situation in which the SKP accomplished a revision of its strategy before any other party operating in a developed capitalist country," points out Aalto.

"We wanted to state unambiguously that the socialism at which we are aiming is profoundly democratic, is based on the will of the majority, will expand the rights and freedoms of citizens, and will be built on the lasting results of the work accomplished by Finns so far.

"However, these basic policy lines were not considered to be orthodox by some comrades. From this the fuss began, and they took upon themselves the task of restoring Marxist-Leninist policy lines and eliminating the revisionism resulting from it."

There would not have been anything objectionable in the matter if the minority had been satisfied with acting on behalf of their positions and views in accordance with the regulations, assures Aalto. The situation became contrary to the interests of the party when the dissidents took for themselves the right to organize themselves into a separate faction. This brought about the need to exclude the minority districts outside of the party.

"This undeniably is a problem in that at least some of the comrades in the TIEDONANTAJA faction feel that they genuinely represent a pure and only correct proletarian internationalism. But, on the other hand: we can say that we are supporting the essence of Marxism in those same issues in which the minority

is supporting Marxism. Naturally, we do not accept their argument that we have supposedly rejected the essential premises of our ideological world with our strategic policy line."

### Social Democrats in Crisis

Now that the internal situation has finally been settled, the SKP again has an opportunity to sharpen its ideological profile, promises Arvo Aalto unabashedly.

Peace work, the elimination of poverty, a new division of labor, a halt to right-wing policies as well as an effort to increase the personal opportunities of citizens to participate are listed in a five-point "energy discharging program".

"It is now high time to return Finland to the path of democratic development. Present government policy is leading society on a bourgeois and right-wing path, which has already substantially increased asociality and injustice.

"The Social Democratic Party is pushing itself into a deepening crisis inasmuch as it continues this policy. The signs are visible in many connections. For example, dissatisfaction in the ranks of the SAK [Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions] is already noticeably great, and it will certainly not be eliminated by those means being attempted now. They are supposedly more militant and more active, but in fact the trade union movement is being made into a silent supporter of government policy.

"The Center Party, on the other hand, in attempting to prevent an increase in the public support of the Conservative Party, has ran to the right at such a speed that it has become increasingly more difficult to see what would make it different from the Conservative Party as far as the content of policy is concerned.

"As far as the Conservative Party itself is concerned, it must indeed be admitted that a radical change in the social position of its supporters has changed as the growth of public support and power have increased. It is no longer the same stable extension of employers' organizations as before. Now its parliamentary group is already declaring a sympathy for strikes, for the process going on in the social labor relationship to be sure, but anyway for strikes. Naturally, there is no reason to close one's eyes completely to these changes."

The basis of a new historical compromise? Not yet, specifies Aalto. "We consider it important that the workers' movement comprises the basic force of government, a force which will provide the direction and tone of cooperation. And not the kind that is only shackled to the hegemony of the will of the bourgeois parties."

### A Question of Months

The future prospects of left-wing cooperation are not, however, considered to be too rosy at this time. The predicted defeat of the Communists in the next



elections has been considered as a factor reducing the prestige of the whole socialist camp and also weakening the position of the Social Democrats with respect to parliament's bourgeois camp.

"It may be that when we restore order to the party and sacrifice our energy on behalf of the nation, the people will punish us. This I do not really want to believe," says Arvo Aalto in arguing against this.

According to him, election behavior will be influenced by many such factors which cannot even yet be foreseen. "It is, however, certain that in the final count the SKP and the recovering SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] will appear to be more sensible than they are today."

Not even Arvo Aalto wants to explain the flight of 150,000 supporters from the ranks of the People's Democrats by mere disgust with internal squabbles. On the other hand, it is considered that the departure of the TIEDONANTAJA faction is facilitating the return of the disenchanted. The chairman continues to place his hopes in youth, among whom many have said outright in private discussions that "there is no sense in supporting such a ragged movement".

"It is outright inefficiency on my part and the part of other SKP leaders if we are not now able to demonstrate to those youth who have left our ranks that our objectives are such for which it is prudent as well as possible to return to the party."

The restoration of credibility as an objective of practical policy is important in another sense also. Aalto, General Secretary Esko Vainionpää, and comrades must quickly be able to redeem the confidence of the CPSU and demonstrate that the concern expressed by the large fraternal party for the dissolution of the SKP is after all unfounded.

The chairman denies having speculated with the personnel changes that have taken place at the top of Soviet society even in his own thoughts. However, it is self-evident that the wave of reform initiated in the Soviet Union will also in time affect the international communist movement. "And relations between the SKP and the CPSU are not detached from this whole."

There is not yet exactly any cause for optimism at this time. Indeed, the Sputnik publishing controversy, among other things, clearly demonstrated that there is still a readiness in the Kremlin to put down anyone threatening its will.

Could it be that the CPSU's economic support will over a period of time create such operating conditions for the Taistoites that they will soon also influence the internal power relationships of Finland's communist movement?

"Not one single political party has been eliminated in this country by money issues. Even as important as the economic side is in organizational activities, parties do not live in a dependency on money, but on whether they have public support and a social obligation in the time to come. Indeed, the whole workers' movement came about in this country without even a bank account."

Thus the development of support as well as the patience of the CPSU will be measured many times during the coming winter when the party leadership intends to make a final break even formally from Taistoite-oriented sections remaining in the SKP.

"Everyone has been offered an opportunity to come into the party with equal rights and responsibilities and within the framework stipulated by the regulations. The decision has been made with a serious purpose in mind and not in a tactical sense. Each section will come to its own decision and will choose its place. No one can be forced and there is no desire to do so. The SKP is not a penitentiary, people come into it on a voluntary basis and leave if they are dissatisfied," states Aalto.

"As far as the time schedule is concerned, the decisions of the Central Committee mean that when the internal situation is resolved, it will also be completely resolved. Such a time period cannot be long, it is a question of a few months at the most."

Subsequent transfers will be made at the level of sections remaining thus far in the shadow of the districts and highest leadership. The Central Committee's role will be limited only to accomplishing what has happened.

"Those sections which do not join the district organizations in the party will adopt a stand on whether they want to remain outside of the party either by a precise answer or a failure to debate the issue."

Like Brothers Together?

Is the worst enemy of a European communist another communist?

There is good reason to ask this question when one examines the postwar tale of woe regarding the extreme left wing in our part of the world. In this framework the only astonishing aspect in the dissolution of the SKP is that the paths of the majority and of the minority are only now going their separate ways.

A division into nationalist communists and communists faithful to Moscow is not at all any kind of a typically Finnish phenomenon even as strongly as it has become personified here into "Taistoites" and "Saarinenites". Perhaps, the only thing that is homemade -- or should we say Eurocommunist -- in this matter is that here the dogmatists have become defendants. In many other countries they have had the initiative at the moment relations were broken off as well as control of the organizational machinery.

For example, in Norway at the end of the 1940s already the local communist party was purged of individuals who were suspected of "abandoning the class struggle for bourgeois nationalism", a doctrine which at that time was inseparably connected with the name of the Yugoslavian strong man Josip Broz Tito. The solution did not benefit anyone; the leader of those labelled as heretics became unacceptable because of so-called personal problems and soon disappeared from the political scene, the core group, which retained its orthodoxy, on the



other hand, lost a large portion of its former constituency and withered into a mini-party without any influence.

In Denmark Titoism did not divide the communists until 10 years later, 1958. However, the old party leadership, which was pushed aside, established the new Socialist People's Party with the support of the intelligentsia and active members of the trade union movement, a party which declared opposition to a market economy, but conceded that social development has not progressed everywhere according to the predictions outlined by Karl Marx. The newcomer soon grew larger than the mother party and achieved a stable position in Denmark's fractured political arena.

Sweden's communists have succeeded in avoiding the Finnish-type open split. Nevertheless, there have been sufficient causes for dispute on the home front. In the 1960s the party was divided into three distinct camps, "dogmatists", "reformists", and a kind of third-line "traditionalists". Since then differences have been restrained by the whole party's fear for the future and the possibility of falling below the voting threshold as a small party outside of parliament.

The rule according to which the strength of a communist party is directly proportionate to its independence from the Soviet Union seems to be valid for the Nordic countries -- Denmark and in the future apparently for Finland also. Elsewhere in Europe, however, this does not necessarily hold true. An example to the contrary can be found in Greece where the External Communist Party, which adheres to Moscow's line, has risen to a more important position than the Internal Communist Party, which primarily represents a Eurocommunist policy.

The "three greats" of Eurocommunism, the French, Italian, and Spanish parties, have clearly been in the hands of reformists. This has not, however, meant that there has not been some strong arm-twisting about future policies under the exterior of reformism. According to many assessments, the membership, particular veterans of the underground era, is clearly more conservative than the party leadership and has not always without grumbling approved the political perceptions of Enrico Berlinguer, Georges Marchais, and partners.

The Spanish Communist Party, whose support dropped in the last parliamentary elections from 11 percent to less than 4 percent, seems at this time to be experiencing the worst internal crisis. The former number one man Santiago Carrillo and present General Secretary Gerardo Iglesias are openly fighting over personality questions as well as ideology. It is, indeed, ironic that Carrillo, the creator of the reform policy, is now accusing his successor of "excessive Eurocommunism". Many others seem to be of the same opinion since two factions positively disposed to the Soviet Union have already broken away from the party in the 1980s.

## SKDL Reports Membership Aging

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Oct 85 p 8

[Article: "Half of SKDL's Members on Paper Only"]

[Text] The SKDL's Executive Council discussed the party's situation and future prospects in Helsinki on Saturday. Vice Chairman Tuomo Molander of the Executive Council painted a gloomy picture of the SKDL's current situation in his introductory statement.

According to Molander, the majority of the SKDL's nearly 1,400 member associations exists in fact only on paper. They issue proclamations which no one reads and deal with personnel matters which do not advance ideology, criticized Molander.

Also the SKDL's membership structure is problematical, stated Molander. The average age of its members is more than 48 years of age, and the party does not seem to interest youth: there are only a few dozen members under 20, less than 0.2 percent of the total membership.

### Real Socialism Does Not Attract People

In Molander's opinion the People's Democrats have failed in the presentation of their objectives. "The SKDL has clearly stated that it is acting on behalf of socialist solutions. However, that socialism to which the SKDL is aspiring has probably remained unknown to the general public," he stated.

"The image of socialism is generally based on the experiences of today's socialist countries. A comparison of their situation with conditions in Finland does not persuade people to be enthusiastic about socialist solutions."

According to Molander, today's socialist countries have proceeded to build their own socialism from different premises than in Finland.

"Concrete models of Finnish socialism have not been presented. Also it has perhaps not been emphasized that in addition to being an alternative to capitalism Finnish socialism will also be different than the presently existing socialism," stated Molander.

In Molander's opinion the SKDL should seek new momentum from idealism and extraparlimentary activities, among other things.

The Executive Council also discussed the SKDL's and Finnish Communist Party's internal disputes. However, no decision as yet was made on the expulsion of the SKDL's two Taistoite district organizations, the districts of Kymenlaakso and Joensuu.

The meeting of the SKDL's Executive Council will continue on Sunday. An educational policy resolution, among other things, was approved at the meeting.

## SKDL Again Appeals to Stalinists

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Oct 85 p 13

[Article: "SKDL Again Appealed to Minority Faction"]

[Text] On Sunday the SKDL's Executive Council offered the minority Communists an opportunity to be included on the SKDL's candidate lists in the next parliamentary elections.

However, the now familiar condition was attached to the offer: the members of the minority districts must agree to carry out the principles and decisions of the SKDL and they must renounce all activities contrary to the SKDL and its member organizations.

According to the position adopted by the SKDL's Executive Council, there is a place in the SKDL's ranks for "all democratically thinking people for whom the goals and principles of the SKDL are dear".

The Executive Council appealed to the Taistoite district organizations expelled from the SKP so that they "would feel a responsibility for the influence of the People's Democratic movement as well as demonstrate in a convincing manner their willingness to accomplish the SKDL's objectives".

The position of the members of minority districts expelled from the Communist Party will be brought up again in the SKDL after these districts have responded to the SKDL's inquiry on their future conduct.

In letters sent to the minority districts it is asked whether they want to work in the SKDL while adhering to its operational principles. At the same time they are reminded of the minority's infractions so far. The SKDL's Kymenlaakso and Joensuu districts are controlled by the minority.

The minority members of the SKDL's Executive Council are demanding that election work and the nomination of candidates be accomplished "without even the slightest discrimination against any present or future partner in cooperation".

In the opinion of the minority faction a broad negotiating meeting should be convened to rectify the present situation.

The Executive Council, which met in Helsinki, also approved a budget stand in which it is assumed that the position of underprivileged segments of the population will in the future be treated separately in the state budget. The Executive Council also gave its complete support to striking janitors in Hyvinkää.

10576

CSO: 3617/24

## EEC CHAIRMAN DELORS VIEWS COMMUNITY'S FUTURE

PM021315 Paris LE MATIN in French 28 Nov 85 p 12

/Interview with EEC Commission Chairman Jacques Delors by Alexandre Adler;  
date and place not given/

/Text/ LE MATIN; Most of the big European states are now community members:  
Could this be an opportunity to look at what stage we have reached with this  
expansion?

Jacques Delors: I do not think that anybody was aware enough of the significance of the community's expansion from 6 to 9, and then to 10, and 12. All those who wanted a 12-member Europe failed to assess what it meant. I note that some governments are frightened by the decisions which they themselves have taken. The expansion of Europe to include Greece and then Spain and Portugal is a political enrichment. Europe has decided to expand, and this obviously entails a culture shock, but a positive culture shock. Northern and Southern Europe are together. It must be stressed that the PS hoped for this union at the appropriate time, and in my view this is a political and cultural opportunity. There are 12 of us, and that is a good thing, a political success, but it is also an economic challenge because it can administer the heterogeneous nature of the new entity.

LA MATIN: However, there are new problems facing the community, for instance the current institutional problem.

Jacques Delors: It is rather strange to see how in the past 3 years, after years dominated by pragmatism and the recognition of national interests, institutional issues have resurfaced. If you believe that Europe can only exist if it is united, you must provide it with institutions which exert pressure on national interests and transcend the legitimate interests of each country. Pragmatism cannot be the only rule of conduct in a Europe which faces daunting challenges linked to the geopolitical changes in the world and the scientific and technological revolution. The institutional question must be faced.

LE MATIN: Does this mean that the rule of unanimity should be entirely set aside?

Jacques Delors: In the EEC's province, in other words the economic, financial, social, and monetary spheres, it is appropriate to move quicker and go further. After the problems we encountered in preparing for the European Council meeting in Luxembourg, Francois Mitterrand's clear restatement of his positions is a pacifying factor and a contribution to a clear dialogue. The president is not questioning the EEC's development. He thinks that it should have a political extension. This extension takes the form of political cooperation and cooperation on security.

LE MATIN: There are the monetary tool, political cooperation, European technological cooperation, and European cooperation on defense. All these are of primary concern to the EEC commission and its chairman....

Jacques Delors: Let us make things clear. I am where I am because I believe in Europe. Since God moves in a mysterious way, and history does too, I will not be upset if Europe is also built through channels other than ours. However, I might as well say immediately that I do not see how the Europe of the future could be built on the ashes of the EEC. I fail to understand that. This makes me vigilant. Consequently I think it is impossible to build Europe as a political entity by attacking the community method.

As chairman of the EEC Commission I do not claim to have a monopoly of the channels of European building. That must be clearly understood. But there must be a minimum, after all, and this minimum is administering the EEC's development. I believe that this involves what I have described as the foundation of the community's recovery--a huge market of 320 million people without any kind of border or barrier. It involves a degree of economic and social cohesion, a demonstration of solidarity, to the extent that each makes an effort. It involves institutionalized monetary cooperation.

/Delors continues/ Finally, it involves a minimum of technological cooperation, which I say is entirely compatible with the development of Eureka. This is the foundation; if it does not exist, then we are building on sand. This is the minimum required. I do not claim that we--the Commission--have a monopoly on European interests. This is proved by the fact that I am trying to help Eureka to succeed; it is proved by the fact that I would understand the existence of a political cooperation treaty outside the community. I simply ask that there should be some prospect of a single treaty which might one day enable the European union to exist. Now and in the future we will only live, exist, influence the world, and be citizens of the world if we are together. The community method is required to create an entity with 320 million citizens. Is the community method adequate? I have never claimed that. If you try to stifle it, then you kill Europe.

LE MATIN: Over and above technological cooperation there is, of course, a common political will. How does the European Commission chairman now view this political revival?

Jacques Delors: I am not opposed to a separate treaty formalizing political cooperation and introducing the problems of security and defense. What I ask is that the future should not be prejudiced, and that there is a possibility of these 12 countries' one day forming a political and economic community.



I note with satisfaction that the French proposal aims to achieve this.

LE MATIN: Do you intend to rely on the European Parliament and European opinion to make progress, and if so how?

Jacques Delors: The European Parliament is like me and you. We live with our extremes of honor and indignity. The European Parliament was elected by universal suffrage and it was not I who decided that. I was a European deputy, and I was very often criticized for its behavior, but I now think that the European Parliament has something to say about European building. I regard it as a duty to help the European Parliament in reviving European building. This does not mean that I am in favor of maximalism. I am not alone; there are 13 other commissioners.

LE MATIN: People now feel that no European country is openly opposed to European building. Paradoxically people feel that Europe has less to say than it did just 30 years ago.

Jacques Delors: For 7 or 8 years I said: Take care, Europe is threatened with decline. And I now say: No to Europessimism. We are getting back on our feet economically, socially, and politically. I have confidence in Europe's strength. I remain faithful to the European model, based on a balance between society and the individual--a Europe which aspires to a universal role, which in other words is capable of winning respect and working for greater fraternity in the world.

/12228

CSO: 3519/68

## REGIS DEBRAY ON NICARAGUA, GUERRILLAS, SOVIET ACTIONS

Rio de Janeiro MANCHETE in Portuguese 16 Nov 85 pp 106B, C

[Text of interview with Regis Debray, foreign policy counselor to President Francois Mitterrand, by Jose Hernandez/Gamma-Sigla, translated by Alexandre Raposo, date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] In 1971, Regis Debray came out of a Bolivian jail, where he had been imprisoned for 4 years because of his involvement with Ernesto Che Guevara, and threw himself body and soul into French political life. In 1981, Debray was named foreign policy counselor by President Francois Mitterrand, with whom he traveled to Brazil this year as a member of the official party. Although he refused to talk about his past as a guerrilla, Debray's high official position did not keep him from expanding on his political analysis of international relations among the states, as seen in this exclusive interview with MANCHETE.

Question: When the French president appointed you as foreign policy counselor, responsible, among other things, for Latin America, some foreign ministers on this continent made their dissatisfaction very clear. Do you think their attitude is explainable?

Answer: Explainable, yes, but the images always lag behind the reality; the image of a man more or less 20 years behind what he really is today. The stereotypes have not been favorable to me. This explains the concern of some foreign ministers, as you put it so circumspectly. The facts will show that they have been mistaken.

Question: You have changed. This is irrefutable. However, there is the impression that your development has not been reflected in your relations with Latin America. Your friends, the people you communicate with, are always the same. You seem to have ignored individuals who have also sought much more pragmatic solutions in Latin America. Why?

Answer: [This impression is] because of the perpetuation of the images and the memory of the guerrilla in the beginning of the 1970s. On the other hand, I practically stopped traveling to Latin America after my release in 1970.

Question: But you have gone to Cuba several times.

Answer: I have also gone to Mexico, Panama and Costa Rica, but I have not had occasion to go to other places. It happens that my horizons have broadened. I have gone more to Asia, to the Pacific countries and to the United States. This means that, until 1971, I was keeping up with Latin American affairs at some distance.

Question: Was it a deliberate decision?

Answer: Yes. In 1981, the president of the republic put me in charge of this sector, which gave me an opportunity to bring my knowledge up to date. But early in 1982 I gave up responsibility for this area.

Question: Why?

Answer: Because men must grow. Because the world is large and varied. Finally, because French interests are concentrated primarily in Latin America.

Question: What is not understandable is why you limited your contacts to people who have something to do with the guerrilla image.

Answer: I believe that life has phases, just as it has years. I had a very strong Latin American phase, a very exciting phase and from which I still have good memories of the friendships I made and of the Latin American vitality and creativity, which I could appreciate. Since then, I have had other phases: Asian, Pacific, North American. But I am not thinking of changing my friendships, because I am loyal to my friends and I am certainly not going to deny publicly what I was, since I am not a turncoat.

Question: The problem is that some of your friends embody a type of power which you have denounced in other places, but not in Latin America.

Answer: I never denounce. What I do is to attempt to understand how political systems function. I am not interested in the model of society but in the power relations among the states. It is an area which one should approach with a clear head, devoid of passion. We must coldly consider power relationships, which are cold. In this way, I have no accounts to settle or accusations to make. I have never made speeches in praise of this or that form of capitalism or socialism. I have tried to understand the relationships among the states.

Question: You cannot be faulted for your personal friendships, with Fidel Castro, for example. But, in the eyes of many people, these friendships are a form of defense of a certain type of power...

Answer: I do not have political relations with Fidel Castro. I have them with Mitterrand. I defend the interests of France.

Question: Do you think that the guerrilla phenomenon is justified in Latin America today?

Answer: In a democratic era, there is no justification for guerrilla action. It is only justified against a dictatorship which prevents the expression of popular sovereignty, which denies freedom to meet and to associate. When the only remaining course is violence, it might be justified. I say "might."

Question: In your book "The Empires against Europe," you were not very kind to your former allies. Speaking about the Communist parties in Colombia, Brazil and Venezuela, you referred to them as "little maverick groups" and "societies of old men."

Answer: We are witnessing a fantastic decline of the classic communist movement in Latin America. It catches our attention.

Question: Does the development of the Sandinist regime correspond to what President Mitterrand and even you would have wished?

Answer: In any case, we had no great illusions. We are in favor of self-determination. Therefore, we recognize President Ortega as the legitimate president of that country. Moreover, we maintain a cordial and close dialogue with the Sandinist leaders. In any event, it is not strangling a country which we are helping to breathe. [Sentence as published]

Question: Do you apply the same reasoning in the case of Salvador?

Answer: We follow the same principle. France has no reason to challenge the legitimacy of this or that electoral process. We are not the arbiters of the authenticity of an election. For this reason, the French Government recognizes Napoleon Duarte and Gregorio Ortega.

Question: Speaking of the United States: do you think a country can be imperialist and democratic at the same time?

Answer: Naturally. Seen from abroad, particularly from Latin America, America is nothing if not imperialist. We forget that behind this is a dynamic, creative and innovative society, capable of staying the hand of imperialism under some circumstances. Nicaragua is an example. There are two sectarian visions of the United States: one that sees only an open society, an extraordinary laboratory of ideas, associations and changes; and one that sees only the imperialist role and the extension of its influence in the world. For my part, I am very happy when I am in New York, but I would not like every city in the world to look like New York.

Question: In the name of the national interest, you accept many things in France that you have criticized on other occasions. According to the same logic, I don't see that one can criticize American policy that also "defends its interests."

Answer: I argue that I am a nationalist of the Left. A nationalist of the Left is someone who acknowledges the reality of other nationalisms. It is

someone who does not seek to impose his will on those who are weaker but is content to resist those who are stronger. There is a form of nationalism which I cannot accept: arrogance, the desire for hegemony and contempt for fellow beings.

Question: According to you, in Europe there is an "ideological" way of perceiving the Soviet phenomenon: the country of the Gulag, with KGB agents everywhere. Do you think that in Latin America--so unconcerned about geostrategic realities--there is also an ideological vision of the "USSR as the Evil Empire," or is it seen as "allied against imperialism"?

Question: There are no absolute truths in politics. There are relative truths at the time and place in which we are speaking. In France, for example, there is a political microclimate which defines itself as antitotalitarian and which sees the USSR in terms of the Stalinist experiment and its consequences. I think this is a mistake. The USSR is changing and it is a much more complicated country than the Gulag. There is another form of myopia in the Third World. It is accustomed to seeing the USSR as the rearguard of the national liberation movements. This is a pure abstraction which ignores the situation of the countries of East Europe and Afghanistan and, finally, the backward character of social and political life in the Soviet Union.

Question: Yours is the classic centrist discourse.

Answer: I know. For this reason, I am seen as anti-Soviet in the Third World and pro-soviet in intellectual circles in Paris. And this is the problem with having a balanced vision.

Question: You say that the USSR has no future as an expansionist power. Isn't it a paradox that this is how you see a superpower which in recent years has extended its influence to Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Angola, while the United States was losing some of its influence in Asia and such faithful allies as Somoza and the Shah of Iran?

Answer: I believe that the United States won the war in Vietnam. They lost at the military level, but they gained, politically, throughout Asia. The American presence has never been as strong as it is today in Southeast Asia, Japan and China. Thus, they won the war. Today, actually, wars are not won with arms, but at the economic, cultural and commercial levels. Moreover, the United States has tipped the overall East-West military balance in its favor, particularly by virtue of its progress with Star Wars technology.

Question: So the expansionist question is still based, in the last analysis, on military power.

Answer: It is true that the USSR is competitive with the United States in the arms area. Otherwise, it is very far behind. But a modern power is no longer a military base because the nuclear deterrent prevents a major war. What is the purpose of amassing so many armored divisions? They are an unproductive expense. Today, power is based on science and technology. When the society cannot benefit from the scientific progress--which is the case in the USSR--it is an underdeveloped society. The armed forces do not weigh in this.



Their psychological threat can be activated but their actual use in a ground war is almost impossible because, I reiterate, of the nuclear deterrent. The Soviets have nothing to offer the Third World but tanks and Kalachnikovs. But the era of the colonial wars is past. The poor countries need capital, engineers and computer systems, which they cannot get from the Soviet Union. In Europe, the Soviets have very few unconditional defenders. They are either met with polite indifference or visceral hostility. It seems to me that, at this time, the important issues are the image, the computers, the communications satellites, the microprocessors, artificial intelligence, the capacity to store, process, and distribute information. This is where the power lies. In this race, the Soviets are behind. Today, the USSR is an empire which is administering its conquests. Afghanistan is a demonstration that to seek new conquests is to invite new difficulties.

Question: Couldn't these disadvantages make the Soviet empire more aggressive?

Answer: This is the theory of Jean-Francois Revel and the French Right. I don't believe it is well founded. It is one thing to have an aggressive policy; it is something else to have the means to carry it out. The Soviets do not have the means. The important thing to know is not what they want to do but what they are capable of doing. It is not a question of good or ill will.

It is a question of the relationship of forces. As long as there is a balance of power, the Soviets will not be able to use their military advantage in Europe. So France has the defense policy that you know about. I am not a pacifist. Peace is achieved with a balance of power.

6362

CSO: 3542/28

## UNIFICATION OF SECURITY CORPS SEEN MISSING GOAL

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 3 Nov 85 p 27

[Text] The intrinsic problems concerning the unification of the security corps get bigger every day as they are becoming more acute lately in a geometric progression, threatening to jeopardize the unification itself which, as is generally agreed, constitutes a substantial achievement of the PASOK government.

The problems which are accumulating because those at the head of the Ministry of Public Order have become rather inept at dealing with them threaten the very cohesiveness of the Greek Police, especially since some claim that an attempt by some high officials--with proven democratic convictions--to uproot the ELAS [Greek Police] can be detected.

Today the Greek Police is faced with undeniable phenomena of discord which have the most serious repercussions on the quality of security and the efficiency of the police services offered to the whole of society. Police bulletins that are getting ever bulkier and "richer" every day are an undeniable testimony to those phenomena.

It is now common knowledge that although numerous steps, at least "visible" ones, were taken to unify the security corps (same uniforms, badges etc.) nevertheless nothing at all was really done to unify...the spirit of the police officers who come from the two corps. In the precincts the prevailing climate is very bad for those who come from the "other" corps and constitute a "minority" in a particular precinct.

A series of administrative measures, particularly in the area of transfers, compounded the problem and created pockets of opposition among police officers where comradeship should reign between them in the face of crime.

The reproach made to the present civilian heads of the Ministry of Public Order is that they have made no attempt whatever to achieve this aim, wasting their energies on trivial matters such as the one that arose recently, namely, whether in official ceremonies police officers should wear...swords, following the precedent of officers of the armed forces.

The essential matter lies elsewhere:

That the heads of the Ministry of Public Order are proceeding by slow but

steady steps to militarize the Greek Police, a fact whose consequences it is impossible to discern now.

With regard to this, it is mentioned that one of the original aims of the unification of the security corps was their demilitarization and their coming under the control of the civilian heads of the Ministry of Social Order.

Now, for unknown reasons, the demilitarization of the police is being abandoned, and before there is any proof of what and how much can be expected from that model, the establishment of a Corps headquarters is being promoted, a development which means that control of the ELAS slips out of the hands of the civilian heads of the Ministry of Public Order and gets into those of the administration of the Corps.

Connected to the whole issue of the Greek Police which, curiously, has been left to its fate in the sense that it elicits no one's interest at a higher political level, is the issue of the rumored retirement of Lieutenant General Manolis Bosinakis and Major General Stelios Tzanakis.

Officially, the reason invoked for their (rumored) retirement is that in the case of the KYP [Central Intelligence Service] agent Danos Krystallis' arrest they acted without informing the civilian heads of the ministry, with the result that the familiar problems of relations between the KYP and the Police were revealed. Particularly where Mr. Bosinakis is concerned, those in favor of his being retired, who have strong contacts in the government machine, charge him with his genuinely bad relations with the KYP director of counter-espionage, Lieutenant Colonel Ioannis Alexakis, and claim that the Krystallis case "surfaced" precisely because of the personal conflict between the Lieutenant General of the ELAS and the high-ranking officer of the KYP.

However, it is also a fact that, apart from the concrete accusations, the circles agitating to have Messrs. Bosinakis and Tzanakis retired, also exploit the general mud-slinging.

According to evaluations of members of the Greek Police as well as of the Ministry of Public Order, the attempt to retire the two generals must be ascribed to the feud for succession to the top of the Corps, a feud that broke out behind the scenes between the highest ranking officers belonging to the former Gendarmerie and to the former Urban Police. The rumored retirement, the same objective observers emphasize, means nothing more than that, at this point, the hands that pull all the strings in the Greek Police belong to those who came from the former Gendarmerie. The result of this reality being that the succession is being prepared for someone who will again be coming from the Gendarmerie, whereas all signs had been pointing to the lieutenant general, Mr. Manolis Bosinakis, as head of the ELAS after the eventual retirement of its present head, Mr. Romosios. (If, in the end, Mr. Bosinakis is retired, the "favorite" for the position of head of the Greek Police is Lieutenant General Ioannis Stavrakas).

However, up to this point nothing has sealed the fate of Messrs. Bosinakis and Tzanakis, and this because their meeting with the premier, Mr. Andreas

Papandreou, that was planned for ten days ago but was postponed, has not taken place yet.

Meanwhile, those who come from the former Urban Police are faced with a most serious problem with regard to information about the possible retirement of the two generals. According to information that has been verified as accurate, officers of the Greek Police have sided with Messrs. Bosinakis and Tzanakis, but as they are government sympathizers they have to remain nameless.

Naturally one cannot believe everything that is being rumored about mass resignations of democratic officers in case Messrs. Bosinakis and Tzanakis are retired, but the stepped-up disinformation around the two generals and the studied refusal to take a clear stance on the issue of the alternate minister of the interior and public order, Mr. Th. Tsouras, have led to the disruption of key services in the ministry and the ELAS, a situation that is at the citizens' expense.

12278

CSO: 3521/34

## CIVILIAN CONTROL OF KYP PLANNED IN TEN YEARS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 6 Nov 85 p 7

[Article by reporter Mikh. Kanimas: "Demilitarization Ten Years Hence"]

[Text] The Central Intelligence Service [KYP] will remain in the hands of the military for at least another ten years after its expected return to "civilian" control. This is what is specified by the presidential decree regarding the new organization that will take charge, which states that demilitarization will be gradual and will be completed in ten years. At that point, the number of the military serving in the KYP is foreseen as being limited to 50 individuals (versus 350 at present), but they will hold the most sensitive positions. From that standpoint, they will totally control the service. The presidential decree, however, does not specify a timetable for the withdrawal of the military from the KYP, nor does it include binding provisions to that effect. Thus it gives the government an opportunity to remain unconcerned about the matter of demilitarization on the one hand, and to be in a position on the other hand, through further presidential decrees, to change the service's orientation, which is a return to civilian control foreseen by law No 1415/84.

With a new organization, the processing of which has been completed and is expected to be submitted soon to the president of the republic for his signature, the military continue to manage the various services such as, for example, espionage, counterespionage, communications, the Security Bureaus and the terrorism section which is being maintained. They will retain those same privileges after "demilitarization" is completed. Civilian employees are entrusted with the control (administration) of the personnel and typing pool directorates and of the sections in charge of processing political information. Civilian employees will be promoted normally, only in services not controlled by the military, who will serve for only a maximum of three years in the KYP. The spirit of article 11 of the Junta decree No 360/69 with the force of law, which put a sergeant above any civilian employee regardless of his qualifications or what service he belonged to, pervades the presidential decree.

#### The Head

The provision that the head of the KYP can be a civilian, who will have the status of a civil servant or a diplomat, is viewed as an innovation of the



presidential decree. According to the new organization, its head could also be a military person in active service or a retired officer.

Two more positions for seconds in command, who will have the same status as the director, are projected.

While the presidential decree foresees an increase in the positions held by civilian employees of the KYP, to 1,800 versus 1,500 today, it neither restructures, merges nor eliminates services of the KYP, and does not restore the vested rights and incentives of the civilian employees which the PASOK had abolished. Those were the secrecy and productivity allowance (50% of the basic salary), the dangerous work allowance and the right of recognition of the 5 fictive years enjoyed by the military.

The presidential decree is the work of a committee appointed by the premier which consists of the alternate minister of national defense, Mr. Ant. Drosoyannis, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Ioannis Kapsis, the head of the KYP, General G. Politis and the premier's advisers, Messrs. Ant. Livanis and Mikh. Ziogas.

According to information, the attempt to demilitarize the KYP was opposed by the military who, as it is rumored, extracted the "promise" that at least during the first stage of implementation of the new organization, the head of the KYP will belong to the military. It is also rumored that the first steps in demilitarization will be taken with the actual boss of the KYP, Mr. G. Politis, as its head.

#### Not Even Symbolically

As reliable circles note, the new organization of the KYP does not ensure even symbolically the demilitarization of the service which, according to law No 1215/84 is a clearly political and independent service under the premier's direct control. They stress that the enactment of the 3-year period as the maximum time limit for officers to serve in the KYP is insufficient for them to become informed and adequately proficient in staff duties, and they underline that decrees such as these should be enacted with special laws so that points can be debated in parliament.

In fact, according to one view, the above mentioned presidential decree cannot abrogate provisions of law No 380/69, for the revision of which another law is required.

12278  
CSO: 3521/34

## ND DISORGANIZATION, LACK OF OPPOSITION RAPPED

Athens KYRIAKATI KI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 27 Oct 85 p 48

[Editorial by Panos Loukakos: "Why ND is Not 'Alternative Solution' Today"]

The recent economic measures and the ensuing dispute did not expose only the government's weaknesses.

They proved once more that there is today no credible main opposition which can both oppose, obviously, the government's policies and in the long term constitute an alternative solution. Thus the problem nowadays is not only what the government does or doesn't do. It is also the New Democracy's inability to advance convincing political arguments and adequately play the role of chief opposition. A role which, in the final analysis, is not strictly a party one since, manifestly, a strong opposition always makes the government more careful.

Among the high officials of the New Democracy there is a common feeling today that the leader of the party, Mr. K. Mitsotakis, failed in what he had been elected for, and that consequently he must be removed from the leadership of the party. The reasoning being that Mr. Mitsotakis had been elected as the "anti-Andreas" of the New Democracy, to wage the battle of the elections "with the same weapons the PASOK used." But the New Democracy suffered a crushing defeat in the elections and its leader failed to justify the hopes that went with his election. At the same time, since he came from the wing of the Center and not from the Right, he remained a foreign body within the New Democracy, as his opponents within the party say.

Thus the recent vote of confidence for which Mr. Mitsotakis asked was voted more as a necessary evil, to avoid a deep rift within the party, and much less because the majority of the ND's parliamentary group wants him for a leader. And it is here, perhaps, that one of the chief points of the opposition party's leadership problem can be found. Though they don't want Mr. Mitsotakis, they are scared to overthrow him. They are scared because they fear that his being overthrown might trigger a further split in the ND, a split which this time would be both deep and final.

For the first question that arises is, what could happen if Mr. Mitsotakis were overthrown? Thus, at this point, an alternative solution does not exist. According to one of the scenarios that are circulating, Mr. Rallis,

summoned from the reserve, could succeed Mr. Mitsotakis. But there are some obstacles to that solution. First, that Mr. Rallis was voted down in the past by the ND's parliamentary group. And second, that if Mr. Rallis were elected, not only Mr. Mitsotakis would leave the main opposition but quite possibly Mr. Averof too, as well as a group of deputies who, in the older quarrel between "Rallis and Averof followers" had clashed with the former premier.

The second scenario that can be heard today in the bosom of the main opposition is the designation to the leadership of a younger member. According to the logic of that version, all the old ones were tried and failed, and now the time has come for the New Democracy to proceed to a renewal in depth by promoting to the leadership its younger members. But here also there are obstacles. First, the younger members who consider they can assume the leadership number over five, and it is an impossibility that they will accept a solution which would not focus on their person. Second, the "elders" would never anoint an individual whom they felt they could not control. Consequently, it would be almost impossible to achieve a majority in a normal election.

All inside the New Democracy see and know that there can be no majority centered on one person today. Not only because the older groups have broken down and no one can orient an adequate number of deputies in this or that direction, so that through deals at the summit firm majorities can be formed. But also because the Damocles' sword of a rift hangs over every attempt that is made.

Thus at present there is an opposition problem. Not strictly a party problem, for then it would be of no interest to those outside the New Democracy. But, more generally, a political problem since a normal course for the nation requires not only a government but also an opposition. And these days the principal opposition is totally unable to play its role. If for one reason or another the present government relinquished power, it is certain that chaos would ensue. Because at that very moment, the way portfolios and offices are distributed, the New Democracy would disintegrate into the elements that composed it.

It is precisely this that is a dangerous historical cycle for the nation. In the years after 1974, there were strong New Democracy governments and there was also a very strong opposition, which expressed itself chiefly through the present premier, Mr. Andreas Papandreou. That is, the New Democracy's downfall was a blow to itself but not to the political life of this nation as well, since there was a ready alternative solution. Today there is no such alternative solution. And this is more generally dangerous. It creates a void, and voids in politics lead to more generally undesirable situations.

Today we have entered a crisis phase. A crisis which is political, social as well as economic. Strong party figureheads, that could function over and above persons, do not exist in Greece. Thus everything moves around Mr. Andreas Papandreou. Konstantinos Karamanlis is no longer president of the republic, there is no reliable leader to succeed the actual premier, so what is to happen when at some point, at the destined time, the hour of the PASOK

to complete its cycle as a government strikes?

The New Democracy which, despite today's critical conditions sleeps the sleep of the just and only bestirs itself to mobilize housewives in the squares, must provide the answer to this question.

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## PASOK SAID TO HAVE LOST POPULAR TRUST

Athens ELEVTEROTYPIA in GREEK 2 Nov 85 p 9

[Excerpts from an article by Vasilis Filias: "Questions Awaiting Answers"]

[Text] However optimistic one is, one cannot help worrying about the turn events are taking. Questions such as "where are we going?" and "what is going to happen?" are among the first people ask themselves.

Signs of erosion, inefficiency and disorganization are manifest everywhere and recur every day.

The PASOK government has managed to exhaust the huge reserves of almost total trust, "veneration" and approval the people freely gave it. We don't wish to be nor are we unfair, but nothing confirms this claim of ours better than the events of the last two or three months, that came as a final touch to the tactics and mentality which sealed the course of the government party after the '81 elections. What are the characteristics of these tactics and mentality?

First, what jurists call a "contradiction between statement and intent" that is, in this specific case, failing to act in accordance with what is being said.

Second, taking initiatives and measures without studying all-around consequences, resulting in disfunctions, retractions, oscillations, with a consequent loss of prestige for the government.

Third, secretiveness and unpredictability in matters where information and exchanges are essential to mutual understanding in society, without which no significant measures have any chance of success.

Fourth, a populist resilience which shakes and disintegrates social structures without conversely increasing the real coefficient of responsible popular participation in the critical sectors of the nation's public life.

Fifth, a tendency to improvisation and amateurishness which goes together with the promotion of unqualified persons, inappropriate and uninformed, at the decision-making level.

Sixth, "bending the rules" (as jurists would put it again), that is, bypass-



ing institutions by creating parallel "channels" and procedures.

Seventh, cultivating a "conspiratorial" and alarmist climate aimed at creating situations that pose a dilemma to the people, of the type: "without us, or after us, cataclysm."

Eighth, the attempt to blow small matters out of proportion or, on the contrary, to minimize big ones, so as to form each time an image of reality that "suits" the government.

Ninth, a determination of the government party to dominate and control all the expressions of collective and trade union [activities].

Tenth, avoiding the ascription of responsibilities where they really belong and, conversely, avoiding provision of any explanation about developments in the government's work.

The consequences are known, and we have had particularly striking examples of late.

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## LEFT URGED TO ASSUME FITTING RESPONSIBILITIES

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 3 Nov 85 p 8

[Article by Y. Massavetas: "The Left Faced With Historical Responsibilities"]

[Text] The nation truly finds itself at a critical turn. Not, of course, because there are strikes. Nor because someone planted a bomb. A bomb blows up a democracy when it is not solidly built. When it is ready to topple on its own. The democracies that work properly don't get blown up that easily. They don't get destabilized at the least provocation.

If, for instance, in Italy the parties were not determined to defend democracy in every possible way, if contacts between government and opposition were not so soundly established, if above all there was no respect and safeguarding of institutions, then what should have happened there, where bombings cost innumerable lives, where blind political violence had reached extremes?

But democracy remained steady and triumphed. It remained in its place to witness the decay and degeneration of terrorism. Because no one viewed those phenomena as a golden opportunity for an attempt to expand power, to weaken the role of the other parties or the trade unions.

If our own democracy still appears to be terror-stricken, this is due to the weakness of its parties. Of its political leadership. And chiefly to the undermining of the regime for which the parties themselves, which blow up the bridges of cooperation and communication between them, are responsible.

Until yesterday the PASOK was blowing up the bridges of communication with the Right. Now it shows a determination, a maniacal effort to "cut itself off" from the Left. To emerge as the sole guarantor of a democratic course, of legal and social order. And, if possible, to push that Left to the periphery.

Today, however, this Left which has so exhausted itself is invited to assume its responsibilities. The dangerous factor in our political life is that we have a government which discourages the people more every day, a main opposition which doesn't inspire them with any confidence as a possible alternative solution and a Left which offers no hope. A Left plunged until now in its own internecine war. Clinging to outdated stereotypes. With anachronistic slogans and ways of thinking and acting. And this concerns not only a segment of this Left but its entirety.

During the political crisis of March, this Left found itself [in the role] of comical rear guard in a game played chiefly at its expense. And it emerged as hawking precisely the opposite of what it really wished to happen. Even its supposedly more progressive segment presented an image lacking credibility, which grievously wounded it. Because it was dragged into the anti-Karamanlis hysteria even though...it was praying for Karamanlis' election. But it lacked the courage to take openly a political stance which went against the current that was artificially contrived. It thus accepted the legalization, sometimes through its cooperation and sometimes through its silence, of methods which undermined the prestige of institutions. It accepted everything. From colored ballots to parliament abolishing itself, rejecting the advice of the investigating committee in charge, under the stricture that it might be accused of siding with the Right. But in democracies, the tactical coincidence of factions with different ideologies to protect institutions, is essential, it is a necessity and not an occasion for rhetorical imprecations.

The latest political decision of the KKE gives hope that most of the Left has decided to rid itself of its complexes and actively enter political life as one of the nation's political forces which has the same rights and the same obligations as the others for a smooth functioning of the democratic regime, as a regime of dialogue, of mingling, of cooperation, of consensus and not of the blowing up of bridges.

On the other hand, everything that is being debated inside the [KKE of the "Interior" gives hope that the leaders of that party will be finally rid of the constraints of proving that it is the one which represents true communism in Greece. Of the constraints of the iconolatry of the hammer and sickle and of persisting in an endless lawsuit for the distribution of an indivisible inheritance which has already been made legal by others through usucaption [long practice].

The leaders of the KKE (Int.) are responsible for the degeneration of the most wonderful hope to be born within the Greek Left. As well as for the killing of an experiment which had already succeeded and which was the envy of Italian communists. That is, of the political vehicle EDA [United Democratic Left] which was the answer to the challenge to overcome the historical rift between socialists and communists.

It was a huge wealth which they allowed to evaporate. Appearing thus today as a schema with a "given" political presence. Today they are offering us some hope. The search for a new persona. But they are in danger of committing another error. Because in none of the position statements that we read did we see that anyone was interested in the prospect of reassembling the "United Democratic Left".

Today the Left has decisive responsibilities toward the future course of the nation. It is invited to play the role of the guarantor of a normal democratic course, respecting all the rules. But new strength is needed. A strength that can be achieved only by overcoming all those factors which prevent a

concrete cooperation between its segments, as well as the practices which bog down its credibiliity, the range of its political message to such low levels.

The time has come for the Left to rid itself of its constraints. Both those of "orthodoxy" and of "progressiveness." Otherwise it will be the first to pay for this crisis, this feeling of political decay which is becoming dangerously stronger every day.

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## 'DESTABILIZATION ' ACTIVITIES SEEN ONLY WITHIN PASOK

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 3 Nov 85 p 48

[Excerpts From an Article by Panos Loukakos: "Who Is Endangered by Whom And Why"]

[Text] Destabilization, then. And anomalous solutions. And the climate of 1965.

So, what destabilization, why a destabilization and who causes it?

Barely five months have passed since the June elections, which gave the PASOK an impressive majority. So who could be thinking today of overthrowing by abnormal procedures a government supported by such a recent popular verdict?

Could it be the army? At this point it is certain it is not. There is neither the proper climate that could lead to a military intervention, nor are there today such foolishly ambitious officers who could ignore that those who made such an attempt in the past are still in Korydallos. [Athens prison]

The "traditional Left"? There is no doubt that, even if it wished to, it lacks at present the mechanisms which could lead to anomalous solutions. But at any rate it has no reason whatever to make such an attempt. Because if an anomalous solution is resorted to, the Communists will be the first to be called to account, as is always the case.

The Right? Today it anything but moves outside the framework of parliamentary politics. Contrary to 1965, it doesn't have even the smallest wing that would agree to or cover anomalous solutions.

The Americans? This is no longer 1965. And American services know very well that nowadays they can't overthrow a Greek government. Besides, they have no reason to do so. It is with this government that they negotiated the continuance of the bases, and it is with this same government that they are negotiating an extension of their continued activities here. While the overall climate prevailing in Greek-American relations is anything but a climate of acute confrontation.

Therefore, the "vehicle"--to use an in word--that will bring about the anomalous solution is missing. But, furthermore, the conditions that could lead



to such an overthrow are totally missing. Because an overthrow presupposes a general lack of government and general chaos as was the case in Greece in the pre-dictatorship years.

Therefore, since today conditions for a destabilization are lacking and because "destabilizers" don't appear to exist, we should perhaps look elsewhere for the causes of this startling alarmism: to the response and reactions elicited by the economic measures.

So, the economic measures led eight PASOK trade unionists to "remove themselves from the Movement." They led to reshufflings in the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] which removed Mr. Raftopoulos from its head. They led to admittedly odd judicial actions which took justice out of the courts. They led to justified and moreover predictable reactions from the communist left and trade union organizations which, according to the government, put them outside the pale of democratic legality. And who is left within? Only those who applaud the measures, applaud the expulsion of fellow-militants and anything else they are told to applaud?

All of which lead to the conclusion that if there is some kind of destabilization today, it exists inside the PASOK and not outside of it. Because all the occurrences of recent days are clear examples of a lack of level-headedness.

When the government announced its economic measures, it cannot have failed to foresee reactions. And surely those reactions and the ones that will follow cannot overthrow it. Governments have never fallen in Greece because they took harsh economic measures. Neither can legitimate public discontent, under present conditions, lead to anomalous situations.

On the other hand, what gives rise to the problem is the lack of level-headedness these days. Because it is precisely this lack of level-headedness which prevents establishing the suitable climate which is essential if the economic measures are to be productive.

Because this lack of level-headedness creates the feeling of a governmental destabilization which, under the circumstances, is unjustified.

Unless, of course, something else of which we are not aware is happening. Unless the government has some other kind of information which shows that something more general, more serious and dangerous is evolving behind scenes unknown to us. If such a thing exists, and it seems unlikely that it does, let the government inform the Greek people, so that all can confront the danger together.

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## AREAS OF COMPETENCE DEFINED IN PASOK EXECUTIVE BUREAU

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 3 Nov 85 p 10

/Text/ The duties and responsibilities of the members of the new PASOK Central Committee Executive Bureau were assigned yesterday. Also assigned their duties and responsibilities were the secretaries of all party sectors. The following assignments were made:

Organizational Sector: Khatzopoulos, Sotirlis and Papoutsis. Enlightenment Sector: Skandalidis, Givalos and Tzoumakas. Youth Sector: Papoutsis, Skandalidis and Tzoumakas. Trade Union Sector: Souladakis and Tzoumakas. Cooperative Sector: Giotas, Mamalakis and Tzoumakas. Cultural Sector: Souladakis and Karaveli; Women's Sector: Kypriotakis and Karaveli. Local Problems Sector: Khatzopoulos, Karaveli and Souladakis. Economic Sector: Mamalakis and Souladakis. International Relations Sector: Karaveli and Tsokhatzopoulos; Support for Government Program and Parliamentary Control Sector: Giotas, Givalos and Sotirlis. Support Committees Sector: Giotas, Papoutsis and Sotirlis. Problems of Greeks Abroad Sector: Sotirlis and Kypriotaki.

The mobilization bureau will have direct liaison with the executive bureau and specifically with Khr. Papoutsis, even though he is a member of the Organizational Committee. The same holds true for the press bureau that belongs to the Enlightenment Sector. Responsible officers are Givalos and Skandalidis.

## Secretaries

The new secretaries are the following: Local Self-Administration: Vasilis Papagiannakis; Kapetanakis and Kharalambous, alternate secretaries. Economic: D. Sapountzis. International Relations: Vasilis Konstandineas; Mandzouranis and P. Nearkhos, alternate secretaries. Support for Government Task: Manolis Khatzinakis. Support Committee: Kedikoglou; Markakis, alternate secretary. Greeks Abroad: Zarlis; G. Kissonas, alternate secretary. Organizational: Pandelis Oikonomou; K. Malesios and N. Mikhalopoulos, alternate secretaries. Enlightenment: Giannis Papadatas; Vourkouvalidis and F. Petsalnikos, alternate secretaries; Youth: Thanasis Papageorgiou; Mangriotis, Karydis and Papadogiannakis, alternate secretaries. Cooperatives: Aslanis; Makis Konstandinou and Giannis Khardalias, alternate secretaries. Trade Union: Made up of a three-man secretariat composed of Spyros Kaloudis, Loukas Apostolidis and Giannis Koulaxis. Cultural: Andonis Tritsis; Rena Lambraki, alternate secretary. Women: Maria Kypriotaki; G. Praxiadou and Ar. Bourdara, alternates. Press Bureau: N. Athanasakis; Mobilization Bureau: G. Papagioutakopoulos; Takis Giambouranis, alternate.

## POSSIBLE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN KKE, KKE(INT) ARGUED

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 24 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by T. Papadopoulos]

[Text] PASOK's antipopular front, expressed with the announcement of the new measures which directly hit the workers, has come to tear down the pre-electoral sloganizing about better days; at the same time, by revealing the current power's mask, which has been maintained with deceitful machinations, it has come upon the procedures for another confrontation with the government by the traditional Left.

The picture given today by both the KKE and KKE(Int) is that of reorganizing the forces, with prospects for cooperation to jointly confront PASOK in the imminent municipal elections.

The procedures in KKE(Int) to change both the party's title and physiognomy are facilitating contact between the two parties.

RIZOSPASTIS has already toned down, while I AVGI is not being bothersome.

The word splintering has entered the KKE's official documents and "legalized" the second communist party which emerged after 1968.

In the parliament, the KKE has extended helping hands, seeking for the voice of one deputy to be heard, while at the same time it has shown itself a supporter of Leonidas Kyrkos' demand to acquire a proper shelter in the Chamber of Deputies.

#### The Re-Evolution of KKE(Int)

The prospect of the KKE Interior's re-evolving has particularly encouraged the KKE in these steps toward rapprochement.

The recent electoral result, which shrank the KKE and gave a parliamentary representation to the KKE(Int), was at the same time a message that PASOK is drawing power from the communist Left, since the slogan, "PASOK or the Right," has finally come through positively for the governing party.

The presence of the KKE(Int), even if with only one seat, in the Greek Parliament and Chamber, has belied the hopes and expectations of those who believed that, sooner or later, the prodigal son would again be incorporated in the KKE.

The differentiations, applied daily, in the positions of the KKE(Int), and its withdrawal from the line professed by the orthodox, pro-Soviet tendency, divided de facto the two parties. Its title is a formal element of contraposition, while the differing direction is by now assumed.

Already, the president of the KKE(Int), in his speech to the Central Committee [KE] plenum last weekend, has rejected PASOK's absorbing the party in the coming municipal elections, and he did not exclude a partial cooperation with other parties.

Given the electoral system, cooperation of the two communist parties in the municipal elections is at the threshold.

This means that the "democratic forces" of the traditional Left have decided to shake off the yoke of PASOK, which wants them to follow it in every difficult circumstance, though it takes care to betray them the day after this favor.

#### The End of Insincere Friendship

It appears the era of insincere friendship between the two communist parties and PASOK has ended irrevocably. This can be seen from the stance of these two parties toward the conservative faction. They no longer deny its liberty-loving character, they have eliminated the epithets of denunciations and they are inclined to go along with the anti-PASOK campaign.

But the alliance is not restricted to the leftist area.

The two communist parties do not exclude cooperation with the other side either.

Both L. Kyrkos, in his speech last Saturday to the KKE(Int) KE, and the resolution of the KKE Central Committee plenum issued on the same day, reject the bogymen of the Right which PASOK has cultivated for its own benefit, and place the liberal bourgeoisie among the broadest democratic forces.

#### The Simple Proportional A Unifying Element

The bridge which apparently will unite the two sides in the immediate future is the simple proportional system.

A permanent and firm demand of the two communist parties is establishment of the simple proportional system. Not that which PASOK called the simple proportional, which was only a variation of the reinforced system, but an electoral system which will distribute the seats more analytically and will not endow the great ones or the first one.

And this is because, in the conservative area, where until yesterday no one talked about the simple proportional, the voices supporting it are multiplying daily. First G. Boutos supported it. K. Stefanopoulos followed. And finally, G. Varvitsiotis and G. Palaiokrassas have now become its supporters from the New Democracy area.

The prime minister has not taken a position on this demand, which will broaden as long as the two largest parties exhibit centrifugal tendencies. Before the elections, he had let it be understood that the demand is being re-examined.

It is clear that, for the prime minister, the simple proportional is a scenario which will be played out only if in the future--near or far, it makes no difference--he aspires to the presidency.

As it broadens, the demand makes it easy for him to use it at any moment, with the justification that he was heeding the common desire. Such a development will result in multi-splintering and, particularly significant, the role of regulator in the governments of many parties. In this way, he escapes the bitter cup of the economy which from here on out will be the government's permanent anguish since everyone agrees that none of the measures can deliver if not combined with a dynamic developmental policy, which is not visible.

#### "Gains" From the Expulsions

At any rate, the economic situation is a unifying element for the leftist area, which is looking forward to broader benefits with the prospect of absorbing the trade-unionists recently expelled by PASOK.

And, as was shown by the administrative councils of the large organizations which applauded the trade-unionists' stance, these people represent not only themselves; aligned with them are many workers who were ensnared by PASOK's unguaranteed, pre-electoral phraseology.

So rearrangements in the area of the Left, beyond changing the KKE Interior's title, are assumed.

They have been accelerated by events, but also the ideas which have ripened in the two rival communist parties.

The fruits of these procedures and cooperations will be counted in the municipal elections, although this does not mean that the political formations are not getting ready.

With the prospect of some early political developments. The theater of politics is under way. The whole troupe is on stage.

The elections did not help to relax things because it was revealed, post ipso facto, that there are many hidden cards--economic ones--which have led to a new turmoil.

The efforts to shift responsibility for the measures to the past have not succeeded.

The violations and national security are the new game which has been taken up to disorient.

This time the Left has not agreed to follow PASOK.

A collision is unavoidable. But alliances, both kindred ones and dissimilar ones, are visible and evident.

(Editor's Note: The opinions expressed in this article are independent and not binding on MESIMVRINI, nor do they necessarily express its political line.)

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## SCENARIOS FOR DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN PASOK

Athens I ANDI in Greek 25 Oct 85 pp 4-5

[Excerpts] In the beginning, the reaction from Kastri was four words only: "Expel them! Expel them!". Later in Kastri, more mature thoughts prevailed: Since we are "freezing" wages and salaries for two years, let us also "freeze" the expulsions temporarily. And let us try to load the agitation and wave of strikes on third parties, on certain "deviative associates who have reasons to undermine Allagi"....

It is commonplace that people in Kastri behave as if they live on another planet. And this despite the fact that they knew--and still know--that the first reaction to the notorious government economic measures came from their own trade-unionists, who are members of PASOK's Central Committee or distinguished trade-union cadres with abundant activity in critical sectors of the trade-union movement.

It is being said that Prime Minister Papandreou did not expect the popular reaction and wave of strikes to take such dimensions. And that, terribly annoyed, he is avoiding meeting even with close colleagues, such as Minister to the Prime Minister A. Tsokhatzopoulos or Minister of Interior M. Koutsogiorgas. On the other hand, it is reported that the PASOK Executive Office's statement, which characterized the strike on Monday almost as a fiasco, gave him the feeling that he is being deceived by his colleagues: "They do not inform me, they misinform me!".

This, of course, in no way means that the prime minister disagreed--or disagrees--with the "line" of the Executive Office statement, in which everything is charged to a certain "atypical front" between the reactionary Right and the "blind" Left, "ignorant of history."

## Oppositions Within New Democracy

Of course, such a front does not exist.

RIZOSPASTIS notes that "similar neo-conservative, anti-popular measures" had been announced before the elections by New Democracy, which today "agrees with the essence of the government measures." Therefore, according to RIZOSPASTIS, there is no "co-navigating" between ND and the Left; on the contrary, there is a "holy alliance" between the government, the Association of Greek Industrialists and the "very broad conservative world."

In any case, it is certain that, within ND, there is no common approach to confronting these measures. "If we were the government," say certain leading ND cadres, "and our economy had reached the sorry state it has reached ('Naturally, PASOK's fault,' they explain) we would apply similar measures."

#### Some Perverse 'Scenarios'

Of course, the PASOK leadership denies there is any "turn" to conservatism. "We are building socialism," they say, even if we lose our credibility, even if the prospect drawn by the new government measures is aggravating all the economic conditions.

Nevertheless, behind these announcements (with the evocation of even Mikhail Gorbachev) is a diffuse anxiety about where the differentiations, and proceedings being completed at this moment within PASOK, may lead.

The PASOK leadership believes that with the mutilation of the ATA [Automatic Cost of Living Readjustment], two-year freezing of salaries, cancellation of all public investment programs, and EEC loan (the latest information refers to a loan of two billion European Monetary Units), and perhaps with some increased rent for the U.S. bases, the Greek economy can take a breather. But life does not roll on with prayer books. Cancelling the public investment programs means an increase in unemployment.... And "increased rent for the bases" means that the bases (or at least part of the bases) will remain in Greece--a condition placed by the Americans so the official invitation can come from Reagan! Who will pay the political cost of increased unemployment, or the bases staying, when you have educated your adherents with deceptive slogans like: "The struggle is now justified," or, "Bases go home"? And what will happen with "socialism" when everyone looks for it and it is nowhere to be found?

Of course, some perverse scenarios--in the area of conjecture--exist. One of these, for example, could be "expanding" the present government schema by embracing center-right cadres, who could be called simply "technocrats," of the Zolotas, Pepelasis, etc. type. Who would object? And, above all, who would accuse PASOK of betraying the "socialist transformation" because it turned to the good services of "technocrats"?

A second scenario could be the prime minister jumping to the presidency of the republic, since the current president, Khr. Sartzetakis, "looks at politics as he would a legal document"! (In such a case, part of the constitutional amendments approved by the previous Chamber of Deputies--after the 9 March surprise--could be not promoted and the president of the republic could keep certain powers in his hands.) Such a jump, which certain government factors place around the end of 1986, could be achieved in exchange for certain trade-offs (for example, the simple proportional), or some "accommodations" to K. Stefanopoulos or certain ND cadres.

Finally, there is always the solution of "distractions" which, as long as they are dangerous--particularly when touching on sensitive areas such as the Aegean--can, at any given moment, help in downplaying the most acute economic problems. Furthermore, the "good" (pro-government) press usually goes "as far as possible," as happened last Wednesday with the "Saratoga" and the U.S. Turkish violations.

The conclusion--not at all original: The times remain exceptionally difficult. And tricky. And everyone gets his responsibilities.

## REPORTED PURPOSE OF PROTEST AGAINST U.S. VIOLATIONS

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 24 Oct 85 p 4

[Article by K. Skouras]

[Excerpts] One only had to take a look at yesterday's pro-government newspapers and read the headlines on the front pages to understand what this sudden anti-American outburst aimed at, with the excessive dramatizing of the violation of Greek airspace by U.S. and Turkish aircraft on the margin of the maneuvers which took place in the Aegean's international waters after the allied exercise "Display Determination 85."

The headlines were so strident, so excessive and farfetched, that they were almost to the point of creating the impression that Greece had been bombed by U.S. airplanes.

The government propaganda machine thought it had found the opportunity to disorient public opinion away from the one, colossal problem which currently not only concerns it, but is literally consuming it: the dreadful course of our economy.

Suddenly

It is not accidental, of course, that the government's sudden anti-American outburst was expressed on the same day the official opposition party organized its large protest rally in the center of Athens, the same day the strikes were continuing on a panhellenic scale, the same day the appropriate ministers in no way refuted that the Christmas bonus is not going to be paid to the workers, and the minister of national economy half stammered that the constitutional right to strike and publicly assemble "will not be suspended, at least for the present...."

In the midst of all this panhellenic earthquake, the government remembered to promote anti-Americanism as a method of disorienting public opinion.

At any rate, irregardless of the inexcusably excessive tone used by the government--for reasons which concern itself exclusively--violations are tending to become a custom now whenever there are allied maneuvers in the Aegean's international waters.

The U.S. position is firm: The United States does not think they are violating the national territory of any allied country when their aircraft, while

participating in allied exercises, enter the airspace of a friendly and allied country. This position is valid not only for the Aegean, but for the whole world, and it is known to the United States' allies (it is also known to the PASOK government which has learned it in practice in recent years).

The government communication is creating a problem connected directly to the United States, as well as a very important one concerning the general climate in the area where the exercise occurred, that is, in the Aegean. The first: How true is it that the U.S. aircraft-carrier "Saratoga" was present, and the entire U.S.-Turkish exercise took place in international waters, but the Greek Government had not been previously notified. In such a case, the actual firing created a real danger for the Greek, but also the international, air forces which could have been hit. The second, contiguous problem is, without a doubt, more burning for Greece. It concerns the flights, and violations of our national territory, by Turkish aircraft, irregardless of whether they occurred during an allied exercise.

On this point, the U.S. side had an obligation to show greater care and sensitivity since it knows very well the serious problems existing in the Aegean and can easily foresee how such actions by it encourage Turkish provocations and dangerously feed Ankara's ambitions.

#### Understanding

The new U.S. ambassador, Bob Kelly, should have warned his government since, in the unforgettable testimony he made to the Senate, he showed such a great understanding of and admiration for the positions supported by the PASOK government, distinguishing, in fact--to an insulting degree--the stance of all previous Greek governments.

He perhaps has appreciated that the bilateral relations are now entering, from developing affairs, a new phase, under conditions very difficult for the Greek Government.

A phase in which it will soon have to be decided formally that the bases will not be leaving, but will stay, that Greece has need of U.S. defensive aid and, in order to maintain the balance of forces in the Aegean, the government needs the U.S. contribution to confront--aside from other things--the very serious economic crisis which is threatening to blow up everything.

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CSO: 3521/29

## ECONOMIC MEASURES SEEN UNAVOIDABLE, POLITICALLY COSTLY

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 20 Oct 85 p 9

[Article by Potis Paraskevopoulos]

[Text] The government measures to save the economy have two aspects. One is unquestionably economic: If they are the most indicated. If they could have been less oppressive for the workers. If they will bring the result the government hopes for. If...if...if. Differences, partial criticisms and opinions exist, and have been expressed on these. But a complete and concrete counter-proposal has not been developed yet by any party from the Right or Left opposition. And this is not accidental.

The bunch of economic measures announced by the government is a strategically significant political choice. The PASOK leadership, after four years of wielding government power and the various experimentations in search of a non-capitalistic course for developing the economy, in the end chooses with its new economic policy--at least for the foreseeable future--a capitalistic course for the Greek economy. This is the political aspect of the government measures.

Everyone is confronting the question of whether the correlation of internal social forces, and the country's international commitments from its historic payments to the western political-economic-defense system, leave room for a radically opposite choice. Because this is the problem, and not the corrective interventions which may be made on some of the announced measures.

In four years of government power, the PASOK leadership has attempted ruptures in the political-economic establishment and in the network of Greece's western defensive allies. All, or nearly all, the anti-Right ruptures have been made successfully. The correlation of political and social forces allowed it. Impasses appear where there begin socialist improvisations, violations of the Greek economic reality, terrorizing of private initiative with socialist verbalism, rejection of a European orientation and a search for third-world supports. But socialism is a serious matter and no one can experiment with it with impunity, whenever he wishes.

PASOK failed precisely in its socialist experimentation. Today it is undertaking a turn, with a forced adjustment in the facts of the Greek economy. It is not too late to prevent economic collapse. It is, however, probably too late to regain the workers' faith in its socialist visions. It handled these frivolously



and failed as a socialist party, whereas it could have broadened the popular support if it had effectively completed the democratic, anti-Right reformation of the country's political and economic life. Then the workers and the economy and the republic would know better and better days, without retrogressions, with open roads for approaching the socialist visions.

Now it was to be expected that the necessary choice of tough economic measures would cause the workers' oppositions, and a political and ideological rupture in the PASOK area, which had been nourished with the "Third September" revolutionary proclamations and with "Socialism here and now."

With this choice, the atypical front of the forces of Allagi crumbles, once and for all we could say. The country's political map is changing. Other correlations of political and social forces are being created. And all this because the PASOK leadership, in the workers' consciousness, lost its socialist features because for four whole years it "played around a lot" with socialism.

It is characteristic--and, as we said above, not accidental--that the leftist opposition to the government measures does not have a completed, concrete and persuasive leftist solution to counterpropose to get us out of the economic crisis. The reactions are restricted mainly to protests about suspension of the ATA [Automatic Cost of Living Readjustment], without another, radically different strategy worked out.

But the ND leadership is also not counterproposing another solution. And it cannot because it would be refuting itself and its policy. It is only trying to politically exploit the popular reactions without being followed by the social forces it expresses politically. It is indicative that leading ND cadres are rejecting the negative stance of their leadership to the government measures and acknowledge they should be supported. Furthermore, the leader of ND has not rejected the measures--beyond his belated populism--and maintains only that the PASOK leadership cannot ensure their success because it has lost the trust of the productive classes.

All these show that these measures, as a strategic choice for stabilizing the economy, were unavoidable. They were made unavoidable by PASOK's government policy in the first four years. And here lies the responsibility of PASOK's party and government leadership.

But political mistakes also have unavoidable repercussions. And these will not delay in appearing on the political field.

9247

CSO: 3521/29

## SAKHAROV CASE BARES USSR 'CONTRADICTIONS'

PM111633 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 6 Dec 85 p 4

/Adriano Guerra commentary: "When the Scientist Dissents"/

/Text/ The fact that Yelena Bonner-Sakharova has been granted permission to return to Italy to consult the doctors she wants, following public pressure and her husband's hunger strikes, is certainly a good thing, and it is certainly also legitimate to regard it as indicative of possible interesting innovations in the Soviet Union's attitudes and stances. Of course it is still only the story, however dramatic and lamentable (consider what their children have now told us about Sakharov's days in Gorkiy), of a Soviet family. There is even a risk, one could add, that the excessive publicity and unscrupulous political exploitation of the case by the press (but also by foreign ministers, as we saw in the preparatory meetings for Geneva) could prompt boredom and symptoms of rejection. But we must continue to talk about Sakharov, both to continue asking for the Soviet physicist to be allowed to live where he wants and continue his studies and to enable the issue to permit the identification of important aspects of the Soviet situation.

Indeed, in this affair one rediscovers some of the elements--we are talking about the factors which led to the paralysis of the seventies and to the demand for change, which seems to be becoming increasingly pressing--that now form the complex problem of what reforms to introduce into the USSR, facing the new leadership group as it now does. Of course, the fact that the situation is not static is shown--as we were saying, and to cite just one instance--by the events of the past few days, with the granting of a visa to Mrs Sakharova. However, it is puzzling that the measure was taken--so one infers from the Soviet authorities' behavior--more as a "goodwill gesture" to the West (and especially the United States, which is itself not entirely immune from reproach for its policy on visas, however) than as a step designed to rectify previous decisions and thus to grant a Soviet citizen the right to travel abroad.

Moreover, it is extraordinary and worrying that the granting of the exit (and reentry) visa was made subject to Mrs Sakharova's pledge not to discuss political matters during her stay abroad. The least that can be said in this regard is that never, perhaps, has a "press blackout" been worse conceived. But since we are dealing not with errors but with a practice deriving from a particular concept of a citizen's duties and rights, one can conclude that here we have

come up against a measure which--perhaps because it was decided on with the intention simply of improving the USSR's world image--reveals the limitations and difficulties which the subject of reforms is still encountering in the USSR.

On the other hand, precisely what is happening does show that very farreaching and complex forms of action are needed if only to restore the country's image, which--as is now commonly acknowledged--was tarnished during the Brezhnev years. Without them (that is, without a policy whereby the Sakharov case, for instance, is resolved--however gradually it need be--proceeding from a recognition of all citizens' right to be given a passport and to have a say both in their own country and abroad) it is inevitable that the very policy of "concessions" and improvements of image will grind to a halt.

Of course, of all the elements of Brezhnev's legacy with which the new Soviet leadership group has found itself burdened, this, of the "Sakharov case" or, rather, of dissidence seems to be one of the most difficult to handle. True, with the repressive policy of recent years it proved possible sharply to reduce the impact and extent of the phenomenon (as shown by, among other things, the reports of the crisis of identity and orientation which has struck emigre groups), but this was really just an apparent victory. In fact--witness what came to light a few days ago at the Budapest forum--dissidence, with all its motivations and components and the policy proposed and implemented for dealing with it, is still one of the key issues where the various thrusts of Soviet socialism intersect and are revealed. The Sakharov affair is exemplary from this viewpoint because it permits the phenomenon of dissidence to be looked at as a symptom of the new and growing contradiction that has come about in the country between society and government at a time when the huge economic and cultural growth that took place in the past and whereby the USSR became the second world power has caused new demands for freedom and therefore specific pressure for reforms to emerge. To understand this better it may be enough to recall that a real thread connects the Sakharov who in 1953 was elected a member of the Academy of Sciences, at the age of 32, for his contribution to building the Soviet atom bomb to the Sakharov of today.

Neither our press nor the Soviet press talks about it any more, but it is along this thread that one must seek the reasons why the initial enthusiastic support gradually became critical support, then a quest for structures of participation, then dissent. The first issues on which Sakharov proclaimed his right and duty to voice his opinions were the ones that had involved him as a scientist.

Of course it was right to help to eliminate the U.S. nuclear monopoly, but then the situation changed and in any case one could, one can, no longer evade the issue of "what to do" with respect to the mortal dangers--not only war but also famine and pollution--threatening mankind.

One outcome of the deliberation of these issues was the 1968 essay "Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom," which at the time seemed to most people the work of a naive visionary, something midway between "Reflections of an Unpolitical Man" and Volponi's notebook. The fact is that the essay was officially ignored in the Soviet Union. But why was it so difficult even for a scientist like Sakharov to contribute to political activity? The reflections of the "unpolitical man" and the scientist could only be followed by those of the citizen.

On 19 March 1970 Sakharov, together with historians Turchin and Roy Medvedev, sent Brezhnev a letter saying it had become urgent to "implement a series of measures directed toward a further democratization of the country's public life." The democratization, it was said, "should facilitate the maintenance and strengthening of the Soviet socialist order," must be "gradual," and must "be carried out under the CPSU's leadership." "There are no other ways out of the difficulties looming over our country," the letter concluded. A shift to the Right, that is, a victory for the supporters of a hardline administration, "will not resolve any problems but will exacerbate the situation and drive the country into a blind alley. A wait-and-see tactic would produce the same result."

I am certainly not now going to discuss the validity of the proposal of "democratization from above" put forward at that time by Sakharov and his companions. The fact is that after some hesitation, the response to the request for participation was not only to break off the dialogue but to create an atmosphere of suspicion around the document's authors, especially Sakharov. The physicist was thus forced to make his first protests and then to seek in the West the interlocutors he had been unable to find in his own country.

One can also say that the Sakharov case is certainly not atypical, within the more general phenomenon of dissidence. If one peruses official and unofficial Soviet publications of that period one can easily observe the fact that virtually all those whom we rediscovered later, in the seventies, among the protagonists of dissidence, took their first steps in the country's political and cultural life in the wake of the 20th Congress, full of hope and of a desire to participate and aware of the necessity and possibility of a new, democratic phase in the USSR's life.

What strikes one is the extraordinary topicality of some of the analyses of that period. "The technological and scientific revolution," one reads in an essay written by an engineer, N. Alekseyev, and a clerical worker, S. Zorin, from Leningrad in 1969, "necessarily demands a definite democratization of the economic and political structures."

We do not know where Alekseyev and Zorin are or what they are doing now, but what is certain is that many of the things they wrote way back in 1969, like many of the things to be found among the pages written in those years by Sakharov, Medvedev, and other dissident representatives, are to be found--and this is nothing new--in some of the top Soviet leaders' speeches.

It will be said that many things have changed since then. For instance, that dissidence, decapitated by means of trials and expulsions, has in many cases turned into "opposition" and impotent rage, in others, disillusionment and despondency. But this fact certainly does not make the words of those years any less topical and valid.

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CSO: 3528/36

## NATTA OPENS PCI PLENUM ON CONGRESS THESES

PM131317 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 8 Dec 85 p 3

/PCI Secretary General Alessandro Natta opening report to PCI Central Committee and Central Control Commission session in Rome on 7 December: "Substantive and Open Debate; Strong Political Commitment"/

/Excerpts/ 1.

Extraordinary attention has surrounded the work of the Commission entrusted by the Central Committee and Central Control Commission with the formulation of a draft document on which to conduct the congress debate. This task has been fulfilled, and now the result will be submitted to you at this session, at which the final redrafting work must be carried out. The interest shown in our decisions is certainly significant. The fact is that since the moment we jointly decided to convene an early congress the international and domestic situation has undergone some very substantial evolutions, with the result that the nature and quality of this attention have changed. It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that many people looked ahead to this date on our calendar with the attitude of someone preparing to write a fine obituary for us, with joyful regret. We can say that those people were shortsighted and are now learning to their own cost how mistaken it is--as we very well know--to rely not on an effort of genuine analysis but on propagandist distortions, which are easier the more power one has.

The communist question has clearly returned as the central topic of the political and institutional debate. The five-party formula which seemed victorious this summer and which was being proclaimed as a long-term strategy has encountered crisis which was certainly not resolved by the worrying resuscitation of an outgoing government. The causes of friction and conflict are all unchanged, and the dispute over primacy within the coalition actually conceals anxiety over an obvious failure, primarily in economic policy but no less in other areas.

The analysis we made together which prompted us to convene the congress has been shown to be entirely wellfounded.

"The essential consideration," we said at that time, "is that following the two elections the strengthening of the five-way alliance seems entirely relative, not only because it still reflects a blocked political system, with all



the typical elements of constriction, mutual coercion, and conflict, and with the burden of contradictions caused by the diversity of interests, backgrounds, and political outlooks, but above all because--this is the most important point--all the problems over which the conflict and struggle have developed over the years are still unresolved and acute."

The past months have confirmed every point in this assessment. We can now more vigorously reassert the need for a renewal of our policy and of our party; and we can do so because, in the presence of others' failures, there is no longer the suspicion that we are motivated--as has happened to some--by the anxiety of someone who feels that he is losing his strength and convictions. The opposite is true. As we said in July, we must renew ourselves because we are aware how great our strength is and how indispensable our role is in extricating the country from a crisis which threatens to exacerbate.

In fact we can now stress more vigorously the erroneousness of those assessments, too hastily formed in some cases, which exaggerated the significance of the local election and referendum results, perceiving in them only the negative aspects for us--aspects which we sharply stressed right away--while neglecting objectively to weigh other aspects affecting both ourselves and other forces. In the case of the referendum in particular it was no propagandist distortion to point to the very great significance of the fact that one party, virtually on its own, secured the percentage that it did from the entire electorate on an issue apparently of concern solely to wage earners. And, above all, because it was inaccurate to define as a positive result for the government coalition--as though it were a single party--the vote in the local elections, in which there was in fact a redistribution of support among the five parties and which concealed more complex phenomena, together with the seeds of future conflicts.

If anything, we should now say that we were actually too cautious about condemning a situation that was destined to become even more seriously contradictory than we indicated, however, clearly.

The government crisis, arising as it did over very important aspects of the international situation and of our country's independence and defense, highlighted the fact that even what had been considered the unifying element of the coalition was actually extremely fragile and unstable. Confronted with a real test, the PSI, and significant sectors of the DC too, had to acknowledge that the prejudice against the communists on the pretext of international considerations is simply ridiculous.

Geneva dealt a further blow to the forces most hostile to detente, whose influence has been felt even in our own country. It is not a definitive result, but it is certainly an initial success for the forces that set their sights resolutely not only on the need for detente but also on the specific possibility of resuming a process of gradual rapprochement and understanding. So our indictment and our peace struggle were correct--and it is highly significant that some of those in government who criticized it as a partisan struggle subsequently had to acknowledge how easy it is to reverse such a controversy, assuming a real commitment to at least a minimal independence of assessment.

The fact is that on the international plane too we have too long suffered a servile conception of the Atlantic alliance owing to the manipulatory and factious use of foreign policy for the purposes of the domestic political struggle.

2.

Overconfidence has had to give way to the acknowledgement of a disturbing fact--and it is this fact that constituted the starting point for the commission's work in formulating the political and program platform that we will discuss and decide on together.

It has been a major task, which began during the summer with the assignment, entrusted to a group of comrades appointed to coordinate the commission, of submitting in the fall a summary of topical issues in the basic areas of society and the state. Proceeding from this ascertaining of the facts and from the orientation imparted by the Central Committee, the commission conducted an open debate and discussion which dealt first with the form and nature of the documents and then with the substance of each of the topics proposed. There have been five plenary sessions, involving a great amount of work in terms of drafting and revision and hundreds of contributions in the form of specific formulation proposals.

This experience--fully confirming that of previous occasions--shows that the most vigorous and fruitful part of the work occurred when general discussions were left behind for a consideration of the substance of the matters in hand and, finally, individual formulations.

These proceedings--which were prolonged because of the government crisis and the current battle over the finance bill in the Senate--have not been spared vigorous controversy and agitation from outside. This has mainly concerned the confidential nature of the proceedings--as though this were something unheard of and unique to the communists. Of course, this agitation is another expression of interest; however, we cannot fail to perceive the prejudiced and illintentioned aspects, as if there were something murky and improper about our proceedings. There is no serious party or organization of church (because this instance has been cited too) that does not have forums and times for working without the constraints imposed by publicity, which unavoidably necessitate the adoption of definite stances and hinder the process of successive reprochments of which all preparatory proceedings consist. And the Catholic bishops' synod pointed out to us as a model for our commission--though actually more similar to a congress--is at this very moment conducting its proceedings to redraft its documents in absolute secrecy. And it really is not only mean but a sign of a desire to attack our party to say that there has been a desire to conceal something--as though there were some kind of constraint on the debate among the comrades, which in fact developed publicly and openly both before and during the preparatory proceedings and which will resume with the publication of the congress documents. There must be a response to this mystification campaign, and a response from the entire party.

But we are supposed to feel in the wrong because a unitary effort has been made in the commission's proceedings and because this effort should supposedly be considered wrong, as though in itself it constituted a shameful bargaining method.

We are in favor of the frankest and most honest discussion of ideas, proposals, and solutions. But it really is absurd that the communists--and only the communists--should be denied the chance to work collegially in a debate at close quarters in which it is possible for the participants to persuade one another of the shortcomings of the various starting positions or of the validity of other positions. Steadfastness in one's own beliefs is not the same thing as incommunicability.

The dialogue and the discussion will continue, more intensively and with the whole party's participation, after this Central Committee and Central Control Commission session. But as we have stressed before, it will be all the more fruitful the more everyone is guided by a real effort of mutual understanding, complete correctness of conduct, and a use of forums and instruments proper to our party.

The indications with regard to method which we jointly formulated earlier have certainly had positive results in the conduct of the majority, though it would be hypocritical to say that there have been no unpleasant episodes.

3.

It is not up to me, nor is it the purpose of this introduction, either to summarize or to comment on the theses. Nevertheless perhaps I should emphasize the most important innovative elements, partly because it is to them that I believe the Central Committee and Central Control Commission should devote their closest attention and most penetrating analysis.

The aim that pervades the document is to provide an answer to a problem that is, in a way, bigger than us and that transcends the confines of our own country--the problem of an effective counterattack to the prevalence which has been gained in so many parts of the more developed world by conservative cultural and political stances, which have consistently proved to be ineffective in resolving the existing problems of the contemporary world. Consequently there is a resurgence everywhere of the need for a recovery by the left and its fundamental principles. This also lends emphasis to the characteristics and values of the special conception of socialism formulated by Italian Communists--values which combine the aspiration to justice with the ideals of political democracy and of the extension of freedoms.

Hence also the significance and the importance of the European option, which in the theses concerns primarily our position as an integral and essential element of the Left in this part of the world, as a force committed to an autonomous analysis of problems common to other developed countries and which therefore connect us, via many questions and many solutions, with other major parties of the West European Left. This option and this commitment for our party and for the Left are given even further emphasis now by the persistence,

even the exacerbation, of hindrances and obstacles to the European integration that constitutes an indispensable objective--and not for Italy alone.

With regard to Italy's future we reassert our demand for the democratic alternative as a present necessity--not only for the reform and revitalization of the democracy but also, and above all, in order to tackle the most pressing issues: the crisis of the state, the demand for a new kind of development. We perceive the dangers of decline, but they are part of a dynamic situation of transformations, sometimes even tumultuous, in the technologies and methods of production, so that the essential issue is that of the government of innovation, of socially directed innovation, and therefore of the resumption of an aware kind of planning.

4.

Hence the real and fundamental problems and the need--not only for us--to accelerate the rate of renewal. We do not need to prove anything to any of our adversaries. It is toward ourselves, that is, toward our comrades and voters, toward the forces that follow us with their support and friendship, that we feel our major obligations. We are not approaching the congress as a force that needs to take lessons from others with regard to internal democracy. If anything, we could deride those who, after so many insulting sermons to us, are seeking or implementing undemocratic, centralist methods which would cause a scandal if we adopted them. But precisely because our party has given such a good account of itself we propose to proceed with the method of internal dialectic, of the real exchange of ideas and stances, of publicized debate, of full powers for elective bodies, of direct involvement of members and grass-roots organizations in the most important decisions, and of the further development of our organization. We do not like emphatic language, which often conceals a vacuum. Nevertheless the theses do present the outlines for a reform of the party, without, however, erasing the positive characteristics that have made it great, strong, and respected.

However, our present duties are not confined to a good congress debate and good congress deliberations. A troubled and tumultuous period lies ahead of us. And we absolutely cannot know whether the unrest and conflicts will subside at least temporarily, or whether they will flare up in new and more serious episodes. The fact that the major party of the government coalition felt the need to cite the possibility of an early election the moment the government crisis was over should make us very vigilant. I have already had occasion to point out that a fifth early dissolution of parliament could certainly not be considered normal: Anyone wanting to assume responsibility for it must be well aware that he is thus contributing to the erosion of the democratic institutions. But we know that there is much irresponsibility. And we are accustomed to seeing partisan reckonings set before the country's needs. This is why we must be vigilant and active in the day-to-day political battle, as we have tried to be over the months. Moreover, the citizens' problems cannot wait. And this is why the debate and the clash in the Senate over the finance bill have become combined, partly with our help, with a major mobilization countrywise.

/12228

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## PCI'S DRAFT CONGRESS THESES REPORTED

PM131040 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 8 Dec 85 pp 4-5

/Unattributed report: "Draft Theses Proposed by Committee of 77"/

/Excerpts/ We publish herewith an editorial summary of the draft theses for the 17th PCI Congress put forward by the Committee of 77. It is a free summary of the original text without official or formal status. As is known, it is the Central Committee and Central Control Commission that must draw up the final version of the document, which we will be publishing in due course.

The first thesis is devoted to the "characteristics and values of socialism in the Italian Communists' conception." While subjecting the historical ideological heritage to the necessary critical scrutiny and analysis, the comparison remains open with the outlook presented by our origins in the 1848 Manifesto: the objective of a class struggle that will eliminate itself and its *raison d'être* by means of the social form of "an association in which the free development of the individual is the precondition for the free development of all." This outlook takes up the legacy of the liberal and democratic revolutions, taking it beyond their historical class confines and strengthening and embodying its gains in a positive freedom for the broadest possible development of individuals by means of an egalitarian and self-governed form of society. This possible outlook must be set against the present situation.

In the areas of developed capitalism we are experiencing a phase of profound structural changes centering on the technological revolution, which permits an extraordinary strengthening and expansion of human powers and provides a historic opportunity for the promotion of labor. The objective of surmounting certain technical divisions of labor and the more oppressive forms of administration of labor is becoming a topical one. But we are still a long way from an emancipatory social synthesis, which will not occur spontaneously. The process of technological innovation does not automatically coincide with social progress. In fact a conservative offensive is severely trying the values of solidarity and equality, so the answer can only be found in a political regeneration that will grant a voice and a form to the liberation movements. This in turn entails a planning and reform capability directed toward exploiting all the potentials for economic and social development through the effective and democratic government of the processes of transformation centering on the problem of unemployment, that is, impinging on the actual processes of accumulation.



In the present situation a more fluid view of socialism is needed in which the aspect of a real current movement and that of a historical phase converge. This is why ours is not a conception of socialism viewed in terms of the complete state ownership of the economy and the administrative management of planning. It is the processes of socialization and of the expansion of economic democracy that are crucial to us. Public intervention in directing the process of accumulation must be of sufficient extent and quality to orient development in a market in which private enterprise, a public sector, and a strong cooperative sector all operate. Beyond that it will be the forces at work that will decide, as long as they enjoy freedom of movement and the necessary levels of information--an essential aspect of political democracy, whose universal value is an irreversible and permanent option for us. Thus in the developed countries the transcending of the capitalist system can be conceived in terms not of major traumatic breaks but of a complex combination of economic forms through which one style of production and life will come to prevail over another. Capitalism has already experienced profound changes, and it is not the ultimate manifestation of civilization. But the characteristics of the socialist and communist blueprint have changed too. A transition to socialism brought about or accelerated by a major international conflict is now inconceivable. The peace struggle has become an integral part of every progressive movement, while the qualitative aspect of development in relation to mankind's changing relationship with nature is becoming a central issue. And internationalism can no longer have simply class characteristics and can only emerge from the global aspect of the liberation of all peoples.

The PCI centers its policy on the issue of peace, which is crucial to progress and to survival itself. The trend toward rearmament must be reversed. It is not possible to rely solely on the bipolar balance; there must be an initiative on the part of all governments, and a growing role can be performed by the EC, China and the nonaligned countries. A primary condition for a balanced and controlled disarmament is a rejection of the militarization of space. A conception of security based on reciprocity and globality must be established. Major importance must be granted to the mobilization of the public and the involvement of a broad and diversified peace movement. A new peace culture must be inculcated proceeding from the increasingly worrying questions raised by the development of military technologies for survival, national sovereignty, and democracy itself. Movements of differing ideological and political leanings can and must cooperate for the cause of peace. The building of a new order of international relations is of decisive importance, and forces within the two alliances must mobilize right away to this end.

#### Europe and the PCI's International Position

The European option is fundamental to Italian Communists' policy. Europe has large human and material resources but also has the highest unemployment rate and does not participate on an equal footing in crucial negotiations such as those on nuclear weapons. A new international course is difficult to envisage without an active role for Europe. Reagan's policy has had several anti-European aspects, and the response to it has been inadequate. However, there is a spreading conviction among the leftwing forces--which does not affect loyalty to the Atlantic alliance and European-U.S. ties--that the two sides'

interests often do not coincide, so that a nonsubmissive conception of European-U.S. friendship for the sake of an equal-based dialogue is making headway. West Europe has an autonomous role to perform in the world, which demands a realistic and frank analysis of the conflicts which threaten to reduce the EC simply to a free-trade area. The PCI is fighting for a reform of EC mechanisms and instruments to equip the European Parliament with adequate powers.

The PCI is an integral part of the European Left, with its own particular character that we have built up over the years, with its complete international autonomy, and with its irreversible option for a socialism based on the complete development of democracy. The West European workers movement, in all its component parts, is experiencing upheavals and a quest that are in many respects shared. Often there has been a similar tardiness on the part of the various leftwing forces in tackling innovations. Sectors of the workers movement have experienced profound crises, but the left as a whole nevertheless has great potential. The leftwing forces are not confined to the parties of the workers movement: They include the new peace and environmental movements and, on another level, Christian and Catholic movements. These forces face a major shared task, and a major contribution in this direction can come from the trade union movements. The PCI intends to aid a rapprochement of the two major aspirations and experiences of the workers movement--socialist and communist--and to seek a solution of their historical divisions.

Our European position does not limit, and in fact demands, our cooperation and solidarity with the progressive forces and national liberation movements throughout the world. We will support in particular the peoples of Latin America, Asia, and Africa still involved in harsh battles for freedom and independence, and we support the process of regaining democracy in which many Latin American countries are involved.

The PCI reasserts the major historic significance of the October Revolution, the decisive influence of the USSR in the defeat of Nazi Fascism, and the importance of the fact that one-third of mankind has opted for noncapitalist paths of development. At the same time the PCI confirms its verdict, expressed at the 16th Congress, on the fundamental shortcomings which generally characterizes the societies which have emerged from that experience. Not only can such societies in no way constitute models for other countries, and especially for those based on democratic systems, but they are grappling with serious and still unresolved problems in their economic, social, and political life. This is why we reassert our hope for broad, thorough, and incisive reforms, while we consider with attention and interest the introduction of policies of reform of innovative plans. We are convinced, however, that new forms of economic management cannot be divorced from the promotion of forms of democratic life, individual freedom, political participation, and people's initiative. With the same spirit of objectivity and the same autonomy with which we have pointed to the responsibilities on both sides for the acute international tensions, we express our appreciation of the strong recovery of political and diplomatic initiative on the part of the new Soviet leadership. We consider the new attitudes apparent in China's foreign policy very important. The greater autonomy which we demand for the West European countries must apply to the East European countries too.

Italian Communists do not nurture anti-American feelings: They appreciate that people's democratic traditions and are aware of their influence in world life. We have sought, and still seek, a dialogue with the democratic and progressive currents of U.S. political and cultural life. Criticizing the present administration's policy implies not any anti-American prejudice but a demand for parity between allies. Our attitude toward the United States is dictated not only by our membership of the same alliance but also by our confidence in the U.S. people's democratic energies and by our desire to establish relations of cooperation with them.

The PCI develops its international relations absolutely independently; it does not consider itself part of any organized movement at the European or world level; and it works to realize its ideals in cooperation with all the forces worldwide fighting for the same objectives. It is necessary to transcend obsolete doctrinaire schemas and splittist and partisan practices and to seek instead new forms of intervention that will involve the entire workers and democratic movement in Europe and throughout the world. New internationalism implies new relations between communist, socialist, social democratic, and labor parties, national and progressive movements, and Christian- and Catholic-inspired nonconfessional democratic movements. The PCI will step up its international initiative without maintaining special relations with anyone.

#### Political Conditions For the Democratic Alternative

The democratic alternative requires that all the nation's positive energies be collated. It is necessary to initiate a process, a wideranging movement of struggle, of investigation into the substance of a change which can result in a "program convention." In preparation for this the PCI appeals to all forces wanting to set the country's political situation moving.

The crisis of the five-party coalition increases the need for a new phase in the struggle for the alternative, working for new political groupings. The democratic alternative cannot be built solely by indicating a government formula: It demands a regeneration of ideas on the Left, a program effort, and an ability to rally social forces together. This task must involve not only the parties but the broad area of individuals, bodies, forces, and movements of the Left. It is this process that can alter the balance of forces and shift the PSI and other nonconfessional and Catholic democratic forces toward more advanced positions, thus making an alternative government possible. To this end relations with the PSI and the other leftwing forces are fundamental. The policy of the democratic alternative, and the quest for unity on the Left do not rule out broader convergences, extending beyond the composition of governments and majorities, on major national issues.

#### Party Renewal

In order to embark on a new phase in its policy the PCI must first renew itself. Many objective and subjective factors are causing a crisis affecting parties within systems of representative democracy. In Italy the very policy of the alternative demands as a precondition for a more advanced and open democracy a reform of the parties that cannot be entrusted solely to modifications of the electoral mechanisms.

Over the past decade the PCI has substantially consolidated a broad electoral support and maintained an impressive organized strength. However, there are negative trends both on the electoral plane and as regards membership. Political deliberations on our policy must be combined with a more precise definition of the nature of the party, priority being given to its relationship with society and resolving the difficulties that have occurred in taking prompt account of what is changing and stirring.

The communists' strength derives first and foremost from their government capability, which must now be enhanced. One fundamental characteristic of the PCI has been its internal cultural pluralism, its fight against dogmatism, and the assertion of the party's absolutely nonconfessional nature. The PCI has thus become clearly a party based on its program backed by a strong ideological impetus and by the interconnection--which must be made closer--between political decisionmaking and responsibilities. The PCI must be able to express society's demands without presuming to superimpose itself on society or, worse, to possess the ultimate truth.

A decisive element in the party's renewal is the development of its democratic life. Debate and a multiplicity of stances are not disintegrative elements but a sign of the party's strength and range of assets. A real effort must be made to guarantee members a chance to participate in the debate and decision-making, which entails a full use of the elective bodies, ensuring their clear functioning by means of proper decisionmaking and voting procedures and by publishing their proceedings. Broader publicity is needed in order to ensure--especially in the case of grassroots organizations--a concrete opportunity to intervene on the various aspects of party policy. Every comrade who expresses an opinion which conflicts with that of the majority must feel entirely at ease if he considers it right to maintain and support his own stances. Procedures must be defined for consulting provincial organizations and members both on political topics and on choices of candidates. The political leadership has already been decentralized and made more flexible. Improvements must be made in connection with the prime responsibility of the communist representation within the institutions. The full autonomy of our research centers is guaranteed. The party's democratic life is based on and guaranteed by the principle of unity, which must be sought and built through the broadcast and freest exchange of views, in accordance with a conception of democratic centralism that is the opposite of what is implied in this expression for those who pursue the path of uncritical monolithism and authoritarian decision-making. For us the rule of the quest for unity means the free formation, in accordance with democratic principles, of majorities and minorities on various issues and problems and an effort to prevent through debate and mutual persuasion of the division into opposing groups and factions supported by their own centralism and constantly at odds with one another. Not only must the unitary principle not impede, it must stimulate the most vigorous and open competition of ideas and proposals in a proper and correct fashion.

The party's renewal demands a more updated and modern line on structural and organizational problems, while standing firm on the principle that the membership drive, the campaign to extend our support, self-financing, and the



widespread information and propaganda effort are in response to a primary political necessity. The role of the sections is essential: Apart from those based on territorial divisions, the workplace, or the place of study, others can be added (for instance, to bring new professional groupings together). There must be a streamlining of the entire organizational structure. A stable apparatus is essential, but there must be a constant effort of improvement so that it can truly become a means of exploiting the party's energies, which must be faithfully reflected in the leadership bodies. There must be a new thrust to make the most of our information and propaganda assets, especially RINASCITA and L'UNITA. The party must pay great attention to the Italian Communist Youth Federation, which is involved in a difficult and courageous phase of renewal and revitalization.

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CSO: 3528/36



## PSI'S FORMICA DEFENDS FIVE-PARTY FORMULA

PM051135 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 29 Nov 85 pp 1, 20

/Interview with PST Lower House floor leader Rino Formica by Ugo Baduel in Rome; date not given/

/Excerpts/ Rome--Baduel: How can the answer to the demand for what you call a democracy "of renewal" be the five-party coalition?

Formica: It is no coincidence that the five-way alliance emerged from the ashes of the national unity alliance and as a grouping of all the forces that have been in government, in very different phases (in Center and Center-left governments). It emerged from the troubles which followed the formulation of the national unity alignment and with a non-DC premier, on the basis of the famous "three emergencies" (economic, ethical, and institutional). In other words it is a delicate and essential point of balance which represents "viable national unity" within the old framework. It is therefore--this is the point--the "transition" between the blocked democracy and the democracy of renewal: To that end it is the only feasible way.

Baduel: But at the moment such an important force as the DC does not regard the five-way alliance as a transition.

Formica: No, and I will tell you why. The DC contested the 1983 elections with the aim of restoring a new centrism and therefore a democracy that would have been not only blocked but armor plated. To that end it therefore tried to form a centrist bloc in opposition to that of the leftwing alternative, in which context it placed the PSI and, in the social sphere, the trade unions. The centrist bloc was defeated, however, so it seems clear to me that a return to the hypothesis of the five-way alliance as a transitional phase should be considered inevitable. But this is where the conflict within the formula arises--between those who want the five-way alliance to a transition to the democracy of renewal and to greater social viability and those who regard the non-DC premiership as the price paid for a corresponding distortion of the five-way alliance into a centrist government formula.

Baduel: And this is the problem that faces us now.

Formica: Indeed, and it is a very delicate and serious matter. If centrism is not justified by numbers in parliament it cannot exist in the government formula. The leeway is too small: We only have 55 percent. If, within that parliamentary 55 percent, we succeed in creating a noncentrist mediation (and the PSI is the best point of balance and of leadership as regards social guarantees and democratic stability), then the formula can work as a transition; if, however, it acquires either centrist or leftwing alternative characteristics, then we are concentrating the maximum social and political conflict into a narrow area of government. This is why I believe that the only function of the five-way alliance as a "viable national unity" formula with a Socialist premiership can be to perform the systematic transition that I mentioned. The experiment could be broken off, but it would be a traumatic break in the democratic evolutionary process.

Baduel: Within your framework how do you place the PCI's proposal of a "program" government?

Formica: If the program is a platform to facilitate the task of governing the country, all well and good; but it is intended as a policy to create the necessary conditions with a view to a pre-established outcome (the leftwing alternative), then I say that it cannot succeed in this phase--a phase that must remain one of balance and transition. The program can entail the negotiation between opposition and majority of four or five points for the country's recovery, to enable parliament to devote at least 50 percent of its time to institutional matters. These are the really pressing issues, which is why it would be a mistake to dissolve parliament before time, which would create further emergencies and could lead to successive "overdoses" of early elections, with very serious risks. All parties must now abandon petty games of convenience: The system itself is at stake here and Italy will be governed by whoever salvages it, saving it from the risk of a crisis of parliamentary democracy, which is the real nub of the country's crisis.

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CSO: 3528/36

## WILLOCH SURVIVES FIRST POST-ELECTION STORTING CHALLENGE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Nov 85 p 4

[Article by Trygve Monsen]

[Text] Oslo--No one, not even the Labor Party, wants a Norwegian government crisis today, but no one can guarantee the nonsocialist minority government eternal life under the difficult parliamentary conditions that exist there.

While the first fall storms sweep in over the country, Norway's Prime Minister Kare Willoch can note with satisfaction that he has succeeded in steering the government through the first political storm since the Storting election 2 months ago. Ironically it was the two Progressive representatives who laid the groundwork for the incipient crisis by threatening to vote against all proposals concerning the treasury.

Clumsy internal behavior on the part of the Labor Party is what saved the minority government from collapse.

However no one is guaranteeing the Willoch government "eternal life" under the prevailing parliamentary conditions. The jubilation over the victory the government scored against the socialist opposition could quickly dissipate when Storting continues the debate on the 1986 budget.

The finance debate has not been a personal victory for the leader of the biggest opposition party, Gro Harlem Brundtland. Observers say the government won because of a "tactical error," referring to her conduct toward her own party colleagues. For the first time in several years the Labor Party leader suffered a clear political defeat because a majority of the Storting party group refused to pursue a confrontation line with the government on the tax issue.

## Potential Chaos

It can be summed up briefly in this way: no one wants a government crisis in Norway today. And the Labor Party does not under any circumstances want to assume government responsibility while there is a nonsocialist majority, with 80 nonsocialist and 77 socialist representatives. Politicians who can remember back 23 years when the Socialist People's Party (SF) held the swing

vote with two seats in Storting do not like to think about the political situations that arose then. In the end SF brought down the Labor government and that meant the end of 26 years of Labor Party rule.

There could easily be political chaos today, but the tax issue was not a good "crowbar" to use in an effort to break up government cooperation. Therefore the Labor Party decided to vote for the Willoch government's tax proposal, which provides a little real tax relief for most Norwegians.

The government will undoubtedly be able to avert political chaos for a long time to come by seeking support from the right and the left on individual issues. It will then be up to the Labor Party to find an issue that can split the three government parties. Christian People's Party group leader Harlad Synnes caused quite a commotion when he said in an interview that it might be desirable in many ways if the Labor Party helped to shape the final form of the 1986 budget.

That remark just a week before the budget debate showed clearly that there is a definite political possibility of creating unrest in the nonsocialist ranks. Willoch's deputy, Kjell Magne Bondevik, "deputy prime minister" and leader of the Christian People's Party, will have no easy task acting as the government's link with the Storting group.

Political opinion polls do show that the Labor Party continues to make gains but there is nothing to indicate a political "landslide."

#### Impossible Conditions

In Norway there is no provision for calling an early election and this means that politicians are forced to remain in their seats for 4 years, even if working conditions in parliament are impossible. This is not made easier by the fact that Storting representatives have to cast a vote. With its majority of three votes at the most the government cannot afford many "defectors" on important issues.

Many lively debates are expected in the national assembly before Christmas. There is a lot of suspense, especially with regard to security policy, since there are a couple of "hand grenades" hidden in the two middle parties, the Center Party and the Christian People's Party. This is particularly relevant with regard to the government's attitude toward a possible proposal from Mexico in the United Nations calling for a "freeze" on the superpowers' nuclear stockpiles.

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CSO: 3613/28

## POLL FINDS INCREASING RESENTMENT OF IMMIGRANTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 9 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Bjorn Talen]

[Text] Public opinion has become somewhat more positive with regard to foreign workers in the last 5 years. But the prevailing attitude is still "Norway for the Norwegians." A large majority would like to maintain very strict immigration controls and would prefer to have fewer foreigners come to this country. It is true that a majority felt that foreign workers represent a positive acquisition for our society and also thought they were treated well in this country, but even so half the people asked wanted as many of the immigrants as possible to return to their homelands rather than stay here in Norway.

In the extensive survey Gallup/NOI [Norwegian Opinion Institute] conducted for AFTENPOSTEN only 22 percent of those interviewed said that the immigration ban should be lifted. In a similar survey made in 1980, 16 percent gave this answer. At that time 30 percent said the law was not strict enough in limiting immigration. This figure has now fallen to 22 percent. A large majority still feels the law is strict enough but there are still more who think it is too loose compared to those who think it is too strict. In 1980 9 percent said the law limited immigration too much compared to 12 percent today.

## No Relaxation

Despite the fact that as many as 84 percent of the respondents opposed any relaxation of immigration policy a minute shift in a liberal direction could be detected. However this trend is somewhat more apparent when it comes to public opinion concerning foreign workers who are already in this country. More people think their conditions are substandard compared to those who think their opportunities are too good. The majority said foreign workers represent a positive acquisition for Norwegian society. The figure here was 52 percent compared to 48 percent 5 years ago. The number of those who feel that foreign workers are a pleasant addition to the local scene rose from 57 to 67 percent.



Such figures might lead some people to think there is little racism in this country. But 42 percent of those interviewed said there has been too much racism in Norway. Other answers also confirmed that there are many disheartening attitudes prevalent--whether one calls the phenomenon racism, xenophobia or prejudice. At least a quarter of the respondents held views that could be given these labels. And this does not take into account people's attitudes toward immigration policy itself, since there could be a number of different motives involved there. Someone could have very positive personal feelings about immigrants and still oppose a more liberal policy because he or she knows how much poorly-concealed racism there is in this country.

Even a question as provocatively worded as this: "Would you prefer not to see foreign workers on our streets?" got a positive response from a quarter of those interviewed. About the same number felt that foreign workers are a negative acquisition and that as many of them as possible should return home. There is no question here of nobler motives behind a restrictive attitude.

#### Hope for the Future

But even so there were some hopeful signs in this survey. Prejudice, or whatever one wants to call it, turns out to be decidedly stronger among those who have not had personal contacts with foreign workers, those who live in outlying districts and people with a low educational background. Younger people have a more positive attitude than older people do. All these factors suggest that much of the prejudice is based on ignorance and irrational feelings and can therefore be changed over a period of time.

The most liberal attitudes were found among women, people under the age of 45, groups with a high social status and people living in the Oslo area and in the southern and western parts of the country. Some distortion in the selection of interviewees also suggests that the results are a little too negative. Women, Oslo/Akershus residents and people with a high level of education are underrepresented and no correction was made for this distortion.

There is also a clear connection between party sympathy and one's view of immigrants. The most positive are definitely those who vote for SV [Socialist-Left Party] and the Liberal Party. KRF [Christian People's Party] voters are somewhat more positive than the average, which is where Labor Party voters can be found. Conservatives are somewhat more negative than the average, closely followed by those who vote for the Progressive Party. Center Party voters are clearly the most negative.

This finding may have a natural connection with the party's geographical and social makeup. This survey must be far more discouraging for the party whose former leader was so strongly involved in the struggle for greater tolerance. Conservative voters have traditionally held far more liberal views on cultural and social issues than Labor voters, for example. Like other recent surveys this poll shows that this is no longer as true as it used to be.

The very fact that a high educational level, contact with immigrants and residence in a central part of the country are background factors leading to tolerant attitudes in this area makes it even more remarkable that the figures for Conservative voters do not lie closer to those for SV and Liberal voters. Actually a high educational level does not have as much of a liberalizing effect on Conservative voters as it does on the rest of the population. While the view of immigrants has become more positive among most groups since 1980, Conservative voters feel just about the same now as they did then.

This may indicate that the classic Tory liberalism is a dying phenomenon. If that is true it is the price the Conservatives have had to pay to become a large popular party.

#### Nice as Long as They Don't Stay

Norwegians obviously regard immigrants as guests who are paying us a visit. A pleasant addition--as long as they don't stay too long. The majority of Norwegians feel that immigrants will always remain a foreign element in Norway and half the respondents would prefer to have as many as possible return to their homeland. It may be poor consolation to our new countrymen that they are regarded as a pleasant addition to the local street scene.

Some 47 percent felt that the immigrants should stay and 47 percent thought it would be better if they returned home. We must assume here that people were talking about first-generation immigrants. It would be incredible if half the people thought that children and teenagers should return to a country they had never seen, whether their parents are British or Pakistanis.

We must make the same assumption with regard to the 57 percent who said that immigrants would always be a foreign element in Norway. But even so these answers stand in clear contrast to a similar majority who said that Norway and Norwegians are well-suited when it comes to taking in immigrants.

Thus in spite of the negative responses to these two questions, a majority of 52 percent said that foreign workers are a positive addition to Norwegian society. And even more people (67 percent) felt that foreign workers are a pleasant sight on the street. But especially with regard to the last question it is probable that the wording had a big effect on the responses. Most people probably do not care much whether or not they see foreigners on the street. But what many people regard as positive about immigrants is the culture they bring with them--whether this concerns family solidarity, eating habits, a service orientation, shops that stay open in the evening or exciting restaurants. On the other hand this restriction to the street scene may be offset by the fact that many people answered that foreigners are a pleasant element without really meaning it, because they do not want to be put in the same category as those who would rather not see foreign workers walking down the street.

The somewhat paradoxical conclusion to be drawn from this is that people who feel there is a lot of racism in this country think the immigrants ought to

stay. And those who feel there is little racism here think the immigrants should go back where they came from.

### Closing the Door

The majority of those surveyed did not favor a different immigration policy than the one we are pursuing today. Popular opinion is more apt to favor increased restrictions than a milder policy. Only when it comes to political refugees does this survey indicate some willingness to take in more.

Some 47 percent of those interviewed approved by and large of the policy in effect now while 31 percent did not approve, but of these people, more wanted a stricter policy than a milder one.

As many as 72 percent wanted an extension of the immigration ban and 84 percent thought the law does an adequate job of limiting immigration or that it is not strict enough.

However there is an interesting point here in that some of the respondents obviously opposed legislation as a tool. Some 22 percent wanted the immigration ban lifted, but only 12 percent said the law is too strict. On the other hand there are people who do not consider the law restrictive enough but want it rescinded anyway. It may be that some people oppose the law because they think it is unfair and discriminates against dark-skinned immigrants.

### General Dislike

Thus there is not much enthusiasm for acquiring additional countrymen. But if we believe the figures there is a dislike of immigrants in general, not just those with darker skins. Only 12 percent wanted to let more people enter the country--whether they are light or dark. A few more wanted to accept fewer dark-skinned than light-skinned immigrants, but the difference was only 36 percent compared to 30 percent.

But we view political refugees a little differently. Some 37 percent said we take in enough of them, 35 percent wanted to accept more and 19 percent wanted fewer refugees coming to this country. This means that majority support does not exist for letting in more political refugees than we do today.

### Norway Best

If we Norwegians are not very enthusiastic about having immigrants come to this country, at least we are well-satisfied with the way we receive them. The majority felt we treat immigrants well, that Norway is well-suited to accept immigrants, that there is little racism in this country and that immigrants are given the same opportunities as Norwegians in all areas.

At the same time many disproved their own assertions. For example, among those who said there is little racism in this country 61 percent felt that immigrants would always remain a foreign element in Norwegian society. Some

41 percent in this group said that foreign workers are a negative addition to Norwegian society and 33 percent would rather not have to see them on the street.

The fact is that those who represent negative attitudes toward foreigners to a large extent are the most inclined to boast about the warmheartedness and tolerance that exist in this country.

But not everyone thinks conditions are as they should be. In spite of everything 42 percent of those interviewed admitted that there is a great deal of racism in Norway and a majority held that view among the group with the highest educational background. Some 42 percent also felt that Norway and Norwegians are not well-suited when it comes to accepting immigrants. A majority of SV and Conservative voters supported this view.

Do we give foreign workers the same opportunities as Norwegians? Yes, said a majority with regard to jobs, housing, health care, social security, wages, education and the opportunity to build houses of worship. But it is worth noting that down the line there are more people who think foreign workers have poorer opportunities than there are those who think they have better opportunities than Norwegians. The only exception to this is in the area of social security benefits.

#### Results of Poll on Norwegians and Immigrants

Question: Do you think it would be better if as many of the immigrants as possible went back to their own countries or would you prefer to have them remain here?

| <u>Answer</u> | <u>Percentage</u> |
|---------------|-------------------|
| Return home   | 47                |
| Stay here     | 47                |
| Don't know    | 6                 |

Question: Do you think the immigrants will eventually be absorbed into Norwegian society or do you think they will always represent a foreign element?

| <u>Answer</u>                 | <u>Percentage</u> |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| Will be absorbed              | 40                |
| Will remain a foreign element | 57                |
| Don't know                    | 3                 |

Question: All in all, do you think the foreign workers we have in Norway constitute a positive or a negative addition to Norwegian society?

| <u>Answer</u> | <u>Percentage</u> |
|---------------|-------------------|
| Positive      | 52                |
| Both          | 4                 |
| Negative      | 35                |
| Don't know    | 10                |

Question: Do you think foreign workers are a pleasant sight on our streets or would you rather not have to see them?

| <u>Answer</u>       | <u>Percentage</u> |
|---------------------|-------------------|
| Pleasant sight      | 67                |
| Rather not see them | 26                |
| Don't know          | 6                 |

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Think foreign workers are a positive addition and should stay here | 33 |
|--|----|

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Think they are a positive addition but should go back where they came from | 18 |
|--|----|

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Think they are a negative element but should stay here | 8 |
|--|---|

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Think they are a negative element and should go back where they came from | 26 |
|---|----|

Question: Do you think the law barring immigration to this country should be extended or repealed?

| <u>Answer</u> | <u>Percentage</u> |
|---------------|-------------------|
| Extended      | 72                |
| Repealed      | 22                |
| Don't know    | 6                 |

Question: Do you think the law has been too restrictive or too lenient with regard to immigration or do you think it is all right?

| <u>Answer</u>          | <u>Percentage</u> |
|------------------------|-------------------|
| Too restrictive        | 12                |
| About right            | 62                |
| Not restrictive enough | 22                |
| Don't know             | 4                 |



Question: Do you think we should take in more or fewer immigrants in the following categories than we do now or do you think the present number is about right?

| <u>Category</u>                              | <u>More</u> | <u>About Right</u> | <u>Fewer</u> |
|--|-------------|--------------------|--------------|
| Those with skins a different color than ours | 12          | 44                 | 36           |
| Those with skins the same color as ours      | 12          | 49                 | 30           |
| Political refugees                           | 35          | 37                 | 19           |
| Immigrants looking for work                  | 10          | 34                 | 45           |

Question: Do you generally approve or disapprove of the policy we pursue with regard to immigrants?

| <u>Answer</u> | <u>Percentage</u> |
|---------------|-------------------|
| Approve       | 47                |
| Disapprove    | 31                |
| Don't know    | 22                |

Question: Do you think we treat our immigrants well or poorly?

| <u>Answer</u> | <u>Percentage</u> |
|---------------|-------------------|
| Well          | 67                |
| Poorly        | 24                |
| Both          | 4                 |
| Don't know    | 5                 |

Question: Do you think Norway and Norwegians are well-suited or not when it comes to accepting immigrants?

| <u>Answer</u>   | <u>Percentage</u> |
|-----------------|-------------------|
| Well-suited     | 52                |
| Not well-suited | 42                |
| Don't know      | 6                 |

Question: Do you think there is a lot of racism in Norway or not?

| <u>Answer</u>   | <u>Percentage</u> |
|-----------------|-------------------|
| A lot of racism | 42                |
| Not much racism | 53                |
| Don't know      | 6                 |

Question: Do you think we have given foreign workers opportunities that are too good, about right or too poor compared to the opportunities Norwegians have in these areas?

| <u>Category</u>   | <u>Too Good</u> | <u>About Right</u> | <u>Too Poor</u> |
|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Jobs              | 11              | 55                 | 31              |
| Housing           | 11              | 52                 | 31              |
| Hospital care     | 3               | 68                 | 9               |
| Retirement homes  | 3               | 63                 | 9               |
| Wage level        | 5               | 53                 | 32              |
| Social security   | 12              | 64                 | 8               |
| Education         | 6               | 66                 | 20              |
| Houses of worship | 14              | 51                 | 20              |

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## COMMENT ON SALGADO ZENHA CANDIDACY CHANCES

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Nov 85 p 6

[Editorial: "The Candidate and the Circumstances"]

[Text] The universe of presidential possibilities began to be peopled early on, but only this week, if Saldago Zenha's candidacy is confirmed, which is more than likely, will the pack of theoretically "strong" candidates be complete. False entries and frustrated backstage maneuvers to launch individuals who did not succeed in becoming anything more than "candidates to be candidate," along with some really bizarre surprises, like Filmino Miguel and Costa Bras, signaled this long "warm-up" for a political battle of great relevance to the institutional picture and one which could be decisive for a possible reordering of forces at the party level. This explains the anticipation surrounding Zenha's potential candidacy.

The strength of a candidacy is not measured just by the candidate--that, is, by his personal prestige or the national image which the candidate may or may not have--but also by the circumstances. In 1976, Ramalho Eanes was a military officer, honored certainly, particularly for his decisive action on 25 November, but, for the vast majority of the electorate, he was no more than an illustrious unknown. It was the combined support of the party machines of the PS [Socialist Party], the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] which lifted Eanes into prominence and made him the president of the republic. In 1980, something similar happened to Soares Carneiro, who, in a few months, went from anonymity to the limelight--and then down to defeat, yes, but with more than 40 percent of the votes--thanks to the personal efforts of Sa Carneiro and the solid springboard which the AD [Democratic Alliance] represented then. In 1986, will the declared support of a major party--or more than one--be the necessary and sufficient condition to elect a candidate? Or rather, will it suffice to add up the votes won by the parties in the legislative elections, or divide them among the presidential candidates according to their political origins, to determine or predict with some accuracy which of them will be the victor? This appears to be the greatest question which the list of possible candidates--Zenha included--is raising at the present.

All the "strong" candidacies which have already been announced or are expected, with the exception of Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, benefit or could benefit

from party support, but none of them appears to be in a position to "make a sweep" of the voters to whom their campaign is directed. Freitas do Amaral cannot be entirely sure of all the CDS and PDS votes; Mario Soares cannot be assured of winning the favors of all the voters who remained loyal to the PS on 6 October; in the unlikely event that he goes before the voters, Angelo Veloso is not guaranteed to win the some 15 percent of the votes which the APU [United People's Alliance] won in the last elections. The same can legitimately be said of Salgado Zenha, if he should come to receive the formal support of the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party]. Actually, if 6 October proved that the boundaries of the electorate of each party are not immutable, there is reason to believe that, in January, they could become very unclear because, in these presidential elections, more than in any other elections, "no one's vote is in anyone's pocket," to [paraphrase] Soares Louro, who is backing Zenha's candidacy.

Be that as it may, party support is important, not only as a useful instrument in the campaign work of any candidate, but as a point of reference for the electorate itself. This is true, whether one is speaking of candidates who do not need a public introduction because they are prominent individuals in national political life, even if they are temporarily out of the limelight--men like Freitas do Amaral or Salgado Zenha--or of individuals who have a good "curriculum vitae" but who are not familiar to the public, as happened with Costa Bras. One of the questions that arises regarding the virtual candidacy of the former number two man in the PS is whether he will succeed, unlike the High Authority Against Corruption [Bras], in winning consensus within the leadership of the PRD, the only one of the major parties which has still not defined its position regarding a presidential candidate.

The profile of the potential candidate and his political career are enough to indicate that the electorate to which he addresses himself is at once vast, strongly contested for and sensitive to various imponderables: the combined voters of the PS, PRD and APU, the area in which Mario Soares, Lurdes Pintasilgo and Angelo Veloso are also active. Veloso must be taken into consideration even though he is described, so to speak, as a merely tactical candidate.

Of all of them, Zenha is apparently the one with the greatest capacity to make a showing in the socialist sector and cause the greatest damage to the candidacy of Mario Soares. This may be reason enough for the PCP leadership to decide to support Zenha at the polls, even enduring the pain of having to explain how the "pay off" will be big this time. Pintasilgo's impact on the APU and PRD voters is perceptible, however, and here may lie the greatest of all the imponderables. In fact, if "no one has anyone's vote in his pocket," the PCP and PRD leadership are not in a position to guarantee the loyalty of their respective constituencies if they come out, directly or indirectly, for the former number two man in the PS. In this context, another factor could weigh significantly: whether Eanes intends to take a public position or not. The Costa Bras episode surely left its scars. What attitude will the president adopt?

Thus it is that the possible candidacy of a man with unquestionable prestige and with no need of public introduction depends on more than these; it depends on the circumstances under which it occurs. Whether they are favorable or damaging to his designs remains to be seen.

## FREITAS DO AMARAL APPROVED BY PSD MAJORITY

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 26 Oct 85 pp 1, 5

[Text] Almost three-quarters of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] voters (72 percent) agree with the decision of the National Council of the social democrats to support Freitas do Amaral as the candidate for the presidency of the republic. This result was revealed by a national EXPRESSO-Euroexpansao poll taken this week among PSD voters on the permanent panel of 500 interviewees representing the continental Portuguese electorate.

In contrast with the 30 National Council members (42 percent of the membership) who voted last Saturday against the Cavaco Silva motion to support the former leader of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], only 14 percent of the PSD voters expressed disagreement with this decision, while the remaining 14 percent expressed indifference to the choice.

The choice made by the party leadership also, on the other hand, increased the total number of PSD voters who have now decided to give Freitas do Amaral their votes from 36 percent to 63 percent, in the short period of 15 days (as the charts below show). Simultaneously, the number of undecided voters dropped 30 points (from 59 percent to 29 percent), with the intention to vote for other candidates remaining without significant change (5 to 6 percent).

Individuals among the 29 percent still undecided said that they agreed with party support of Freitas do Amaral, but have not yet decided how they will vote. Thus according to the poll 6 percent of the social democratic voters say they "probably will vote" for the Christian democratic politician, although they are not supporting him at this time, 2 percent have now decided "never to vote for him," while 21 percent do not know or did not indicate what their decision will be. It was established, moreover, that at the time when the interviews were held, 3 days after the meeting of the National Council of the PSD, 28 percent of those questioned still did not know whom their party had chosen for the Belem race.

## Urban Disapproval Greater

In analyzing the approval, disapproval or indifference indicated by those interviewed (who by then knew that the former AD [Democratic Alliance] leader had been chosen by the PSD), it is curious to note that a definitely higher level of disapproval can be seen in the Greater Oporto region than in all the



other zones of the country (21 percent as compared to 14 percent on the national level), and that there is greater disapproval in urban than in rural regions (18 percent as compared to 11 percent).


It is also on the youngest age level and in the highest social stratum that the relatively greatest disagreement with the 41 social democratic National Council members who approved the Cavaco Silva proposal (18 percent and 19 percent, respectively) is seen.


Among the reasons volunteered by those questioned for their agreement with the choice of the founder of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], the fact that Freitas do Amaral "will be a good president" (46 percent), "is consistent with the ideas of the PSD" (15 percent) and "I have always liked him" (14 percent) stood out. On the other hand, there were only two reasons which were the almost exclusive justification of the attitude of those who disagreed: "He is not a PSD candidate" (47 percent) and "I do not like him" (50 percent).

It should be noted, finally, that this was the second EXPRESSO-Euroexpansao political poll in a series which will by the end of the year provide a record of the major changes in the development of the electorate. The panel established for the presidential election includes 500 voters chosen from 262 localities (sampling points), distributed as follows: two (cities of Lisbon and Oporto) for the population concentrations with more than 100,000 inhabitants, 60 for those with 2,500 to 100,000 inhabitants, and 200 for those concentrations with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants.

Since the same individuals are repeatedly interviewed by Euroexpansao (with possible adjustments based on availability in terms of time), the figures provided by the survey take on a higher level of reliability, according to the officials in charge.

In this instance, in order to analyze the development of the PSD vote between 7-8 and 22 October, 180 voters on the EXPRESSO-Euroexpansao panel who said they had voted for the PSD in the last elections were personally contacted. As usual, the poll was taken by Euroexpansao and the analysis of the results was the responsibility of EXPRESSO.





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CSO: 3542/24

## SERIES OF POLLS ON PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES REVIEWED

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 26 Oct 85 p 21-R

[Text] The surveys published in the press over a period of almost 2 years make it possible to note some significant movements in the popularity curves of the candidates for the presidency, despite the hesitation which may exist about the quality and the figures provided by some of the polls. For example, it can be seen as natural that the total number of those interviewed who are abstaining or indicating indecision has declined with the approach of the elections and the definition of the most important candidacies. But let us examine the curve for each candidate, and the changes which have occurred in the course of this period.

Lurdes Pintasilgo

This candidate ranked very high long before she had publicly indicated her interest in the Belem race. The gradual rise which the polls revealed showed a decline in the summer of 1984, when the initial meetings of the former CNARPE led to reservations about her candidacy. In October of last year, in an interview granted to EXPRESSO, she indicated her intention of going ahead with the candidacy, coinciding with a definite rise in her "score." There was then a slight decline, during the same period, curiously enough, when Firmino Miguel enjoyed the greatest popularity--at the beginning of 1985. Until the collapse of the Central Bloc at the beginning of this past summer, the curve declined slightly, while at the same time those for Mario Soares and Freitas do Amaral were rising. With the fall of the government and the establishment of the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party], the popularity of Pintasilgo rose again, reaching its highest point at the beginning of October. The influence the results of the legislative elections and the launching of the Costa Bras candidacy will have on the position of the former prime minister remains to be seen.

Freitas do Amaral

He has over a period of more than 1 year maintained a percentage level of between 10 and 15 percent, very little affected by his resignation statement in the summer of 1984. At the end of the first quarter of 1985, with the departure of Mota Amaral and, in particular, Firmino Miguel, he declared as a candidate and saw his support almost doubled, benefitting further from the


sympathy shown for Cavaco Silva at the Figueira da Foz Congress. The emergence on the scene of Lemos Ferreira (who reached a 10 percent score) caused a decline in the period between June and October.

#### Mario Soares

His curve has stayed at a low level for a long period, with ups and downs generally complementing the movements of the Lurdes Pintasilgo curve in the other direction. Also, he seems to benefit from the moments of greatest instability in the leadership of the PSD [Social Democratic Party]. There was a gradual increase from February 1985, reaching its highest point at the time of the collapse of the Central Bloc and our entry into the EEC. The Soares curve then began a decline which continued until the October election.

#### Other Candidates

The PSD has been the source of a number of proposed candidacies which never worked out. Mota Amaral remained, until the internal referendum, in the 10 percent area. Alberto Joao Jardim showed sporadic surges at the end of 1984 and the beginning of 1985, reaching a maximum of 15 percent. Mota Pinto (9 percent maximum), Pinto Balsemao (7 percent) and Cavaco Silva (10 percent) were also among the militants suggested as a result of the instability of the party. Firmino Miguel even surpassed the Freitas do Amaral "score" at the beginning of this year, following his resignation. Lemos Ferreira emerged in the summer of 1985 at the 2-3 percent level, showing an increase up to 10 percent prior to October, and affecting support of the former CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] leader. Costa Bras, however, never succeeded in rising above the 3 percent level in the course of 1984, and later disappeared from the polls. And this has happened, moreover, with a goodly number of others, including Rocha Vieira, Fernando Amaral, Adelino da Palma Carlos, Francisco Nogueira, Almeida e Costa and Salgado Zenha.



**Key:**

1. Undecided + Abstaining
2. PSD Congress in Braga (Mota Pinto beats Mota Amaral)
3. PS [Socialist Party] Permanent Commission meeting in Sintra (Soares plans succession)
4. Former CNARPE voices reservations about Pintasilgo
5. Freitas resigns
6. Pintasilgo announces candidacy (interview with EXPRESSO)
7. Meeting at the Pátio Alfacinha (Mota Pinto supports Firmino)
8. PSD National Council meeting in Bonfim (Mota Pinto withdraws)
9. PSD referendum (choice of independent candidate adopted)
10. Firmino resigns
11. Freitas declares candidacy
12. Figueira da Foz PSD Congress (Cavaco supports Freitas)
13. Collapse of the Central Bloc (criticism by Cavaco of Soares' candidacy)
14. Entry into the
15. Announcement of Lemos Ferreira's candidacy and PRD convention in Tomar
16. Soares urges Pintasilgo to withdraw
17. AR [Assembly of the Republic] elections
18. Costa Bras candidacy
19. PSD supports Freitas
20. PSD-CDS fail to reach agreement on legislative elections
21. Formal candidacy of Soares (PS convention)



## COSTA BRAS' DEPARTURE SAID HUMILIATING TO FANES

## Fanes' Power Seen Diminished

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 9 Nov 85 pp3-4

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

[Excerpts] In a brief 15 days, Gen Ramalho Fanes has been defeated--worse than this, publicly humiliated--by his own base of support. In fact, in a little more than 2 weeks, we witnessed the birth, growth and death of the candidacy of Col Costa Braz [sic], which had been supported by the outgoing president of the republic.

The candidacy was born with the promise that Fanes would support it, and there are those who assure that he signalled this at the outset; the president is said to have made his position known in an informal conversation with a member of the press.

The candidacy grew under the auspices of Lt Col Melo Antunes, who is considered to have been assigned by Belem to work with the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] and the 25 April Association to create the conditions to promote the candidacy.

It suffered a reversal when the president went to the United Nations, taking Lt Col Melo Antunes with him.

It savored the short-lived consolation of another meeting in Lisbon, with General Fanes again expressing his approval and support of the candidacy; the election committee was being created (featuring Cmdr Mario Aguiar) and efforts were underway to set up a campaign headquarters.

During this hectic period, the sublime optimism of Lt Col Melo Antunes was nourishing the hopes of Col Costa Braz, until the fatal day when he had to be told the whole truth: his name did not attract either the PRD or the MFA [Armed Forces Movement], which was increasingly taking control of the PRD.

The MFA won the power struggle with General Fanes, which confirms what we have said here so many times.

General Fanes is no de Gaulle--the real leader of his henchmen. He is an umpire who has been overruled by his alleged supporters. He does not command; he brings up the rear. He does not impose; he submits. He does not make the decisions; he carries the banner. He does not have a trusted party; he is a useful political tool for this party. He does not have the loyalty of the military; he has temporarily been the most suitable instrument of the April officers.

As we predicted, the MFA has returned in devastating triumph, so triumphant that it has wagered on taking control of the PRD, so devastating that nothing has stopped it--not even General Fanes and his chosen candidate.

The April officers did not like him. They vetoed him, even after the president expressed his position twice. And General Fanes had to admit defeat, allowing Col Costa Braz, in announcing his early withdrawal, to state expressly that he had had the support (to no avail, obviously) of the president of the republic.

Score: MFA - 1; Fanes - 0. The first accounting of yesterday's allies and today's commitments, with larger scores to come.

#### PRD Civilians React

Offended at the takeover by the resurgent MFA, some civilians in the PRD reacted promptly:

--In an attempt to save the president's face and also to save a party which cannot long survive division, the weakening of its patron's authority and the furious and broad-based momentum of Engineer Pintasilgo's candidacy.

So they looked again to a civilian candidate for Belem. As for plausible military candidates, those who exist have either been inviable for a long time or became inviable following the unexpected crucifixion of Col Costa Braz at the hands of his former friends. Implausible military candidates there may be.

Prominent among the civilian names is Dr Francisco Salgado Zenha, a stubborn man, unattached, Socialist, reasonably acceptable to some areas of the PRD.

He is well accepted by the PRD rank and file and is thus a possible substitute for Col Costa Braz. A "historical" Socialist, he is ideal to create division within the PS [Socialist Party], splitting the former secretariat between the desire to promote Dr Vitor Constancio in the next May Congress and the desire to settle old accounts with Dr Mario Soares. A solitary man, he has an aura of independence, equidistant from everything and everybody. He is a stubborn man and perhaps not one to fear obstacles or to give in to defeats.

If Col Costa Braz was the retaliation against Engineer Pintasilgo, Doctor Zenha is the revenge against Doctor Soares, a vendetta that begins with Medeiros Ferreira and ends with Mario Mesquita (and one or another, inside and outside the PRD, who have powerful reason to grumble).

Doctor Zenha is not a match for Engineer Pintasilgo, nor does he appear to have half the chance of Col Costa Braz of reaching the second round, but he might take away a little more of Doctor Soares' support and fragment the present

and future Socialist leadership. In particular, the possibility of the ascension of Doctor Constancio, Doctor Sampaio or Engineer Guterres would be summarily erased.

However, under normal conditions, no one would be willing to take on this role of fireman in a fire that is already almost out of control, much less that of a substitute fireman, for want of better one.

In the specific case of Doctor Zenha, it will be interesting to see what will weigh more in the balance: good sense, which will tell him that no one has ever been used so patently as a tool to rescue another party from desperation; or a mixture of conviction and eagerness for revenge, which would tell him not to lose the chance of his life to get back at his former comrade, Dr Mario Soares.

In some measure, Doctor Zenha was well chosen. It would be difficult to find another individual who would hesitate even for one minute to take the path of good sense, because no one could see General Eanes or Dr Palma Carlos giving him their enthusiastic support. It is certainly not edifying to see a president who would like to leave office free and clear thumping for a candidate for Belem, but it would be ethically intolerable for General Eanes to change his choice of candidate every 15 days or to give his general support to a whole series of exchangeable candidates chosen by his barons, who, it would seem, do not respect the inclinations of their leader.

In any event, as a presidential candidate, Dr Salgado Zenha will represent another fascinating item for the psychoanalysis of Portuguese political life.

#### Anti-PRD Party

While Doctor Zenha appears to be the last desperate hope in the final effort to find a candidate to ease the shame of the Costa Braz episode, there are Eanists who are calling for a more profound and radical solution.

The PRD has not gone along with General Eanes, they say. It has used his name and the image of his wife. It has deserted its patron, if not betrayed him.

Hence General Eanes cannot risk the formal leadership of a party over which he already has no substantial control. He must create a true party of his own, a truly Eanist party.

These sectors have even pressured Col Costa Braz to lead this movement, since he has the legitimacy of having been the choice of General Eanes himself for the presidential nomination.

It is clearly unlikely that Col Costa Braz will want to take even one more step beyond the steps which have already brought him to the unpleasant situation of political disillusionment.

It is even less likely that an anti-PRD Eanist party would be more than a temporary reaction of protest by Eanists who perceived that their leader had been humiliated.

The important thing is what effect the failure of Costa Braz will have on the crisis within the PRD.

The PRD is destroying itself. The MFA is eroding its unity. The candidacy of Engineer Pintasilgo is breaking up Eanism and its support structure.

This is good news for the Right, of which Pintasilgo has been a real ally from the outset. Even the moderate socialist electorate is beginning to understand what President Maria Lurdes Pintasilgo is about. She is the country.

#### From Morality to Unity

In politics, the state of grace always generates favorable results, and disgrace generates more disgrace. These are cumulative, inevitable and perhaps unfathomable processes.

Thus it is with the PRD. There was the defeat of General Eanes and Col Costa Braz. There was the party division and the disorientation of the leadership. There was the renunciation of a candidate for the presidency of the republic. There will certainly be parliamentary effacement, since the party will have to submit to tacit support for the program of the new executive. There will certainly be erosion in the local governments.

How many years, how many months can a party remain united and cohesive in an ideological vacuum, a party whose patron has been humiliated on a vital issue, a party in which the MFA carries more weight than the civilian component, a party subjugated, dominated, paralyzed by the candidacy of Engineer Pintasilgo?

#### First Conclusions

Politics is dirty business--it reveals party weaknesses when least expected; it does not spare anything or anyone, even giants with feet of clay.

Less than 2 months ago, going over the list of winners in the 6 October elections, wasn't everyone talking, among others, about the PRD and General Eanes?

Now, after just a few weeks, one of the victors of 6 October has already been defeated.

The PRD, then so full of hope, is now a divided, disoriented party, looking for ways to camouflage the loss of its presidential candidate. The then moralistic PRD runs the risk of being discovered today in the most puerile, if symptomatic, of election frauds--the falsification of signatures.

The then ascendant Eanism is now divided between a vigorous MFA, which has chosen Engineer Pintasilgo, and a lone general Eanes, who supports candidates who have no followers. General Eanes gives the movement its name but he does not command it. The MFA and the Pintasilgo supporters provide the troops, using a borrowed name.

--Until the day when Pintasilgo no longer needs the Eanist label. Why? "Pintasilgoism" will be the future, redemption with a touch of Christian utopia, which seduces the military, attracts the multitudes and even wins over members of the Episcopate.

It remains to be seen--to use a Biblical metaphor--if General Eanes will resign himself to the role of Pintasilgo's John the Baptist.

And the president's wife, sitting in the little television room at Belém Palace, recalling the public baths of a few weeks ago, evoking the importance of her contribution to the PRD campaign, remembering what she said about morals and politics, must be aching inside, aware of the fleeting quality of the mandate, of the ingratitude which is the inevitable payment for those who sit in the seats of power, and of the chagrin of the faithful who yesterday rejected the presidential choice of today.

Moreover, Eanes was not undone by Dr Cavaco Silva, whom he has treated kindly, as demonstrated in an inaugural address very different from the one he made when Dr Sa Carneiro was the prime minister. Nor by Dr Mario Soares, nursing his bitter thoughts of the defeated Eanes. But by men the president trusted, by [Pintasilgo] his closest advisor and friend, by his united and loyal comrades-in-arms.

As any reader is well aware, we are not dying of political sympathy for the current president of the republic and his wife.

But it is only fair to point out how humiliating for the president the Costa Bras episode was. The same man who carried the banner to attract a million voters is now denied the right to point out the political path for his followers.

*Sic transit gloria mundi.*

#### MFA Influence Seen Powerful

Lisbon O TEMPO in Portuguese 8-14 Nov 85 p 11

[Article by Ribeiro Ferreira]

[Excerpt] "Ramalho Eanes does not fool us any more. Now we will be the ones to determine the strategy to see that the power in Portugal will again be inspired by the April principles. We do not support, in any way, any project for personal power, no matter who that person may be."

This statement, made to TEMPO by a prominent member of the 25 April Association, reveals the truth about the withdrawal of Costa Bras [sic]. It was the MFA [Armed Forces Movement] and only the movement which decisively opposed the candidate chosen by Eanes. The war between the April officers and the president of the republic is now public and notorious.

Costa Bras woke up Friday morning with the firm decision to notify Ramalho Eanes and the public that he was withdrawing his candidacy for the presidency of the republic.

The official, who has been responsible for combating corruption since October 1983, had arrived at his decision on Wednesday. Before he carried it out,



there was a long exchange of views with Fanes, the only person who had clearly and unequivocally given his full support to the Costa Bras candidacy.

The straw that broke the camel's back was the Pintasilgo debate at the National Culture Center.

Most of the military officers in the 25 April Association, except for Vasco Lourenco, attended the debate in an open demonstration of esteem for Pintasilgo, not to support her in the presidential race, but to say to Ramalho Fanes that they did not support his choice and that they were clearly drawing the line at Costa Bras.

#### Still the Garcia dos Santos Affair

Before then, however, the old comrades-in-arms of the frustrated presidential candidate had the delicacy to explain the meaning of their gesture to him. Basically, they had nothing against Costa Bras. Their gesture was, above all, directed against the strategy of Ramalho Fanes. The so-called April captains have not forgiven Fanes for not having used his power immediately after the 1980 presidential elections, for having allowed a constitutional revision which did away with the Revolutionary Council, for having failed to save the only MFA representative among the Armed Forces chiefs of staff. Thus the Garcia dos Santos case came to the fore in the intense discussions which culminated in the April officers' decisive refusal to align themselves, once again, with the strategy of Fanes, designed and executed without the consultation of his faithful supporters and often against his own military base of support.

Costa Bras could not run the risk of having his candidacy opposed by the MFA, resuscitated in the 25 April Association, and with the PRD itself bringing up the rear.

Incidentally, one of the prior conditions set by the reserve lieutenant colonel was precisely the support, or the lack of opposition, of his former comrades-in-arms.

#### Is There a PRD?

For its part, the PRD remained passive throughout the process. Several observers have confirmed that the PRD members are already paying the price for having taken a large percentage of the votes on 6 October, solely because of the prestige of Ramalho Fanes.

Although Jose Varlos Vasconcelos and Marques Junior, two of the prominent leaders of the new party, clearly support Lurdes Pintasilgo (the engineer's campaign was basically launched by the weekly O JORNAL), Herminio Martinho and the so-called PRD advisors, namely Joao Botaquilha and Miguel Caetano, held the party structure to the strategy defined in Belem by Fanes and Melo Antunes.

In the case of Costa Bras, the opposition manifested by the major support for the Fanist movement (the military) and the stands in support of Lurdes

Pintasilgo by some influential civilians who have always sought to wrest the PRD from Fanes' hands (although using his image to establish the party) brought Portugal's third major party to a total standstill regarding the presidential elections.

Without the capacity to say yes or no, for over a week the PRD was totally incapable of defining a position regarding the Costa Bras candidacy.

Incidentally, this silence suited Ramalho Lanes and Costa Bras perfectly. Basically, the PRD only exists in terms of the purposes of the president of the republic.

The PRD silence did not trouble Costa Bras. With Fanes' support, any candidate or party can mobilize a significant mass of voters and, moreover, be assured of the implicit or active support of the Communist Party.

Thus the so-called April officers were solely responsible for the fall of Costa Bras. Moreover, the revitalized MFA not only intends to control the strategy of Ramalho Fanes but to take charge of the Fanist party.

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CSO: 3542/33

## JARDIM ACTIONS SEEN AS PART OF PRESSURE PROCESS

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 26 Oct 85 p 4

[Editorial by J. C. B.]

[Text] Since Alberto Joao Jardim has already called Ernani Lopes a "Nazi" and has already denounced a Masonic plot to destroy the country by reducing holiday lighting, it will come as no surprise that, at the beginning of this week, he appealed for abstention during the presidential election.

This was a reflection of the council meeting at which the PSD [Social Democratic Party] approved support of Diogo Freitas do Amaral as a candidate by 41 votes to 30, and at which other party members expressed their intention not to participate in the campaign.

For once, Alberto Joao Jardim is not alone in fanning the winds of polemic argument.

Only while the others spoke for themselves, not seeking leadership of anyone publicly, the Madeira region leader went farther, announcing his intention to "ask the people not to vote in the elections for the presidency of the republic."

The masters of Canedo now have an outstanding follower.

But with some differences: this was not a question of urging the building of a road in a region beyond the mountains, but of attacking the excessive liberalism of a social democratic sector putting its faith in as "unliberal" a candidate as Freitas do Amaral.

It was not a question of a boycott by anonymous people, but of a rebellious gesture coming from one who is affiliated with the decisions of the main social democratic body between congresses.

It was not a question of a proposal coming from a group excluded from the system, but an act undertaken by one who, although stubbornly opposed to the political system in effect, has allowed himself to be elected within it and who governs within it, and without it, would never have become a national figure.

In short, this would fail to be a case for consideration by the disciplinary commission of the PSD only if Cavaco Silva did not want it to be, or, what is more likely, lacked the strength to cancel out the traditional maneuvering room of a man who, for 7 years now, has channeled the dissatisfaction of the people of Madeira toward Lisbon.

This is a skillful maneuver which has also, moreover, been used by Mota Amaral, but with the circumspection typical of him, and without such spectacular electoral results as those on the neighboring island.

Alberto Joao's peevishness, his tirades, his polemics, are not as wild as they seem to be. They are a part of a continuing process of exerting pressure, so that the source, the millions of voters who nurtured the development of Jardim, will not dry up.

Threatening with the right hand and beckoning with the left. This is what seems to be happening now as well, in the alleged boycott of the elections. Four days before the appeal for abstention, the PSD in Funchal had already agreed to support Freitas do Amaral if, on the second round, the former leader of the CDS were to be opposed to a candidate like Costa Bras, Lurdes Pintasilgo or any other for whom the communists vote. This is the same as saying to the future prime minister: "You can even count on me. However, let the millions of voters say."

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CSO: 3542/24

## NORWEGIAN UNEASINESS OVER SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY DETECTED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Nov 85 p 9

[Commentary by Olav Trygge Storvik]

[Text] Over the weekend 12 prominent officers in the Swedish Navy sharply criticized their government's handling of the submarine incidents. The 12 officers, who were interviewed by SVENSKA DAGBLADET, said that there are many more submarine violations than official statements indicate and that the government tones down navy reports. They also said that the government seems to assign a higher priority to normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. The action of the 12 officers is remarkable and really focuses the spotlight on the substance of Sweden's neutrality policy.

Norwegians have also questioned how much correspondence there is between the "liturgy" and the reality of Sweden's neutrality policy. Are there aspects of neutrality that cannot tolerate the light of day, that do best in the dark? Historian Rolf Tamnes posed this question in an article in HISTORISK TIDSSKRIFT.

Tamnes used a review of an article by two young researchers, Kersti Bildberg and Klaus Misgeld, as his starting point. They examined Swedish policy up to the mid-1950's from several angles, but Tamnes expanded this perspective and questioned the very credibility of Sweden's neutrality policy in our own era.

It is suggestive, for example, that Sweden is very restrictive when it comes to giving even serious researchers access to its archives. This is particularly true of the period after 1945. In other countries, such as Norway, researchers have been able to consult foreign, especially American and British, archives when the authorities turned down their requests. But that move is almost completely ruled out for Swedish researchers. Those who work with national records in Washington and London are struck by the fact that they have little to say about Sweden's relations with the West, especially when one gets into the 1950's, Tamnes writes. Is that because Sweden's situation is exceptional and highly sensitive from the viewpoint of Washington and London?



But then what about Yugoslavia? In the same archives one can find a lot of declassified material about the "plots" of the western powers with Tito following the break with Stalin in 1948. This tempts one to ask if it is the Swedes themselves who have put pressure on the Americans and the British to keep the material under wraps. Whatever the reason the result is that research has simply revolved around topics that lie outside the fundamental issue, namely the substance of Sweden's neutrality policy, Tamnes writes.

### Unusual Fare

It is thought-provoking to read Tamnes' evaluations in the context of an article by Captain Hans von Hofsten in SVENSKA DAGBLADET. And von Hofsten's criticism has been echoed by several other naval officers.

This was unusual fare for the readers: the captain revealed that the Swedish people (and those in the rest of the Nordic region) had not been informed of three serious episodes in which foreign submarines penetrated Swedish waters. The first took place near Faro as early as 1962. There was another episode in Gullmarsfjorden in 1966 and a third off Karlskrona in March 1980. In all three cases there was clear evidence that foreign submarines had entered Swedish territorial waters. Von Hofsten knows what he is talking about since he took part in the operations himself. At the end of this period he was the commander of the destroyer "Halland" which used armed force against a submarine in connection with one of the previously undisclosed episodes.

Von Hofsten said that Swedish defense policy has rested for far too long on a foundation that refuses to face the facts. And in addition: "The extent, intensity and seriousness of foreign underwater activity in our waters has been hushed up--and even ridiculed--by both the prime minister and the foreign minister in a way that can only be interpreted as an indication that they really do not believe or perhaps do not want to believe the reports they receive from the chief of defense."

### Credibility

Coming as it does from a high-ranking officer who is subject to strong loyalty demands, von Hofsten's criticism is quite remarkable. It can probably only be explained against the background of many years of frustration on the part of a career officer who is very familiar with what is really going on in Sweden and the Baltic Sea region and is in despair over the political leadership's passive and almost excusing attitude when confronted with hard facts.

But this again raises with full force the question of whether Sweden's neutrality policy is credible. It is of little interest how Swedish politicians responsible for this policy would answer that question. It is outside Sweden's borders, primarily in Moscow and in Oslo, that credibility can be measured. But here one immediately runs into difficulties, for in both capitals the official comments that are made public are never totally sincere, whether the reason is politeness or opportunism.

#### Viewed from Moscow

However Rolf Tamnes feels that Sweden's nonaligned status did win some recognition in Moscow starting in the mid-1950's, although it is doubtful that this attitude had any effect on Soviet war plans. But in the 1980's there have been new signs from the Kremlin that suggest a lack of confidence in Sweden's doctrine of neutrality.

In addition to the series of submarine episodes, which speak for themselves, a book came out in Moscow in 1984 that tells us something about political thinking among those in power when it comes to the Nordic countries. Author Lev Voronkov, who is described as a researcher, indicated that Moscow has never accepted the idea of "Nordic balance." On the contrary, he advocated a new security policy arrangement involving nuclear-free zones in which Sweden would be expected to play an active pro-Soviet role.

At this time it is probably being noted with great interest in the Kremlin that the Swedish prime minister is making strenuous efforts to stabilize relations before his trip to Moscow. It is also interesting that he considers it more valuable to visit the Soviet capital first before making a trip to Washington.

#### Viewed from Oslo

For reasons of self-interest it is not considered good manners in the Nordic countries to criticize the defense and security policy of one's neighbors. As far as possible politicians avoid saying anything that could add to or intensify the difficulties and that could present problems for them the next time around. And Sweden's neutrality policy has never been publicly criticized in Oslo. On the other hand no one has ever expressed satisfaction with it either. And one can detect signs of incipient uneasiness in Norway concerning the credibility of Swedish neutrality even though the uneasiness is not yet visible on the political level.

Indications of this uneasiness have been heard in connection with the Defense College's plans to arrange seminars and later on a big conference for the purpose of examining developments in Sweden's defense and security policy.

In the past Norway felt fairly certain that Sweden could not be used as a route for Soviet forces and that Soviet airplanes would not take a shortcut over Sweden to attack targets in Norway. In the 1950's and 1960's there was little doubt that Swedish defense, and especially the air force, was strong enough to deter attempts like this.

But now, unfortunately, doubts are beginning to arise. Recently the chief of the Swedish coastal fleet said that his resources were inadequate and that as a result the Swedish Navy had abandoned the idea of defending large parts of the coast. This involves the entire west coast and the northern and southern coastlines along the Gulf of Bothnia.

What about the Air Force?

But the Swedish Navy is not the only one with a lack of resources. From a Norwegian point of view the situation in the air force and developments in that branch in the future are of greater importance.

It would be interesting to find out if the Swedish Air Force has also been cut to the point where it must concentrate its forces on certain areas. And how many dangerous "holes" for Soviet overflights toward Norway would this create? These questions involve complicated evaluations but there seems to be no doubt at all that the credibility of Sweden's ability to maintain its neutrality should be examined very critically in the future.

6578

CSO: 3639/36

## NORDIC COUNTRIES' ARMED FORCES CHIEFS HOLD QUIET MEETING

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Oct 85 p 2

[Unsigned article: "Commander-in-Chief on Foreign Territory"]

[Extract] Commander-in-Chief Lennart Ljung, who is now in his eighth and last year as the government's defense chief, is in a quiet way very anxious for a functioning Nordic military cooperation.

Its being quiet is due to Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland having three different military and security policy solutions, in which the dependence upon NATO in the West and the Soviet Union in the East cannot be overlooked. Sweden, in the middle, is more independent, having committed itself to strict neutrality.

At intervals of several years, all four commanders-in-chief, or, as he is called in Finland, the commander of the defense force, meet so that they can discuss common problems. Some time ago this occurred in Trondheim, Norway, when the Nordic reserve officers' federation celebrated the 50th anniversary of the exchange of reserve officers among the countries, not least in the area of field sports.

At the jubilee banquet, Lennart Ljung could cautiously admit that he had already visited Norway the day before the official invitation, in a Swedish military helicopter, which in heavy fog strayed several kilometers across the state border at Sulitelmamassiv. He was immediately forgiven by Olof Palme.

9909

CSO: 3650/48

## ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL RESTRUCTURING, TRAINING PLANNED

## Equality Among Two Groups of Officers

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 2 Nov 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Officers and Officers"]

[Text] In the personnel system development plans of the Defense Forces made public last week attention was focused primarily on changing military ranks even though they are in themselves a secondary issue in the whole matter. The emphasis of the reform is on improving the quality of training, above all, by means of accomplishing the intermediate educational reform in the military area also.

Naturally, military training must also be renewed as the work of the Defense Forces and, above all, weapons systems develop along with the great leaps in technical development. The work of the training instructor will become ever more demanding. It is also reasonable to reclassify duties. In many duties a long military training is not necessarily imperative; for example, a professional nutritionist coming from a civilian occupation as chief of a garrison mess hall can manage just as well as a sergeant-major.

The question presenting the most problems will be the merging of the career paths of warrant officers and cadet officers. The distinction between professions has not in itself been as drastic in Finland as it is in many other countries. Cadet officers have received normal recruit training and in wartime capable noncommissioned officers were generally promoted to captain. About 10 years ago the concept of warrant officer was created and the path was opened up for them to advance to the lower officer ranks without attending the cadet school.

Now it is intended to open up the path for warrant officers all the way to the rank of major. Since more than half of the whole warrant officer corps will retire from this rank, those who have received an intermediate or higher education will have been made rather equal.

Even the smallest outward symbols from spruce twig decorations on the collar badge to the lion fighting against swords are important in the army. Now the



concept of warrant officer will be eliminated; the career of an academy officer will begin again from the rank of second lieutenant. An experienced sergeant-major or a warrant officer received more respect in the eyes of an outsider than a young lieutenant. If, however, the academy level officer corps considers a reduction in differences in hierarchy to be important, it is probably not too dangerous.

One of the important principles of today's society is the elimination of educational blind spots. A college-level engineer can work in the same job as a graduate engineer, and a graduate of a commercial institute can direct a bank office just as well as an economist. From this point of view it is justified to overlap the graduation of ranks at the lower end of the hierarchy of cadet and academy officers as well as emphasize the opportunity for an academy officer to acquire a higher level of training.

On the other hand, an incorrect thinking on equality should be avoided in an educated society if anywhere. A demanding task presupposes a demanding education -- and as such it is not reasonable to run everyone through all the channels. The new proposal does not mean a transition to a uniform command in the manner of Sweden and Norway; higher-level duties presuppose the training of a cadet officer, and the highest level duties presuppose studies at the War College with its various continuation classes.

Satisfaction of the demand for equality easily results in an inflation of titles in all organizations. The opening up of the rank of major to academy officers means that the rank of a unit commander will change to major. In the final count the consequence of this will be a step up on the ladder of ranks for all other duties, which can cause problems in international comparisons, among other things.

It is just as clear that in the Defense Forces there are numerous duties in which an officer is not needed. Are enlisted men becoming a new group of non-commissioned officers? The title of "professional military personnel" has then been proposed for enlisted men to crown their own distorted concept of equality. What then is a noncommissioned officer?

And if the Defense Forces deem it important to give in to the backward demand of apparent equality -- indeed, it does not in itself cost anything -- it would be much more important to correct the inequality prevailing in the economic position of the professions.

Lieutenants, first lieutenants, and captains, who have come from the ranks of warrant officers, receive a better salary than officers of the same rank who have graduated from the Cadet College. This can, perhaps, be even justified by the various increases for seniority -- indeed, a capable cadet officer will have an opportunity to go quite far. On the other hand, it is senseless that, for example, in field exercises commanders receive a smaller salary than their subordinates because of a different compensation system.

The friction between the two professional groups in the Defense Forces is an unnecessary hitch in the security policy machinery even though the positions

of the trade unions [officers' leagues] should be seen in the proper perspective as a straightforward promotion of interests. On the basis of the proposal of the Defense Forces we should begin a process in which respect is given to the other party, economic inequality is eliminated, and outward status symbols are not exaggerated in modern society in a strange manner.

#### Defense Forces' Personnel Structure

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 9 Nov 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Defense Forces Personnel System Being Reformed"]

[Text] The restructuring of the personnel system in the defense forces was begun about 10 years ago. The elementary school based noncommissioned officer corps was changed into a comprehensive school based warrant officer corps. The reform still had the stamp of a partially experimental nature and many questions remained open. Now it is a question of taking the whole reform to its final form so that the new educational structure of society as well as the effects of the intermediate educational reform, in particular, and overall technical development will be correctly applied.

The General Staff has naturally conducted its work independently, but very aware of the demands and limits established by the practical differences and differences in principle in two unions operating among the personnel. Simply stated, the concern of the Officers' League has been the retention of the traditional identity of the officer and the high level of training. The position of the Cadet College as the basic university based training school for the higher level officer corps has remained as an essential demand. In the matter of salary the league is especially irritated by the fact that an officer who has graduated from the Cadet College must wait several years before reaching the level of a warrant officer of corresponding rank.

The young Warrant Officers' League, for its part, has proposed the transition to an integrated officer system, in which the Cadet College would be replaced by an officers' academy based on secondary and higher education and officers would be appointed to the officer corps without any distinction. University level warrant officers have not been satisfied with the opportunity reserved for them to enter the Cadet College through a long process in the manner of the general intermediate educational reform. And the rank of captain as the highest rank in a warrant officer's career has been too modest.

The general framework of the training and educational system in the final personnel plan will remain the same in principle, the academy level and cadet school will be retained. The granting of the title of officer to everyone without distinction is the most surprising reform. It could be retained as a mild inconsistency as differences in basic education and duties remain more or less the same since one can advance from the command of basic unit or company to the highest leadership in peacetime only by means of the academy level cadet school.

Those individuals graduating from a command academy or an officers' academy according to the reform would continue to work within the framework of maintenance and technical duties though they can now advance to major from the rank of captain. This concession in the restructuring plan was also made so that trainers will not be required -- as the Officers' League has unconditionally demanded -- to have a college level education, the officers' academy being sufficient. The acquisition of qualifications in officers' colleges and advancement through various courses and the War College would guarantee the same opportunities for those who have completed the officers' academy as graduates of the Cadet College under the new system. In practice a longer road will remain a possibility only for the most persistent, but in any event a quota for nonuniversity graduates will be reserved in the officers' colleges according to General Valtanen.

In spite of the elimination of the noncommissioned officer rank and the generalization of the officer designation, the basic personnel corps will not, however, make up a uniform officer corps. The officer designation most certainly pleases the warrant officers, not to mention the additional benefits. On the other hand, the chief demand of the Warrant Officers' League to obtain a simplified and uniform command system with officers' schools and advancements will remain unfulfilled. The plan will retain the prevailing partial overlapping, but it will apparently satisfy -- as the General Staff has probably thought -- the principle segment of officers, the higher officer corps, with relatively few changes.

Even modest changes here and there are in themselves important. Inconsistencies in beginning salaries would be rectified, as well as the system of compensating education. The acceleration of career development is promised as an essential improvement in the plan. Its speed will be revealed only after we can be certain of the new ranks and funds, and this is already in the hands of individuals other than those compiling the plan.

#### Younger Recruits, Longer Service

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Nov 85 p 21

[Article: "Military Service at Age 19 Already"]

[Text] The number of recruits will decrease at an even rate until 1992 when a new increase will begin. For this reason consideration is being given to a law by which the number of recruits will be evened out. Therefore, 19-year old males will be accepted into the military. There will be the least number of 20-year old men in 1992.

Generally, there are 35,000 men in the military every year. From this the number will initially fall off drastically and will then even out at 31,000. In 1992 it is expected that only 27,000 men will enter the services.

Large fluctuations in the number of recruits are not good from the point of view of the garrisons. However, not one of the 38 garrisons will be closed, but dispositions will occur in the garrisons. The fact that men would enter

the military from two age groups thereby preventing the depopulation of garrisons has been considered as an equalizing factor.

The hope has been expressed in the Defense Forces that 19-year old men would be approved for the Army. Therefore, the Defense Ministry is now preparing a proposal to amend the selective service law.

#### Fewer Entering Civilian Service

The number of individuals applying for civilian is continually decreasing. The greatest number was in 1982 when 1,174 men chose civilian service. This is 2.9 percent of all recruits.

According to the new civilian service law, the duration of service will be increased from 12 months to 16 months. The law has already been approved and it will go into effect in 1987, and the inquiry board system will be eliminated at the same time. The law required an even more detailed approval of the statute.

It is believed that an extension of the service time will reduce the desire for civilian service. Last year 894 men entered unarmed military service, and the number is still under a thousand. The first time there were more than a thousand men in civilian service was in 1978. Men in civilian service make up 2--3 percent of all recruits, even last year they comprised 2.3 percent.

The Defense Forces assign Jehovah's Witnesses and others who refuse to enter the military for religious reasons to unarmed service. Their number has usually been about 200. Thus the fluctuations in the number of those refusing to enter the military are for ethical reasons.

10576  
CSO: 3617/31

## SWEDISH CHIEF OF STAFF ON NORDIC MILITARY IMPORTANCE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Nov 85 p 15

[Article: "Nordic Area Has Become Important to Super Powers"]

[Text] The security policy situation in the Nordic area has undergone an essential change in the last few decades. The Nordic area is no longer a remote area from the point of view of the super powers, but rather quite important when examined from a strategic point of view, stated Swedish Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Bror Stefensson in Helsinki on Tuesday.

Economic questions as well as technical development have affected this change according to Stefensson. Oil has become an important factor for each power group and this, for its part, has increased the significance of the North Sea and the Barents Sea. As a result of technical developments, attempts at direct overflights in Nordic airspace must be taken into consideration, particularly in a crisis situation. The surveillance of much more extensive areas is easy by means of computers and satellites, he said.

Stefensson also touched upon recent border violations in his presentation. Most of them, especially those committed by aircraft and surface vessels, have been unintentional. On the other hand, those committed by submarines have more often than not been intentional. This is a clear sign of the increased military attention being given to the Nordic area and particularly of the importance of the Swedish coast in a possible conflict, stated Stefensson.

#### Small Countries Must Do Something

"The weather prediction is rather bad if we are to compare the situation in the Nordic area to the weather," said Stefensson. This does not mean an increased danger of a major war, but rather a deterioration of the general atmosphere. Small countries must not just be satisfied with observing these changes, but they must do something in order to improve the situation, he emphasized.

So far Sweden has succeeded very well in its material defense readiness. However, our defense capability must be measured according to what is happening around us. The question becomes even more problematical when we remember that if we are not masters in our own house, our credibility is lacking.



If we make our defense weaknesses public too forcefully, the consequences will be negative, and if we keep them a secret, the consequences are the same, said Stefensson. He predicted that the discussion on maintaining Sweden's defense capability will be animated until the spring of 1987. At that time the decisions to be made will provide a picture of how credible Sweden's neutral policy can be considered.

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## TOP DEFENSE OFFICIALS VIEW MILITARY SITUATION

De Ruiter on Image

The Hague LEGERKOERIER in Dutch Oct 85 pp 11-13

[Article by Minister of Defense De Ruiter: "Defense, Not in the Wrong Place"]

[Text] The striking thing in the Netherlands is that despite all the troubles and problems, over the cruise missiles and nuclear arms for instance, the vast majority of the population feels that this country must continue to be a member of Nato. That has been and is the view of our successive governments. We continue to be firmly convinced that without Nato our security absolutely cannot be guaranteed. And fortunately there are no important groups in Netherlands politics that think differently on that score. Seen from the Netherlands, the Netherlands-Nato relationship is not problematical, and the reverse is true as well. Nonetheless, in this country people assume that Nato's view of the Netherlands is more negative than it is in reality. The appreciation felt for the Netherlands within Nato has of course suffered because we have been working for several years on a decision on something that Nato sees as a central point of its policy--the cruise missiles. But even so I notice that within Nato, and this includes the military commanders who deal directly with the Netherlands armed forces, there is a wide appreciation of the Netherlands' contribution and of the dedication and training of our units.

## Nato Contribution

Also partly responsible for that view is the fact that in recent years we have been able to keep our contribution to Nato respectably up to snuff, based on the agreements included in the coalition agreement. That does not however give us the right now to think that we can get by with a little less. After all, for this cabinet period we have assumed annual real growth of two percent in defense expenditures, although an earlier Nato agreement--which was also accepted by the Netherlands--laid down growth on the order of three percent. This agreement was recently reconfirmed by the Nato ministers.

When this cabinet took office, the economic situation in this country was much gloomier than at present. For that reason we told Nato at that time that we would just have to take a small step backwards. A small step, moreover, that has had considerable consequences for planning. We also accepted that, and the entire Netherlands political world also supported that decision. Now that we are finally beginning to see some improvement in the economic situation, there is all the more reason not to slack off. So it is entirely realistic once again to take that agreement on roughly three percent growth as our starting point for the period after 1986. The fact that Nato partners like the United States are now temporarily reducing their budgets is irrelevant. You have to remember their much greater financial efforts in past years. It would be unreasonable, if not unfair, to conclude from their reduction that the Netherlands will be contributing more than those partners. We have to maintain a certain modesty on this point.

## Not Weapons Fanatics

In addition I would like to make it very clear that we in the Netherlands never talk about weapons and money for armaments in isolation; rather we always see those things in a wider context of international consultation, of negotiations aimed at arms limitation and, more broadly, at disarmament. So we are not weapons fanatics who simply think the more the better. Politically speaking, we want nothing more than reductions all along the line, East and West. It is however dangerous and actually in conflict with that goal to draw fixed financial consequences from it, in a kind of vague hope that those negotiations will someday succeed.

There is also that fact that modern weapons systems such as we do have to acquire as part of the process of renewal, even though we do not blindly keep up with developments in this area, are much more expensive than in the past. That has aptly been described as a sort of structural disarmament. If we do not take that into account, if we purchase new weapons with the same budget as before, then we will fall clearly behind.

## Political Spectacle

What we also have to watch out for is that we do not place too high expectations in the negotiations between East and West on arms control and arms limitation. Those expectations have often arisen from strong hopes and from the understanding--and this is not unique to the West--that we simply cannot go on arming ourselves unrestrainedly all over the world. Negotiations are politically the only feasible way to work on that. Sometimes, however, you see that not much effort is being made at the negotiating table; instead they carry on a kind of global discussion in interviews on both sides and in speeches. The only purpose of this can be to win a more favorable position at the negotiating table and in public opinion. That public pressure certainly works against the real negotiations.

Compared to the excessive expectations, the results must certainly fall short, and that can give people the impression that we are gradually getting very close to war. Fortunately that is not the case. There are no indications that either of the superpowers is considering undertaking any adventure. The entire political spectacle surrounding the negotiating table has a bad effect on the atmosphere, which must however be a good one if they are to reach results. I find that a very troubling development. But there are also hopeful signs. Despite the laborious negotiations and the charges on both sides, we do have various negotiating fora and extensive trade and cultural relations between East and West.

## Necessary Growth

Let us come back to the Netherlands defense effort. I have already said that a certain growth will be necessary in the defense budget, if we do not want to fall behind compared to the present situation, which itself still gives some cause for concern. We do however have to take into account the fact that deep cuts are having to be made in very many sectors in this country, and thus that the defense growth will always be less than it should. For that reason we constantly have to ask ourselves whether we are spending the defense budget as efficiently as possible. To prevent more money from being spent than necessary, we have possibilities at the international level, such as cooperation on equipment, something that State Secretary Van Houwelingen is working for. But at the national level too we can do what needs to be done. The defense apparatus itself will have to reduce the weight of the administrative side in order to improve the operational side.

After all, everything we do--politically and administratively, from highest to lowest--is aimed at fulfilling the operational mission as well as possible. If there are things in the organization that are in the way, then they will have to be altered. There are innumerable complaints that the organization works imperfectly, but it is not so easy to seek out where the real bottlenecks are. You will not find discover them just by setting up all

sorts of working groups, internal and external; to discover them you need the cooperation of everybody in the organization. I think it very important that at every level, even where the large political totality is not visible from day to day, people join in thinking about concrete measures to improve operational readiness. That demands that people be well informed and well motivated.

### Social Acceptance

And that brings me to another important point: social acceptance of the defense apparatus and of the people that work in it. In my contacts with military personnel I do find that they wonder about that. I always point out--and I cannot emphasize this enough--that it is not just that the Netherlands political world finds defense necessary, but that the vast majority of the Netherlands people also believe it to be essential. And there is no reason at all for the military to think that they stand apart in Netherlands society and are not genuinely accepted.

The Netherlands is a country--and that is a very fine thing--where people discuss policy a great deal, defense policy too. No day goes by but the papers are full of articles about subjects connected with defense. Just take nuclear weapons, for instance, and now I am intentionally not talking about the cruise missiles. Churches, political parties, writers, professors, and others ask: "Do we have to, can we?" That is a normal and also a politically desirable process. This kind of debate also takes place in Parliament. The government takes the point of view that in the present situation certainly, but presumably also for a much longer time yet, nuclear weapons are necessary to a strategy that aims at security, but that on the other hand everything must be done to reduce the pressure that nuclear weapons exert on the entire world. Anybody who claims--and I know some people do--that this means we question the value of the armed forces, well, they are wrong.

In Nato too there are talks underway everywhere as to what is the best function and structure for the armed forces now. Nor must these debates lead to a feeling that the governments have come to view the military as second class. On the contrary, the precise point of them is to employ political understanding as a guide to optimize their contributions to the total process of preventing war and furthering peace.

### Not a Necessary Evil

Naturally things can happen that give a bad picture of the armed forces. Take the affair in Oirschot, where conscripts were truly treated in an absolutely impermissible manner. The sole correct reaction in such a case is not to conceal or minimize the affair, but to admit right out that mistakes have been made, that we do not view that as normal, and to keep on with the process of creating conditions such that abuses like that become known and can be combatted. On the other hand, you must not get the idea that the armed forces are made up solely of saints. They are after all a large organization, and things can go wrong there. That is still no reason for the people who work there to think that they are in the wrong place. They, like me, have a task to carry out as responsible citizens in a large operation, which in this case happens to have a defense mission.

For that matter you often hear people describe the armed forces as a necessary evil. I think that is much too negative a way to look at it. The armed forces are a necessary contribution by the government to stability and to preventing war in the world.

### Motivation

In an earlier connection I used the word "motivated." During my visits I have been able to see that the armed forces not only function well but are well motivated as well. Of course there is concern about things that work less well, about falling behind as a result of all the financial difficulties, about the questions of pay that are so important to everybody. Even so that cannot be grounds for lack of motivation, because other

organizations in our society too have to accept restrictions. The important thing, however, is that people be able to bring up the problems with those who bear the responsibility, that those problems be recognized there, and that they be worked on.

I am convinced that the vast majority of our armed forces are striving to achieve the best possible results with the means available. It does not go unnoticed that the Netherlands armed forces are like that. From my international contacts--and this sounds like a little sales pitch from a minister who wants to say something nice--I find that people know that the Netherlands soldier likes to make the effort when a challenge comes up. And that is true not only of the volunteers but also very certainly of the conscripts, for whom I have great respect. The nice thing about the Netherlands conscripts is that they like to grumble and sometimes come across as a bit unmilitary on the outside, but when it counts, they cut an extremely good figure. And you cannot expect young men between 18 and 20 to work the whole day with a smile on their lips.

It is also good from another point of view that we have conscripts in our armed forces. They form a cross section of youth in our society and force the armed forces to be attentive to social developments.

My impression after being minister for a few years is that you can indeed offer some criticism of the Netherlands armed forces, and that the armed forces also have reason to direct questions at us, but that all in all they are a well-led and well-equipped organization within our society, one that we can rely on if need be.

#### Van Houwelingen on Modernization

The Hague LEGERKOERIER in Dutch Oct 85 p 14

[Article by State Secretary Van Houwelingen: "Modernization Demands Close Attention"]

[Text] What we have given a high priority to in recent years is changing how things are organized, which is necessary if we are to make the transition from relatively simple to complicated equipment. Although that transition had already been announced in the Defense Note of 1974, the idea that this would also have consequences for organization only came up much later.

Another important organizational point has been that, parallel to the modernization of our defenses, which includes all sorts of large projects, the decision-making process within the entire Ministry has been further streamlined. That has led to the introduction of an entirely new procedure: the Defense Equipment Selection Process (DMP). This has brought much more order into the decision-making process for equipment projects, from beginning to the end, including the final phase of disposal, although that still needs to be worked on some more. The regulation covers everything from, say, the initial study up to the actual purchase and introduction of new equipment.

A second point that I think is very important is that of the measures to get better control over the operation of the armed forces. We have now reached a point where we are certainly going to plan and organize their operation better in advance. You can only do that if you know precisely what is happening. The final work is being done on the information system that we need for that. It will take a few years more. This is a broad policy, and it will take time before steady control over operations leads to control of costs and improvements in the quality and thus the readiness of weapons systems. We have already noted some improvement in recent years however.

#### International Cooperation



Another point that has received very close attention is international cooperation on equipment, the attempt to achieve more standardization. Within the defense organization a policy has been developed for this. The acquisition of important projects also calls for a different approach. The Ministry has become not just the purchaser, but more the project developer--jointly with the other countries and, on a political level, with industry. The goal of this policy is to get more defense in the end from the same budget. In addition, Netherlands industry should benefit more from that budget. This must not however be turned into artificial acquisition procedures, which often lead to additional costs. The Ministry has in the past spent hundreds of millions of guilders extra for that.

The main point is to buy products where it is most advantageous to do so, i.e. to let competition work. On the other hand we want to use international cooperation agreements in such a way as to have Netherlands industry share in the profits as much as possible. Not only has management been improved, but more money has been made available for the operation of the armed forces. One specific example that will show up at the working level is the improvement in the supply of spare parts and maintenance equipment. Modern equipment and adequate operation will lead to an improvement in the level of training.

Good training grounds and the use of simulation techniques are of essential importance in carrying out training programs. After all, and certainly in a conscript army, you have to be able to train quickly, and that demands the most modern means. In this connection it is also important that the matter of training grounds has been clarified in the Netherlands. The plan for the structure has been accepted by Parliament, and we are now coming to the point of setting things up.

#### Accent on Quality

We have not put the accent only on the quality of organization, the decision-making process, and operations, but also on improving the quality of working and living conditions. In a large organization like the armed forces you cannot escape the need to modify plans. An effort has always been made, however, to avoid making too casual cuts in budgets for working and living conditions, which are so important to a soldier. That does not mean to say that it never happens, but it is at all events weighed carefully when it does. You would be safe in saying that people see a change in policy in this regard.

Summing up, I would like to say that the Memorandum of Explanation in the 1986 budget reveals that after years of talk about standardization and European cooperation, that has now become our integrated policy. If you compare this Memorandum with one from 3, 4 years ago, you will find a big difference between them. And that is due to a clear policy choice.

#### Hoekzema on Personnel Issues

The Hague LEGERKOERIER in Dutch Oct 85 p 15

[Article by State Secretary Hoekzema: "Priority on Personnel Is Correct"]

[Text] The more familiar I got with my job, the clearer it became to me that over the years the legal position and working conditions of the military and the civil servants in the Defense Ministry had moved very close together. I believe however that the limits to that process are emphatically determined by the unique mission of the soldier in the armed forces. His position in the organization is definitely somewhat different from that of the civil servant by and large. That is why I very intentionally began on a comparison of pay and benefits packages in 1983, to lay the foundation for personnel policy. A comparison like that is of course a gigantic job, and the fact that it was accomplished in 18 months shows how seriously we took the matter.

## Pay Structure

Now that we have gotten this far, you hear people saying we should draw the financial consequences. To do that, we will first have to draw up a new pay structure. Where the comparison gives us averages, we will now have to determine how the pay structure should look rank by rank. That is a very different matter, because there are some ranks that have not fallen behind. So it calls for careful thought. Although it may take some time before we have that new pay structure, it is of course important to make a start. Well, we have.

The sum of 50 million guilders has been earmarked for the first stage of the compensation adjustment, as part of the work and rest time adjustment. That represents a doubling, and that is very noteworthy at a time when finances are extremely tight. What must also not be forgotten is that pending the new pay structure, we have held up the decision on the health cost regulations for soldiers and their families. And that despite the fact that as far back as the 1982 Spring Note, it had been determined that health cost regulations for the military should be made the same as those for civil servants. Now that will only come about in connection with the new pay structure.

## Reduced Working Hours

Something else that demands quite close attention is the reduction in working hours. This does not have to be a problem for the armed forces, as long as the 80 percent of the lost time that is made up to us is directed at the main problems we face now. If working hours should be reduced even further in the future--even for the armed forces--than something will have to be done about the length of initial training.

To be sure there are jobs that a person can carry out after a very short training period--guard duties, for instance--but that will not work with other jobs. Because of the increasingly advanced technology in the armed forces, training people to use complicated equipment will require a certain minimum time. That means that you will have to move toward a variable service time of around 12 to 18 months. The question is how you convince conscripts to choose the 18-month jobs for officers and specialists. Pay will have to provide the answer in one way or other. In my opinion we can do that within the constraints of the budget, because a longer period of service also means that you need fewer people each year. In addition we will be able to stop the trend toward having to attract more and more volunteers, which is expensive.

In any case, for the armed forces there is a limit somewhere to reductions in working hours. They have to remain in total readiness, and in that way there is no comparison with other operations.

## Visits

The Inspector General of the armed forces has found a discrepancy between policy at headquarters and how it is understood at the working level. You can only overcome that by carefully providing information explaining that policy. Visits to units lend themselves particularly well to that. In talking with people you find out where the problems are. On the other hand you must not be afraid to give them your own policy ideas. So as a minister you have to move around in the organization regularly to see what is happening.

Looking back at the recent past we can conclude that in the personnel policy area a lot of things have been begun and completed. Besides the measures already discussed, we could also mention the integration of women into the armed forces and the regulation on disputes, which was connected with the completion of the whole system of consultation. The list could go on quite a bit, but the important thing is to show that the defense leadership has to a considerable extent put the priority on people. And the people have, I am firmly convinced, very much earned that.

12593

CSO: 3614/30

## BOFORS PROCEDURES IN ILLEGAL ARMS SALE TO IRAN DESCRIBED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by Bo Gandersson]

[Text] Businessman Karl-Erik Schmitz in Malmo -- said to be Bofors' middleman in the suspected smuggling of war materials to Iran -- has now decided to speak out openly. In a newspaper interview he said that last winter he helped Bofors sell 200 tons of gunpowder to Iran by way of Yugoslavia.

Through his company, Scandinavian Commodity, Schmitz was to buy a hundred million dollars' worth of oil from Iran last year, he said in the newspaper, EXPRESSEN.

During negotiations in Teheran, representatives of the Iranian defense department said they wanted gunpowder, military explosives, detonators, and cartridge cases in exchange.

Schmitz, who for a decade has done business in Iran, made contact with gunpowder and explosives factories in a series of West European countries in order to set up an exchange.

#### Got a Bite

In Yugoslavia he got a bite. A factory was prepared to deliver 500 tons of gunpowder and explosives. But the crux of the matter was that this supplier could not provide the whole shipment.

"The supplier contacted Bofors in Karlskoga. To be more exact, Nobel Kemi, which is located within Bofors. After a few days, Bofors called me up to discuss the deal," he said in the interview.

In November of last year Schmitz and a representative of Nobel Kemi traveled together to Yugoslavia and concluded the business.

According to Schmitz, the transportation was accomplished by a ship from Sweden that took the load of gunpowder to Yugoslavia. There the cargo was

immediately loaded onto another vessel, which took the gunpowder to Iran.

Bofors' subsidiary company, Nobel Kemi, which acted as the seller of the gunpowder, had the permission of the Swedish government to export to Yugoslavia. But the authorities there had concluded a so-called final user agreement in which they guaranteed that the war materials would stay in Yugoslavia.

"Unknowingly"

Schmitz says that he himself was not aware of the export conditions and that he had no way of knowing about such things.

"Bofors has been in this business long enough to know what it is doing. And the company didn't have to concentrate on anything except the delivery to Yugoslavia."

In answer to the direct question as to whether Nobel Kemi knew that Iran was the real receiver of the gunpowder, he answered: "Yes, Iran was mentioned in the discussions. And besides this, there are only two large users of gunpowder and military explosives today -- Iran and Iraq. Bofors benefitted from the exchange of goods I arranged. Nobel Kemi's man talked about the fantastic market down there. They aren't exactly buying gunpowder to put it on the shelf. He complained that the market was closed to Bofors."

#### The Only Business

Schmitz deals through his business firm in Malmo for most of the goods: socks, food, chemicals, fertilizers, among other things. He says that the business with the 200 tons of gunpowder is the only one he has done for Bofors' account.

On the other hand, he says that he was the middleman for a great many Western countries that sold gunpowder and explosives to Iran.

As DAGENS NYHETER has reported earlier, most Western European countries are involved in this business, and many governments are also connected with the dubious business of smuggling to Iran.

Last summer the Italian authorities halted the export of war materials to Iran. The matter concerned, among other things, a 50 ton load of gunpowder from Bofors that was discovered when it was on the way to Iran through Italy.

#### Sealed

Swedish customs officials followed the 50 ton shipment on its way through Europe, and, according to the report, informed the Italian authorities, who took action. Bofors was later forced to take the shipment back. Today it is confiscated and sealed in Karlskoga.

Schmitz says that he has contracts for the delivery of gunpowder and explosives to Iran for a total of 70 million dollars. He says he delivers 200 tons of gunpowder a month.

Nobel Kemi is suspected of having smuggled a 200 ton, a 50 ton, and another shipment of gunpowder to Iran. The criminal investigators from customs think that the company misled the government when it sought permission to export to Yugoslavia and Italy when it was selling to Iran.

Not until April of next year at the earliest will the prosecutor, Stif L. Age, decide whether to prosecute Schmitz and the representatives of Bofors.

"The Deal Was Intended for Yugoslavia"

Nobel Kemi's manager, Hans Sievertsson, told DAGENS NYHETER that his company undertook some gunpowder business with the help of the Malmo businessman, Karl Erik Schmitz.

"But the deal was intended for Yugoslavia, not Iran. Our documentation shows this," Sievertsson said. "Through Karl-Erik Schmitz and his company, Scandinavian Commodity, we received a business contract in Yugoslavia. I don't remember how many tons of gunpowder were involved," he continued.

"We then sought and obtained the permission of the Swedish government to export gunpowder to Yugoslavia. After all, this is a country to which we normally sell war materials. The Yugoslav authorities also concluded a so-called final user contract, and we also have proof of receipt from there that shows that the gunpowder was imported to Yugoslavia."

In the interview in EXPRESSEN, Schmitz said that Nobel Kemi knew all along that Iran was really the final receiver of the war materials. But Sievertsson will not confirm this statement.


"I can only say that our internal documents contain nothing that indicates that the gunpowder went farther than Yugoslavia. To say that the gunpowder was intended for another country would presume that we cooperated with the Yugoslav authorities. We don't do this, and besides, it is a practical impossibility," Sievertsson said.

Sievertsson would not discuss the question of whether he could have been misled by his subordinate officers and not received sufficient information about the gunpowder and explosives.

Nobel Kemi is an integral part of the Bofors company and manufactures and sells, among other things, gunpowder and military explosives. The customs police suspect that the company is smuggling war materials to Iran, Syria, Egypt, and other countries in the Middle East in the amount of about 100 million kronor.



Soon Hans Sievertsson will testify at an inquest, and there he will, in his capacity as manager, more or less automatically be informed that he is suspected of the serious crime of smuggling.



Key:

1. The businessman arranged for the transportation of 200 tons of gunpowder from Sweden to Yugoslavia. The government had given Bofors permission to export there.
2. Last spring Bofors attempted on its own to ship 50 tons of gunpowder to Iran by way of Italy. But the shipment was stopped by the Italian authorities and returned to Karlskoga.
3. In Yugoslavia the gunpowder shipment was immediately reloaded on another ship that took it to wartime Iran in violation of Swedish law.

9124

CSO: 3650/69

## PAPER COMMENTS ON ARMED FORCES' CHIEF SUB INCIDENTS REPORT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Oct 85 p 2

[Editorial: "The Commander-in-Chief Shows His Pictures"]

[Text] In his last quarterly incidents report, the commander-in-chief is again more definite. About five observations during the period from July to September are considered to have no other explanation than that foreign underwater activity has occurred on Swedish territory. The probability that this is the case is assessed by the commander-in-chief as high.

This is a message with more serious significance than the report in July, according to which an intrusion could have occurred, and in which it was emphasized in a new way that "incontrovertible proof" was lacking. Before then, in April, the most uneventful period in 15 years was spoken of, and the January report was unprecedentedly cautious. The number of sightings reported reports declined this September in comparison with the two preceding months, but in comparison with the corresponding quarter in 1985, there has been an overall increase.

It is politically significant that the government is thus unfortunately far from being able to assume that Sweden's efforts to defend its territory have led to tranquility in our waters. This is also evident from the departing defense minister's comments. As part of his political testament, Anders Thunborg emphasizes the need for a continued rapid build-up of the Swedish submarine defense.

The fact that the commander-in-chief is making public an example of the sightings during the year is an outstanding initiative. If anything, however, the material confirms the suspicion that exclusively visual observations are in practice worthless. With today's obviously more rigorous sifting, one wonders whether the defense staff and analytical groups would really be able to give the same basis for a Harsfjarden incident today that the the submarine defense commission gave late in the winter of 1983.

Evidence has to stand up in the courts, where different parties can conduct an interrogation. One requires something else from a basis for conclusions that could lead to security policy assessments.

The commander-in-chief's latest report is certainly going to be noticed most because of the photographs published, the first of their kind in years of hunting for submarines. It is said here that this had to do with military personnel on guard, who were alerted. The pictures are reported to have undergone spectral analysis and data processing. It has been asserted that the object was artificial and moved through the water under its own power. To put it differently, it could accordingly be a part of a foreign submarine. The layman, of course, cannot draw any conclusions whatsoever of his own just by looking at pictures that have given the experts a great deal to ponder.

The defense staff's information chief also says that the pictures do not amount to any proof. This is a bit of an embarrassment. But even so, thanks for the candid account!

9909

CSO: 3650/48

## NAVY CHIEF RENEWS REQUEST FOR SPECIAL ANTISUB CORVETTES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Navy Requests Four Coast Corvettes"]

[Text] Next week, the navy will get four new coast corvettes, specially equipped for hunting submarines, if the government decides in accordance with navy chief Bengt Schuback's wishes.

The four corvettes, which will cost a total of 1.2 billion kronor, will be built by Karlskronavarvet.

"The coast corvettes are a crystal-clear issue for us. It is the minimum required for us to be able to meet our surface attack requirements and strengthen the submarine defense organization," DAGENS NYHETER was told by Commander Anders Timdahl of the naval staff.

The four new coast corvettes will supplement the two corvettes "Stockholm" and "Malmo," which are currently conducting their trial runs and are to be operational during 1986 or 1987. The navy's coast corvettes are to replace torpedo boats of the Spica class.

According to the navy, the coast corvettes are a necessary addition to give the submarine defense organization more staying power.

The corvettes are equipped with radars, mines, depth charges, and a new towed hydrophone, "Fisken" [the Fish], which makes it possible to search for submarines for a long time. The coast corvettes are capable of operating for an entire 24-hour period.

#### Motor Replacement

The navy has so far only been able to rely on its Vertol helicopters, which do not have the same staying power, and whose active hydrophones are primarily intended for searching for submarines out at sea.

At the same time, these heavy helicopters will get different motors. The replacement of the motors of the 20 Vertol helicopters of the air force and the navy will cost 500 million kronor.

9909

CSO: 3650/48

## NAVY COMMANDER DISCUSSES ASW EFFORTS

PM191700 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 8 Nov 85 p 3

[Swedish Navy Chief Bengt Schuback "Focus" article: "Our Efforts Have Been Inadequate"]

[Text] The 1969 defense law paved the way for a drastic reduction in ships and other units which, in addition to their normal role in the defense of our coasts, were particularly suited to protecting shipping, against submarines attack, for example.

The then Navy chief announced that he considered the developments in the Navy to be unacceptable. The lack of helicopters and ships for submarine hunts was then raised year after year, but without result.

The rundown in the Navy's capacity in this respect is clear from the table below:

| Number of units      | 1968                                     | 1985                            |
|----------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| Surface attack ships | 60, including 20 destroyers and frigates | 34, including 2 new corvettes   |
| Submarines           | 21                                       | 12                              |
| Minesweepers         | 39                                       | 22, including 2 new minehunters |
| Helicopters          | 10                                       | 10                              |

Thus it took approximately 15 years to reduce our submarine hunting capacity to today's low-water mark. It will take at least half this time to begin to build it up again.

It is not simply a question of acquiring materiel. Hunting submarines requires long training and great experience among personnel if success is to be achieved. Regaining lost competence will take time. The situation is similar in the field of research into underwater technology, which has been neglected as a result of the shortage of consumers.



For more than 2 years now the Navy has been restructuring its activities and devoting its energies wholeheartedly to improving its antisubmarine defenses with the very limited resources at its disposal. With the support of the government, normal training has been put on one side. Comprehensive materiel purchases have been initiated.

Over a 2-year period more than 2 billion kroner are being invested in various antisubmarine measures. A little more than half this sum has been given to the Navy through various measures, and the rest has been achieved by adjustments to previously planned and much needed purchases for the fleet and the coastal artillery. In addition, the level [of] ambitiousness of normal training has had to be reduced.

But this restructuring will take a fairly long time--too long a time in the view of some, to judge from recent signs of "frustration" among my officers.

Some 10 to 15 ships and helicopters were constantly at sea and engaged in anti-submarine activities for 215 days during 1984. Some entrances to Sweden's archipelagoes were kept under constant surveillance. If the ice period is ignored, this means that Swedish units were in service day and night, on ordinary working days as well as on public holidays--something without parallel in the postwar period.

This effort has been possible because of the sacrifices made by personnel, despite the large amount of overtime involved and lengthy absences from home. Despite inadequate resources people have done their best to get the violations to stop.

This certainly deserves great recognition!

But our efforts have not been enough. We have been forced to note this the whole time. However, much has been gained in the way of experience about the nature of underwater activities and the management of antisubmarine operations.

The two coastal corvettes, the "Stockholm" and the "Malmo" will become operational next year. As a result submarine hunts which embrace a range of ships, helicopters and aircraft will be given a further component which will be able to engage in submarine hunts for a long time and in difficult weather conditions. Two Landsort-class minehunters are already part of this force, and there will be further units. Considerable quantities of underwater sensors and weapons are beginning to make their appearance with different service units, at sea and on land.

In 1987 the situation will be further improved. A submarine hunt force of a size able to carry out its task along a section of coastline for a considerable period can be set up in 1990 when the four coastal corvettes whose funding was approved last week enter service. At the same time even more entrances to Swedish archipelagoes will have been equipped with modern surveillance materiel and new weapons.

We know from experience that submarine violations have been used against us simultaneously on a broad front over several sections of coast. We must therefore be realistic and begin to plan, because not even then will our resources have a sufficiently deterrent effect. More forces and more well watched areas are needed for the simple reason that our coast, which needs to be kept under close surveillance even in peacetime, is so long.

The measures so far decided should therefore be seen as a first step in the expansion of our defenses against submarines and correspond pretty well to the Navy's production capacity in the coming years. What happens then is one of the most important questions facing the present Defense Committee.

If the present level of defense spending is maintained a second submarine hunt force cannot be set up until the turn of the century! The Armed Forces commander in chief has presented his report, which is to serve as a foundation for the 1987 Defense Bill, in his long-term plan part (o885). With the 3-percent annual increase in the defense budget recommended by the commander in chief it will take 10 years before two all-round forces and some significant strengthening of the surveillance of the entrances to Sweden's archipelagoes can be achieved.

The commander in chief has decided that he is unable to give the Navy a larger share of resources in the total equation for the armed forces that he has had to draw up. A symptom of how much the strength of our defenses has fallen since the beginning of the seventies!

The Navy chief has proposed a considerably more rapid buildup which could give 3 to 4 forces by the mid-nineties, but has accepted the commander in chief's equation within the proposed economic framework. The future will show whether this will be sufficient. I doubt it.

After the serious submarine violations in 1980-1982 the government issued new rules in 1982 for the action to be taken by the Swedish Navy against violations of our territory. The rules mean that in so-called Swedish internal waters, in our archipelagoes, for example, arms may be used against foreign submarines without prior warning.

The rules state that in territorial waters advance warning must be given before arms are used with the aim of bringing the submarine to the surface. By international standards these rules are strict and represent a delegation of the decision whether or not to use weapons to the man in command on the spot, which shows confidence in the Navy's personnel.

Contacts with submarines are often short because of the configuration of the waters in which the contact takes place, and swift action is therefore important.

When I give lectures I am often asked if one of the reasons why we have never succeeded in bringing the submarines to the surface is the fact that political restrictions have been placed on us. My predecessor, Rear Admiral Per Rudberg, generally replies to this question by saying that he "survived five governments

and six defense ministers" and that none of them imposed any restrictions on him over and above those contained in the IKFN [expansion unknown] rulebook.

I myself have been taking part in submarine hunts for a long time in a position of responsibility. I too have never experienced any form of political interference or been given any instructions as to how the job is to be carried out.

Nor has the government sought to limit the openness with which the reporting of indications and observations of foreign underwater activity has been carried out. I want this said to put an end to the misunderstandings occurring at present.

Naval combat forces have their most important role in cooperating with the other combat forces to create a deterrent to attack from the sea. Practically all the Navy's units have an all-around usefulness in various conflicts in peacetime, neutrality, and war. The capacity to combat submarines is important in all these situations. Violations of our security can never be accepted.

The reconstruction of our antisubmarine defenses has up to now tallied quite well with the Navy's capacity to administer the resources that have been given to it. The political leadership has played its part in this respect.

The approach adopted in the 1987 defense bill will be crucial for the continuation of our desire to demonstrate our determination to maintain credible anti-invasion defenses and to put an end at last to the violations of our territory.

/8918

CSO: 3650/73

## NAVAL HELICOPTER UNIT DEVELOPS ANTISUBMARINE CAPABILITY

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish Oct 85 pp 11-17

[Text] Based on the experiences of World War II the Swedish Navy was the first military service in our part of the world to latch onto the early development of helicopters. The need for an airborne platform integrated with the naval forces--primarily for reconnaissance purposes--was no less important to us than to other navies. Aircraft carriers were completely excluded and obtaining access to coordinating aircraft from the Air Force also was not an entirely frictionless process. The helicopter then seemed to be the answer to our prayers. It was small and had the unique property of being able to be based--at least temporarily--on cruisers and destroyers, for example. Land bases were relatively resource-economical and, last but not least, the Navy itself was able to decide when, where and how to deploy the helicopters.

Said and done. Tests were initiated as early as 1951, and the Navy Chief's Helicopter Committee in 1955 had plans for no fewer than five helicopter wings. Each wing was to consist of eight heavy and three light helicopters, as well as a special long-range reconnaissance helicopter intended for direct cooperation with our coastal missile batteries.

Unfortunately, since then the times have been characterized by fiscal belt-tightening. New Navy plans at lower funding levels have had the result that many good projects have been delayed or cut back in quality and quantity. Some have never even been realized.

Of the committee's proposals the only ones to remain were two helicopter divisions which were established in the late 1950's and which are still in existence and are stationed at Berga in the Sodertorn region (1st Helicopter Division) and at Save outside Goteborg (2d Helicopter Division).

On the other hand, over the years these units have undergone a rapid operational and technical development and today form two small but efficient units with many and difficult duties to perform.

The submarine incursions of the last few years, as well as the rearming of the surface attack units with long-range sea-based missiles, have, separately, once more confirmed an old truth: No navy worth its name is able to fulfill its duties without an integrated airborne component. It is even possible that the submarine incursions during the 1980's would never have been initiated if the five helicopter units contained in the proposal by the 1955 helicopter committee had been realized.

## The Helicopter--a Naval Unit of Many Pursuits

The helicopter has many unique properties--some have a positive effect on the performance of its duty, others affect the task negatively. In order correctly to utilize a helicopter in naval connections, it is necessary to create circumstances such that the positive properties are exploited to the maximum, at the same time as the negative ones are minimized. Failure to do so often results in something other than what was anticipated.

The all-overshadowing positive characteristic is the operational and tactical mobility of the helicopter. Two and one-half hours after starting from a field base in the Stockholm region a fighter group, after rapid refuelling in Blekinge, can for instance be deployed for antisubmarine hunting outside Karlshamn. During the actual mission the group can be redirected from the Karlshamn area to the Utklippan region, for example, in about 15 minutes. An enemy submarine, which in its periscope spots one of our antisubmarine helicopters on the horizon--far beyond sonar range--could 5 minutes later be involved in fighting for its life with that same helicopter, which has surprised it by rapidly moving closer. A submarine which slowly approaches our coast in submerged position without perceiving any threat could in the next minute be exposed to armed action by a helicopter equipped with guided and target-seeking antisubmarine torpedoes. This operational and tactical mobility thus permits the realization of one of the most decisive basic rules of warfare--the desirability of surprise.

The most limiting property of the helicopter system is its absolute base dependence. This can vary from a simple advanced refuelling spot to a major base, where the helicopter can be repaired, rearmed and obtain fuel and ammunition as well as food, rest and new orders between missions for the crews. A well-functioning base system is necessary if the helicopter system is to retain its combat endurance.

There are those who maintain that the major weakness of the helicopter is its short tactical endurance, which is limited to 2-4 hours. This assertion is both correct and incorrect depending on what it is compared to and the criteria used.

A missile boat naturally has greater endurance during a reconnaissance mission than a helicopter, which, however, in turn has greater endurance than a reconnaissance version of the Viggen, for example. But in comparing the three systems and their capability of reconnoitering a large area of the sea as a function of time--meaning with the actual result of the endurance for the same type of mission, the order must be reversed.

The limitations of an individual platform in terms of action time can always be compensated for by having more units--and this is primarily where our problem can be found. We have sophisticated helicopters--but too few.

## The Spheres of Action of the Naval Helicopter

The unique flying properties of the helicopter have resulted in its use all over the world for many types of duties, both military and civilian.



The heavy helicopters of the Swedish Navy have two principal tasks:

- Antisubmarine activity
- Radar reconnaissance with target data transmission to missile boats

Furthermore, they have a multitude of secondary duties, such as:

- Rescue service
- Materiel and personnel transports
- Minesweeping
- Fire-fighting

#### Antisubmarine Warfare in War and Peace

Today the antisubmarine function is the totally dimensioning function--a circumstance which can scarcely have evaded anyone. The entire HKP4 weapon system (see the fact box) is built upon this type of mission, and all other duties are more or less a result of expanded utilization of either the antisubmarine equipment on board or of the helicopter platform as such.

The capability of the helicopter to stand still in the air above a point results in, for example, the possibility of lowering various sensor equipment into the water. It may be said in a somewhat oversimplified way that in the antisubmarine task the demand on the system is primarily to bring a sophisticated vertically adjustable hydrophone with a well-trained operator to exactly the desired location. If there is a submarine at that spot the system is supposed to be able to indicate and classify it and subsequently deploy weapons. All equipment on board is optimized in order to cope with this task independent of weather and light conditions.

Our helicopter system is primarily developed for antisubmarine warfare outside the coastline and at sea and not inside the skerries. It is essential to remember this. The enemy is then a conventional submarine which normally must behave actively in order to reach its targets. These may be for example our routes of transportation to and from Gotland or to and from Sweden or our naval forces during operations at sea.

The helicopters are then utilized either in a "free antisubmarine search" when searching areas at sea before our ships arrive or in a "fixed antisubmarine hunt," in which the helicopters are grouped around our ships in a protective antisubmarine screen.

An enemy submarine, which in a similar situation is forced to act passively--to lie still or lie low on the bottom--has great difficulty in completing its mission. An escort force consisting of ships and helicopters completes its mission principally by seeing to it that the escorted ships arrive safely in port--not primarily by rendering the submarine harmless. By forcing it to act passively the same result is achieved.

If the enemy submarine is on an intelligence or mining mission, for instance, it should act in a different manner. The time factor is not equally important. In the event a submarine threat occurs, a passive submarine tactic is the only correct thing to do--wait out the opponent and continue when the threat is reduced. A submarine acting in this manner--particularly inside the skerries--today has a significant chance of avoiding discovery, a fact that is just as well-known as it is deplorable.

Here the endurance and performance characteristics of the respective system come to the foreground. After the Harsfjorden incident the Maritime Commission determined among other things that we had many too few antisubmarine helicopters and that their equipment needed to be improved with respect to the new threat picture. Subsequently measures have been taken which will increase the number of helicopters and provide us with additional new equipment in order to be able to identify objects on the bottom.

Within the foreseeable future helicopters will be needed for antisubmarine warfare both in wartime and during incidents in peacetime, there is no doubt about that.

#### No Reconnaissance--no Information

The above motto, borrowed from the air reconnaissance units, is obviously applicable to our naval units as well. Leaders of operations both on land and at sea must have information about the opponent's position and strength in order to be able to undertake necessary measures ahead of time--moving, concentration of strength as well as preparations for coordination and protective measures etc.

Since an antisubmarine-equipped helicopter requires a radar for various purposes (searching for periscopes, fire control, navigation etc.), it became natural to use it for radar reconnaissance against surface targets as well. "The seagull that flies highest sees the farthest" is an axiom which is valid for radar stations as well. Raise up the radar into a high tower, in a helicopter or in an aircraft, and the range increases dramatically.

Consequently, our heavy helicopters have been used in many years of exercises in order to provide information about the location and strength of the opposing units--information which is transmitted via radio to fire control centers on land, outlying combat ships and attack aircraft. The new missile system of our surface attack units has such a long range that external target information sources are necessary if in a missile duel with the opponent we are to win the "battle for the first strike."

The development in this area follows other navies, which already utilize helicopters for the same purposes. New and more powerful radar stations for HKP4 are being procured and their radar images will be transmitted to our ships via encrypted data-based radio link.

#### The Helicopter Units Undergo Change

The two helicopter divisions of today are largely self-sufficient units as regards training, helicopter materiel and maintenance and base services. However, much argues in favor of keeping primarily training and helicopter maintenance together in one place under the leadership of one authority. But at the same time there are operational demands to have helicopters permanently prepared for deployment in the various regions.

The Navy chief has therefore decided to introduce a new helicopter organization within the Navy beginning with the 86/87 fiscal year. The background for this is the supreme commander's decision that four heavy helicopters (HKP4) are to be transferred from the Air Force to the Navy and equipped for antisubmarine warfare and, further, a government decision that

the Navy is to have only one helicopter maintenance facility and that a third helicopter division is to be established in southern Sweden (Ronneby).

Work on the introduction of this organization is already in full swing. In principle, materiel and personnel will be distributed according to the table below.

All three divisions in the new organization have a joint task--maintaining readiness for and undertaking ordered operations in their own region or through a concentration of forces in a region. In addition, the First Helicopter Division is responsible for all basic training of both crews and technicians and base personnel for the peacetime and wartime organizations.

At the 1st Helicopter Division an antisubmarine aircraft is presently being tested for the purpose of gaining experience from this platform, which among other things carries passive reconnaissance sensors against submarines, such as infrared and sonar equipment. There are also thoughts of testing lasers as well as arming these aircraft.

Many navies are using precisely such antisubmarine aircraft. These are normally 2-4-engine large aircraft with long periods of action and with great capability for operating independently at sea, something that a helicopter will never be able to manage.

#### STRIDS- OCH ELDLEDNING FRÅN HELIKOPTER



#### Combat Information and Fire Control from Helicopter

These very expensive and sophisticated aircraft are especially suited for use against large and noisy nuclear submarines in Atlantic waters, but are probably not very cost-effective against silent conventional submarines in the Baltic Sea, for instance. But certain systems can be mounted in smaller and relatively inexpensive aircraft and can thus be utilized in a more cost-effective manner for moved-up passive area reconnaissance.

The future will show the ultimate design of these new naval aircraft and their place in our antisubmarine organization.

#### Increased Base Mobility--Increased Protection

The wartime organization of the helicopter units will also be changed within the next few years. Today's wartime organization is built around a relatively well-covering system of ordinary bases (O-bases) and temporary bases (T-bases). This base system is fundamentally sound since the helicopters are always relatively near an established base no matter where they are operating.

But in recent years above all two factors have brought about a new base philosophy, partly the increased threat against fixed bases, and partly the difficulty of providing many bases with the required technical equipment and competent personnel.

#### The New Helicopter Organization

|                                    | Number |      |                     |                    |           |            |
|------------------------------------|--------|------|---------------------|--------------------|-----------|------------|
|                                    | HKP4   | HKP6 | Antisub<br>aircraft | Career<br>officers | Civilians | Conscripts |
| 1st Helicopter Div.                | 8      | 8    | 1                   | 108                | 5         | 100        |
| 2d Helicopter Div.                 | 3      | 1    | 1                   | 38                 | -         | 10         |
| 3d Helicopter Div.                 | 3      | 1    | 1                   | 37                 | -         | 10         |
| Helicopter section                 | -      | -    | -                   | 6                  | 3         | -          |
| Helicopter maintenance<br>facility | -      | -    | -                   | -                  | 20        | -          |
| Total:                             | 14     | 10   | 3                   | 189                | 28        | 120        |

By making the base components for wartime divisions completely vehicle dependent and by applying a mobile base tactic, the threat against the all important bases can be reduced. This mobility also allows the bases to be moved into the vicinity of the operational area.

It is essential for the vehicle park of the helicopter divisions to become suited to the purpose and supplied with the required reserves, or else we risk the helicopter units becoming overly tied to their location.

The most outstanding quality of the helicopters--mobility--must not be limited by a poorly functioning base system.

#### If You Want the Best--Be Prepared to Pay

Every Navy chief who has an integrated aircraft component surely wishes for an expansion of it in order to retain or reinforce the total effect. But it is also likely that he hesitates at the cost. Procurement and operation of airborne systems are some of the most expensive things available, and the need for advanced personnel is nearly infinite. But if it is not possible to do without, what does one do?

Surely one compromises and tries to acquire as many aircraft components as is practically feasible, at the same time as one tries to keep the operational costs down by limiting flying time allocations and minimizing the personnel



cadre. A limitation of flying time allocation results in a reduced need for funds, spare parts and technicians, since the machine park is then at "half speed." Everyone adjusts to what is possible at this level and time passes.

But then something happens, perhaps an incident, perhaps a conflict--and the system is ordered to operate at "full speed." It is then found that the crews drift back down toward "half-speed" due to a lack of spare parts and a shortage of competent technicians. Then incantations and spells are of no use and one has to pay dearly in terms of time and money for building and maintaining the system at the level intended from the beginning.

Such rebuilding can take several years.

Many dangers lurk and there are no shortcuts. If a reliable air component is desired, it is necessary to let it grow from a number of healthy and strong "roots:"

--Regular turnover of airborne, sensor and weapons materiel. With time old materiel becomes more expensive to maintain and its performance characteristics and availability decrease relative to altered threat pictures and demands.

--Well supplied stockpiles of spare parts and exchange components.

--Sufficiently many and competent technicians at both central and local levels, that is to say as many as are needed in order to operate the system at "full speed" and in order rapidly to be able to handle and take action involving potential technical problems.

--Professional crews, which have mastered their materiel to perfection and, when necessary, are professional enough to get the most out of what the system is capable of supplying.

Shortages at the "root level" sooner or later show up in the form of poorer results, reduced availability of materiel and personnel departures.

With a slight travesty it might be possible to state that to a Navy chief the "roots of the helicopter system are bitter, but its fruits are sweet."

Over the next few years the chief of our Navy intends to add both materiel and personnel to the helicopter units which will considerably improve performance characteristics and availability. The Navy's helicopter units are thus able to face the future with confidence, and all of us are delighted about that.



The HKP4 B/C Weapon System

Number: 3 HKP 4 B      Manufactured by Boeing Vertol, USA, and delivered during the early 1960's. These helicopters are presently undergoing a modernization. (Civilian designation: BV107-II)

7 HKP 4 C      Manufactured under license by Kawasaki Aircraft Industries, Japan. (Civilian designation: KH107-II)

Note:      Four Air Force HKP4 were modified and will be added to the Navy during the period 1987-1990.

Engines:      Two Rolls-Royce gas turbines of about 1,300 HP each (Bigger engines are intended to be added during the period 1987-89)

Max. starting weight:      About 10,000 kg

Sensor equipment:      Active hydrophone, radar, torpedo fire control

Armament:      Depth charges, antisub torpedoes

Other equipment:      --Automatic navigation system (permits automatic flying during the entire mission profile and thus operation totally independent of visibility conditions).  
                          --Decca navigator, Doppler radar navigation system, direction-finding system. (VOR and ADF)  
                          --Complete equipment for instrument flying  
                          --Radio equipment for HF, VHF and UHF  
                          --Emergency direction-finding system and rescue gear  
                          --Tow hook for towing ships or smaller minesweepers

Performance data:      --Cruising speed about 110 knots  
                          --Operational time 1-4 hours, depending on the choice of load

Crew:      2 pilots, 1 observer (tactical leader), 1 hydrophone operator and 1 flight engineer

#### Fact Box for HKP6

Number: Navy;      10 manufactured by Augusta-Bell, Italy (Civilian designation: Augusta-Bell 206A)

Engine:      Allison 250-C20, about 400 axle HP

Max. starting weight:      1,450 kg

Sensor equipment:      Radar (Decca 125), bathythermograph

Armament:      Depth charges

Other equipment:

- Direction-finding system (VOR and ADF)
- Limited equipment for instrument flying
- Radio (VHF)
- Cargo hook for hanging loads

Performance data:

- Cruising speed about 100 knots
- Operational time 1-3 hours, depending on the choice of load

11949

CSO: 3650/60

## NAVAL OFFICER DISCUSSES PROBLEMS IN COASTAL DEFENSE ABILITY

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 5 Nov 85 p 2

[Article by Fredrik Braconier]

[Text] Harsfjarden--"The submarine intrusions are definitely continuing." This straightforward report was given by the chief of the coastal fleet, Claes Tornberg, when he met Monday with a group of journalists out in the waters of Harsfjarden. While the coastal fleet was beginning its major fall maneuvers and missile ships were leaving port near Berga, the commander took the opportunity to share his views on the situation in the Baltic Sea.

This situation is not especially encouraging from the Swedish standpoint. The Baltic Sea has more and more strategic significance and our entire oblong country borders on this body of water. Even though all our naval resources are now concentrated in the Baltic Sea south of Aland, we still do not have much to offer.

This is particularly true of our resources for hunting submarines. In 1990 we can expect to have 1.5 antisubmarine units, but we will need several more. In addition, while enemy submarines can stay out for 1 month, the Swedish navy operates normal Swedish working hours.

"Being half-blind is not enough. We also have one or two arms tied behind our back," one naval officer dramatically expressed today's situation.

The conclusion is that the Swedish navy today lacks the ability to detect foreign submarines, even if the navy happens to have a vessel on the spot.

This, in turn, means that the true number of submarine intrusions is certainly much higher than indicated by the statistics--and rapid improvement is hardly in sight. Even if the commander in chief should convince the politicians to meet his demands for future allocations to the military--which the leadership of the coastal fleet doubts--this will provide only a slow improvement in our ability to hunt intruders under the surface of our waters. In today's situation, our leaders have other priorities.

"It is considered more important for our coast guard to explore for oil than to hunt submarines," one officer commented bitterly in connection with the

navy's difficulty in procuring airplanes to improve its ability to counter the submarine threat.

The Swedish navy is now occupied not only with submarine hunting in times of peace. On the contrary, the main task is to prevent an invasion on and under the sea during times of war.

Can what remains of the Swedish fleet carry out this mission successfully?

The answer is that it depends on where and when such an attack takes place. An attack from the west would hardly be hindered by any Swedish warships at all. Everything we have, we have in the Baltic Sea.

A rapid and unexpected attack would also meet limited resistance. If our defense is to be effective, it must have time to mobilize. The navy has attempted to increase preparedness with the resources that are available, but these are hardly sufficient. If a serious situation should arise on short notice, only small sections of the fleet would have time to weigh anchor.

One morning in Harsfjarden on board the combined staff vessel and minelayer Visborg a confrontation is revealed between peaceful Sweden and a more and more hostile environment. The sailors confront the threat from abroad far into our own waters, while the rest of the country seems to remain overly calm or even doubt the officers' reports.

The politicians fail to strengthen the military and the leading media discuss again and again whether or not any intrusions have even taken place. In a peaceful world, Sweden would truly be an exemplary member of the global community. We threaten no one and we do not seriously believe that anyone truly has evil intentions against us.

May Providence protect such a naive little country from the dangers of the real world.

There is an imminent danger that the remaining units of the navy will be insufficient to justify this confidence.

9336

CSO: 3650/70

## OFFICER REVIEWS DEFENSE PROBLEMS, CALLS FOR STATE RESPONSE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Han von Hofsten, Naval Commander]

[Text] The Foreign Ministry should deal with Sweden's foreign policy, the Defense Ministry with security and defense policy, and the government must manage this entire complex. The commander in chief and the defense branches must obtain and utilize the resources of the military according to the instructions of the Defense Ministry. Lower-level officers must see that instructions are carried out.

All this is logical and bureaucratically straightforward and in a well-developed country such as Sweden, it has a good chance of working. If extensive, detailed control is to be avoided, however, all levels must have the same basic insight concerning the nature of problems and how they are to be solved. If differences arise at the various levels concerning how fundamental facts are to be interpreted or dealt with, then this friction must be eliminated in some way if the overall system is to work.

In a democracy, of course, this is done through discussions, until a consensus based on reasonable arguments is reached.

#### Must Obey

An officer knows perhaps better than anyone else that rapid shifts in an external chain of events often necessitate actions that seem to conflict with previous patterns of behavior. There is no time for discussions or, for reasons of secrecy, they cannot take place.

In such cases in the military, actions are controlled from above through orders that subordinates must obey, even if they do not understand the overall context. They must have confidence that those above them know best in a given situation. In clear-cut cases this is called discipline. In confused situations it is called loyalty. In the military system, the individual must accept this unavoidable circumstance.



## No Problems

In nine cases out of 10 no problems arise, since the officers at the various levels are sufficiently well trained to understand the situation and inform everyone all the way down the chain of command.

Why, then, have signs of breaches in loyalty appeared in recent days? My answer can be summed up by saying that, for far too long, our defense policy has been based on arguments that deny the facts.

The extent, intensity, and seriousness of the foreign submarine activity in our waters have been concealed, belittled, or even ridiculed by prime ministers and foreign ministers in a way that can only be interpreted to mean that they simply do not believe or, perhaps more accurately, do not want to believe the reports from the commander in chief.

As a result, the practical countermeasures have been half-hearted, too little, and too late.

## Two-Way Loyalty

If military personnel must be loyal to the government and its policies, then this must be a two-way loyalty. This means that it is impossible, year after year, to mishandle the results of the efforts of this personnel without abusing this loyalty to the extent that the loyalty will fail in certain situations. This is a sad state of affairs.

Theoretically, I believe that there are two possible explanations to the government's actions. The government either ignores the violations intentionally for some obscure reason, or it simply does not believe they exist.

The former suspicion is rather unlikely, so I will deal with it later by relating my own observations.

Uncomfortable or unpleasant circumstances that do not mesh with one's previous concept of the world are often suppressed. If an unpleasant possibility is not supported by clear-cut indications, then one tends to seek other causes for one's observations. That is a natural reaction and I am not ashamed to admit that I was one of the first not to believe what was reported.

## Like A Hero

In 1962 a destroyer division was located off Faro waiting for a target for anti-aircraft practice. A 0.5 meter thick fog covered the calm sea. An observant young officer saw a small blip on the radar screen with a steady course and a slow speed. Persistent questions from the radar room below up to the officer on the bridge finally made me quite irritated. He "knew" that there was something out there, but I could see there was nothing that could do 7 knots.

Finally, the officer received the chief's permission to start the sonar: distinct

metallic echo, Doppler effect, and propeller noise! The destroyers, all with sonar contact, formed a battle line to turn away the intruder through a dramatic and powerful use of force. It disappeared out into the open sea at high speed, causing a horrible noise in our sonar equipment.

In my youthful enthusiasm, I felt like a hero, especially since my orders included pushing the button to drop depth charges. It was a great shock.

It was an even greater shock when, on my next leave, I found out that the newspapers had expressed doubt that it really had been a submarine. Was it not more likely that the question of defense spending was coming up soon and . . .

Not even all my fellow naval officers were convinced.

#### Happened Again

It happened again on 1 October 1966. A number of reports indicating submarine activity on the west coast were sent to military district headquarters in Skovde. The staff's submarine officer rejected many reports because the indicated location was difficult to navigate or too shallow. "In addition, it is unlikely that several submarines would violate Swedish waters at almost the same time!"

Those who doubted the incident at Faron supported the effort toward a careful analysis here, however, and the result was that four or five cases must have been submarines. All the naval officers were convinced.

When the report was presented at the defense staff, everyone bit their tongue, but said nothing. I was given a tongue-lashing by the chief of staff for explaining to the press the regulations contained in IKFN (abbreviation for the commander in chief's orders for "Military intervention during violation of Swedish territory in times of peace and neutrality, etc."): "To be sure, the orders are open, but we must not sound bloodthirsty."

The newspapers were skeptical. In an editorial, AFTONBLADET called naval officers obscurantists. The government said and did precisely nothing. In the debate over new IKFN regulations, the commanding general called for tougher regulations against submarines, but his proposal fell on deaf ears.

#### Budget Subs Appear

In 1972 a political decision was made, according to which the ability of surface vessels to hunt submarines would be eliminated. The naval chief protested vigorously to the government. Individual officers presented arguments in the trade press. With few exceptions, the press was indifferent.

Scattered reports were heard from 1967 to 1979, but no armed countermeasures were taken. This gave rise to the term "budget submarines." The fact that this implies an accusation that personnel made false reports while in service did not concern the mass media. Naval personnel had no way of defending itself and the politicians remained silent. Naval officers kept their clenched fists in their pockets.

## United States Shows Interest

On 12 March 1980, after a chase of several hours, the newly equipped destroyer Halland drove a submarine out of the inlet to Karlskrona. For the first time in a long time, a depth charge was dropped as a warning. The captain of the ship was prohibited by the commander of the naval base from using fire for effect. Even the most solidly pro-defense newspapers ran only a small, one-column report.

One person who did show interest, on the other hand, was the United States naval chief, who personally called his attache in Stockholm with instructions to find out everything possible about the incident. To his delight, he found out that the attache happened to have been visiting on board the ship when the incident occurred!

## Commander In Chief Prevents Article

No reaction from Swedish authorities was forthcoming at any level. The commander in Halland asked the defense staff for permission to write a newspaper article on what was happening along our coasts, in order to wake up the nation. The idea was rejected, on orders from the commander in chief. The crew of the only remaining destroyer asked their chief why no one believed them or reacted to what had happened. I had no answer.

The so-called Uto incident occurred during the fall of 1980. An analysis showed that several submarines had committed serious intrusions. After several depth charges had been dropped as a warning, the units participating in the chase were prohibited by the military commander from following the IKFN regulations and using fire for effect without his personal orders, contrary to the opinion of the naval base commander and despite the fact that, for the first time, the submarines tried to maneuver themselves free without leaving Swedish waters.

Finally, after warning fire was used several times, the order was given to use fire for effect. Once this happened, the indications ceased immediately. It now became clear that the entire military hierarchy had finally realized that there actually were foreign submarines in our waters.

## Sarcastic Press

The government (now of a different color) provided additional, although moderate, appropriations for materiel procurement. Large sectors of the mass media were still not only skeptical, but even sarcastic. More talk about budget submarines and other humiliating words of abuse caused several naval officers to think twice before appearing publicly in uniform and running the risk of being heckled.

Many of us thought that someone at a high level would have the courage to speak up, but this did not occur. This time the destroyer chief wrote an article for the navy's own journal, MARIN NYTT, without asking permission. The conclusion of the article was that we should "drop our gloves" and

implement the IKFN regulations, which are not all that bad, in a more consistent and tough manner. I heard by way of the grapevine that the commander in chief had expressed dissatisfaction. Otherwise, no one reacted.

#### U 137 A Godsend

The realization that submarines in our waters had become a serious reality had finally sunk in, but there was still no one at a high level who was prepared to make full use of the possibilities for the use of arms that were actually available even then. For the longest time, they did not want to believe that this was necessary.

Thus, on 27 October 1981, submarine 137 came as a godsend. Karl Andersson himself testified that he could not believe what he had seen until the Soviet naval flag was unfurled, showing the hammer and sickle. The whole event was simply unbelievable. But the scales fell from everyone's eyes. All the talk about budget submarines came to an end. Additional material was purchased and the IKFN regulations were sharpened.

Once again it felt honorable to be a naval officer.

The relief was mixed with a feeling of discomfort, however. Two decades of struggle with all permissible and decent means to awaken the nation and make it see what was happening around us, but invisible and under the surface, had failed until the enemy went aground and revealed himself.

It is clear that it is virtually impossible to enlighten one's own organization and the public over a phenomenon that is difficult to observe and that emanates from individual persons and small teams of specialists at the bottom of an organization, particularly when we are dealing with unpleasant facts.

I believe that the example cited here demonstrates that, for unpleasant news to be understood and to permeate a nation, the information must come from the country's government.

#### Genuine Harmony

After the so-called Harsfjarden incident and after the Submarine Commission's study, which revealed a large operation with a total of six submarines at various locations in the Stockholm Archipelago, there seemed to be genuine harmony throughout the military complex. All levels seemed to be aware of the nature and extent of the threat, tougher regulations were issued, and new materiel was on the way.

Everyone was able to work in a system that corresponded to their training and reason.

Then some strange things began to happen. The prime minister was accused of sending mixed messages to the Soviet Union through GRU officers in New York. Exceptional measures, by Swedish standards, were taken against representatives of the opposition.

Quarterly reports from the commander in chief spoke of continued serious violations and the government said it took a serious view of them, but it gradually toned down statements by the commander in chief until it began to sound as if it were doubtful that any violations had occurred.

The consistent position against the responsible power, which the government spoke of, began to shift back and forth along with the number of violations reported during the most recent quarter.

#### Began To Wonder

It was not just navy people who began to wonder about the situation. This was demonstrated by the fact that the entire democratic opposition in parliament called for a no-confidence vote against the foreign minister.

All this was followed by professional officers with increasing surprise and discontent. They could not understand what was happening. Personally, I was most surprised when the prime minister said that Gromyko had assured him that the Soviet Union respected Sweden's borders and that we should "make a note" of his "friendly smile."

The fact that many well-informed people in our country were uncertain as to what the government really thought about the submarine violations and what reasons it had for acting as it did was indicated clearly by the actions of the nonsocialist parties, by books that were published, and by newspaper articles and the public debate.

Of course, naval officers were no exception. But none of this questioning and debating has yielded any results. The prime minister still speaks ambiguously and vaguely. Thus, almost out of desperation, I have forced myself to let honesty go before etiquette and speak out in order to provoke an explanation by the prime minister.

#### Idiots Can Be Right

Thus, in brief, this long article is an earnest plea to the prime minister to explain the government's security policy in plain language, for everyone to understand. It is also meant to elucidate a quote from Churchill: "One of the most important lessons I have learned from an entire life at the peak of power is that idiots are often right."

9336

CSO: 3650/70



## ECONOMIC EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AGENCY URGES NEW MEASURES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Oct 85 p 17

[Article by Emily von Sydow: "Reducing Imports in Wartime Requires Better Preparation"]

[Text] "Increased dependence upon foreign countries is a threat to our neutrality and our ability to support ourselves."

Sweden's economic preparedness must therefore help industry and municipalities to ensure readiness for action in the event of an international crisis.

The National Board for Economic Defense, OEF, has proposed in a report to the government that the country ensure better economic preparedness through closer cooperation between the economy and the authorities, for example in order to develop substitute products for the goods that might be affected by an end to imports. This includes, for example, alloy metals from South Africa.

The possibility of creating a substitute also reduces the need for stockpiling. The OEF wants a drastic reduction in the storing of supplies.

"We have already sold off a great deal of our oil reserves, since the use of oil is declining. We also do not need such large stocks of clothing and naphtha, which is a basic raw material for the plastics industry," says Gunnar Nordbeck, the director general of the OEF.

The sale of these stocks will partially pay for the investments that the OEF wants to make in order to increase the security of electrical power, among other things.

"It is not realistic to count on a blockade with closed borders. It is a 1940's term that does not apply today. We believe that in a wartime situation we are going to be able to import 60 percent of the ordinary goods, like clothing, etc., 50 percent of the strategic goods, like oil, and 20 percent of the goods that are controlled by one of the military alliances, e.g. electronics. We have counted on being able to import half that amount of these goods," says department director Mats Ekeblom.

9909

CSO: 3650/48

## RESEARCHER SEES ARMS INDUSTRY RELYING TOO HEAVILY ON WEST

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 26 Oct 85 p 18

[Text] Stockholm (NTB-TT)--Since World War II Sweden's weapons industry has supported NATO's arms buildup. The way security policy is implemented is a breach of Swedish nonalignment, according to peace researcher Bjorn Hagelin in a recent book.

Hagelin is a peace and conflict researcher at the University of Uppsala. He used to work for the Defense Research Institute.

In the book, "Arms Production Booming," he wrote that the longer Sweden tries to be the little land that mainly produces its own guns, missiles and airplanes the more Sweden will be forced to cooperate with other western arms industries. At the same time this increases the necessity of exporting weapons.

## Illegal Exports

The book deals largely with the controversial Swedish arms exports. The suspicion that the big Bofors concern has been involved in illegal exports has led many to ask if it is right to concentrate on this branch of industry.

Hagelin feels that no Swedish government can say no to this kind of arms deal. The need for exporting arms and cooperating with the arms industries of other countries increases as weapons become more expensive and more advanced.

He warns against thinking that with its current security policy Sweden is capable of freeing itself from defense industries that produce weapons for the NATO defense system. Hagelin points out that Sweden contributes to the western arms buildup. The Carl Gustaf anti-tank weapon and the Bofors 40-mm anti-aircraft gun have become standard items within the western defense alliance.

The Swedish arms industry helps the United States and the other NATO countries with research, expertise and materiel. The United States used Bofors guns both in Vietnam and on Grenada--while at the same time the Swedish government criticized both the Vietnam War and the intervention in Grenada.

"There should be no doubt about where Sweden belongs ideologically, politically and economically. Neutrality has not prevented cooperation between Swedish and western military industries. There is no corresponding cooperation with eastern countries," the peace researcher wrote.

## ARMY SEEKS NEW TANK FOR 1990'S; OPPOSITION EXPECTED

PM211633 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Nov 85 p 6

[Anders Ohman report: "New Tank An Army Demand"]

[Text] The Swedish Army wants a new tank toward the end of the century. By that time the two current models, the 102 centurion and the S-tank, will have outlived their usefulness.

A new tank will mean a bill amounting to billions of kronor for the armed forces.

The army could envisage some other weapon capable of replacing the tank in the anticipated combat milieu of the nineties. But so far the armed forces have been searching in vain.

"I consider that we need a new tank to meet the anticipated threat scenario of the 1990's. There has been a buildup of armored vehicles around us, and we have to counter this threat scenario. The best countermeasure against an enemy tank is a tank. If it is possible to find some sort of replacement, it is all right with me," Lieutenant-Colonel Anders Sifvertsson, chief of the Army General Staff tank division, said.

A new Swedish tank is expected to be a heated issue in connection with the 1987 Defense Bill.

The army's 101/102 Centurion and 103 S tanks will be rebuilt to cope with anticipated combat milieus up to the mid-nineties. They will be given new motors to increase their maneuverability. Their firepower will be increased and laser targeting equipment will be installed.

It will cost a little over 400 million kronor to modernize the S-tank.

Army Chief Erik G. Bengtsson has ordered from the Armed Forces' Materiel Administration a new armored vehicle called "Combat Vehicle 90." This will be produced in seven versions--from an armored track-laying vehicle to a shell-firing vehicle [granatkastarvagn].

The combat vehicle will give soldiers good protection against shrapnel and will be designed for combat in hilly and densely forested northland terrain. But the army does not view it as a tank.

The tank's military value lies in the fact that it can provide effective heavy fire and at the same time give soldiers full protection. The tank is suitable for combat in open terrain such as in southern Sweden.

Commander in Chief Lennart Ljung has given his views on economic alternatives at the various levels he has investigated in his program plan for the 1987 Defense Bill.

The commander in chief's lowest level for 1987-1992 is a kind of minimum framework for Sweden's defense potential, seen from the military viewpoint. It is the lowest level at which Swedish defenses would have any meaning.

The commander in chief also put forward his own level. For the army this considerably more expensive level would be the only one possible if the present downward trend is to be broken. It does not represent a Swedish military buildup but simply means that the margin by which Sweden has fallen behind the rest of the world will not increase.

As far as the development of combat vehicles in the 1987-1997 period is concerned, the commander in chief proposes that 2.8 billion kronor be spent on development and purchase. This is the figure at the lowest level investigated by the commander in chief.

At his own level the commander in chief proposes that a little over 4 billion kronor be invested in combat vehicles.

The difference between the two levels is most apparent from the figures for the purchase of new equipment in the 1992-1997 period: 1.8 billion against 2.8 billion kronor.

The army has on its shopping list: in addition to the development of a new tank, the purchase of new antitank helicopters and a new antitank missile.

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CSO: 3650/74

## ARMY DIFFICULTIES IN RETAINING OFFICERS REVEALED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by Anders Ohman]

[Text] The officer shortage in the Swedish army has reached the stage of an acute crisis. The greatest shortage, comprising 700 officers, is found among the group of company grade officers between the ages of 30 and 45. In units that have been discontinued, up to 60 percent of the officers have resigned. Premature departure is also great among young officer candidates who enter the private sector upon completing the military academy.

The army is also threatened with aging in the 1990s, when the majority of the officers will be over forty.

"The army's most important personnel mission now is to retain the personnel we have and to ensure good recruiting. The drain must cease. This must be taken into account in the coming defense resolution," Johan Kihl said. He is a lieutenant colonel and the chief of the army's personnel staff.

Commander in Chief Lennart Ljung has recently conferred with the four defense chiefs. The personnel question has been an important item on the agenda. The defense leadership is preparing for a meeting with the government.

## Gloomy

The army is experiencing a gloomy situation. Early departure among the permanent personnel strength, about 9,500 military men, is about 1.5 percent. In an economic recession the number has been down to one percent. Each percentage point corresponds to about 100 persons.

In the units that have been discontinued, the departures have been very large. Sixty percent of the officers resigned.

They chose to stay where they were living and take a civilian job instead of continuing their military career at another place. The army had hoped to liberate personnel resources by discontinuing units, but the departure was



greater than what the planners had calculated.

The greatest officer shortage in the army is among company grade officers on Level 3, where there is an acute shortage of 700 officers.

#### Aging

The army is experiencing a situation similar to that of the fleet as far as young officer candidates in military academies are concerned. The premature departure is great. About ten percent of the young candidates quit.

Another gloomy matter for the army is aging. Bengt Gustafsson, military commander in upper Norrland, warns that in the 1990s two-thirds of the army's career officers will be older than 40.

The reason for this is the double effect of a high retirement age and a reduced force together with a limitation of new recruiting.

"In order to maintain the necessary physical fitness, particularly for a military organization, a personnel policy resolution is necessary that will allow for early retirement and increased recruiting," Bengt Gustafsson said in his analysis.

#### Different View

The personnel section of the army staff has a somewhat different view of the aging threat. The many premature departures have a positive effect on precisely this tendency, since new recruiting becomes necessary, and younger military men come into the organization.

DAGENS NYHETER visited the Svea Life Guards on Wednesday in Kungsängen outside of Stockholm and met Major Rolf Jonsson, 35, the deputy company commander.

He had just been out exercising, running in the woods, something the Commander in Chief has permitted during working hours. Running in the woods is a way an office can relieve tension. His job can contain extreme stress.

"I often substitute for others. My job is to support and help," Jonsson said. He has been in the army for 17 years. He belongs to the largest risk group among company grade officers.

#### 25 Resignations

In the Svea Life Guards the greatest lack is among platoon leaders with the rank of captain, who take five to seven years to train. The unit has had 25 resignations since the beginning of the year. There are 300 officers in the Svea Life Guards.

"I have personally reached the stage where my motivation is weak at times. The positive part of the job is the soldiers. Those doing compulsory military service today are of excellent quality," Jonsson said. But he is worried that the soldiers will be disappointed with their training. It is insufficient. A recent investigation has shown that motivation decreases among compulsory military service soldiers during training.

Available resources are used for the squad leaders, who also experience their military service as more meaningful.

"We are forced to concentrate on the leaders first of all," Jonsson said.

9124

CSO: 3650/69

## ARMED FORCES FACING PROBLEMS RETAINING SKILLED OFFICERS

## Air Force Captain Complains

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Mats Holmbring, a captain in the Air Force: "Captain on Exodus of Air Force Pilots to Civilian Aviation: 'Make Air Force Attractive'"]

[Text] The MBL [Codetermination Law] negotiations between government and union representatives regarding regulations for the flight of Air Force pilots to commercial aviation will be concluded in a few days.

Those of us who received notification from the government on 14 March this year that no pilots from the Air Force could be employed by civilian airlines, accepted the consequences of this and resigned from the Air Force, should reasonably have had the opportunity, in a country of freedom and legal security, to have a certain amount of time to consider such an important decision. One might be leaving a position which has been held between 10 and 20 years.

The government is now proposing that those pilots who in January 1985 served as career officers in the Air Force, or those who were training for it and who had flight duty, may not be employed by civilian airlines.

Exempted are those who applied to leave in writing before 14 March 1985, that is to say the same day the government made its decision public.

## No Time for Consideration

Therefore, this means that no time for consideration was allowed in order to prevent the pilots from leaving the Air Force.

Now in October, when the government has had more than 6 months to ponder this, it is to be MBL-negotiated, and it is probable that once again it will end up being an encroachment on the freedom of the citizens.

The situation can be resolved the way it has been in other countries with greater freedom for the citizens.

## Stay of Their Own Free Will

In Norway and Denmark the Air Force pilot's job has been made so attractive that the pilots now choose the Air Force instead of civilian airlines.

If the will is there, we can continue to have a strong and powerful Air Force in Sweden, but only if the pilots remain in the Air Force of their own free will.

## Navy Cites Officer Drain

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 25 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Resignations Worry the Navy"]

[Text] The Navy is greatly worried over the early departures of technically well-trained personnel. Younger officers in particular halt their military career and choose well-salaried jobs in business and industry.

Navy Chief Bengt Schuback is proposing an extensive program of measures for the next five-year period in order to halt the exodus from the Navy.

Higher salary and increased support for families are on the proposed list.

The expanded antisubmarine activity results in a greater need for military personnel in peacetime, says the Navy chief, and he simultaneously states that the Navy has a troublesome shortage of younger qualified personnel.

The premature departures are numerous, both during officer's school and afterwards. Resignations of military personnel with technical training from the military academy are especially problematic.

"Through the influence of market forces the wage difference between the leading stratum of Navy personnel, as well as qualified technicians, and the corresponding categories in the civilian, state and private market has increased," the Navy chief says.

The Navy's personnel turnover is about 250 per year, who retire or who leave early.

## Low Wages

With the help of a civilian consultant firm the Navy has studied the reasons for the large number of people leaving early; 88 officers who requested leave of absence or resigned in 1984 were interviewed.

Forty-two of those who were asked replied, 25 of whom were interviewed and 17 of whom answered a survey.

The boom in business and industry explains the many early retirements in recent years from the Navy. The relatively low wage level in comparison with civilian life is not indicated as a decisive point.

Social issues, of a family-related nature such as stationing, command, family responsibility and working time as opposed to leisure time, and free trips home, are indicated as significant reasons.

Many of those asked have felt shrinking motivation for the officer's profession. This is partly because the naval system has ended up in a vicious circle because of the premature retirements.

#### Plugging Leaks

Many vacancies are filled according to the method of plugging leaks. Officers have to perform the jobs of two men and must assume positions of great responsibility prematurely. They may never feel the satisfaction of a job well done. This feeling of inadequacy in officers gives rise to thoughts of changing jobs.

An officer at sea in a ship unit can feel motivated more easily than in a post on shore. On the ship he can distance himself from much of that which disturbs motivation and concentrate on getting the ship, the unit, to function as well as possible.

One detail which has also created dissatisfaction is the midshipmen who, live a life of luxury during their training period in Karlskrona. A young cadet can spend up to 9,000 kronor net a month. His allowance permits these advantages.

The officers academy is absurdly perceived by the midshipment as an economic anticlimax. "I won't live this well even as an admiral," they may say.

Among the cadets there is something called the 100,000-kronor club. The members' goal is to live frugally during the period of study at the officers academy and set aside 100,000 kronor. These funds will then be used as college funds--in the civilian sector.

The Navy chief proposes a review of the financial conditions at the officers academy. One suggestion is to introduce a bonus system which is earned after a certain period of service after various schools and courses. A bonus of 40,000 kronor is suggested after 2 years' service at the officers academy. The system can continue up to the level of Navy commander.

The Navy Staff is very critical of what it calls the "economic opportunists in Karlskrona."

Captain Sven Carlsson, new chief of the Navy's personnel administration section, tells DAGENS NYHETER that it is good that the Navy is now talking openly about its hard-pressed personnel situation.

"All of these premature resignations cost a lot on money, and we must quickly find solutions so that the younger guys, in particular, will like it and stay," Sven Carlsson says.



Captain Bror Schweiler who works with placement of Navy personnel says that the situation is now so worrisome that it is time for a completely new strategy.

"Our suit is too large--in the present situation we cannot fill it," Bror Schweiler says.

The Navy chief emphasizes that the measures which must be undertaken in order to correct the personnel problems must take place within the framework of the Navy's economy.

#### Officers' Group Compares Salaries

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Oct 85 p 11

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Union About Officer's Exodus to Business and Industry: Threat to Entire Defense"]

An academy-trained naval officer can be offered a monthly pay of 20,000 kronor in the business sector--twice as much as he earns in the military. Early retirement among younger officers is a threat to the entire defense organization, say the two labor unions TCO-S [Organization of Salaried Employees-National Government Civil Servants Section] and SACO/SR [Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees-National and Local Civil Servants Union] which organize the officers' corps.

The officer's union shares Navy Chief Bengt Schuback's concern that so many officers are leaving.

Gunnar Rosen, first ombudsman for the National Organization of Officers (TCO-S), is of the opinion that the early retirements are a problem for all of branches of the military, not just for the Navy but also for the Air Force and the Army.

"A strong wage drift in the business sector has created this situation. Our military wage system with 2-year contracts is too rigid. We have not kept up with the wage development. The problem is not new, and it affects the entire government administration," Gunnar Rosen says.

The supreme commander has a so-called "market wage supplement" which is intended to reduce the wage gap. With this supplement an aircraft technician can get a monthly paycheck of about 12,000 kronor. In the aircraft industry he receives 14,000 kronor to do a similar job.

An officer who has completed an upper-level course at the officers academy has a higher market value. If he continues as an officer after completing his training he will have a monthly pay of about 10,000 kronor--in the business sector he is tempted by twice that much, a monthly salary of about 20,000 kronor.

"We have now somehow reached the threshold of pain. In the Navy the job is extremely hard due to the incident preparedness. Soon someone will have to

offer a lot more," says Sune Birke, ombudsman for the Swedish Officers Association within SACO/SR.

Military officers are organized in two labor unions. A merger has not been undertaken since there is dispute regarding organizational affiliation. The SACO officers do not want to join TCO-S or vice versa.

The two officers' unions have various proposals for solutions to reduce the early resignations in the Navy. One trip home per week is a joint demand. Many officers are at sea for long periods and are isolated from their families. The incidence of divorce is pronounced among Navy officers.

The Navy leadership's criticism of the "fortune-hunters in Karlskrona," that is to say the midshipmen who can collect fat monthly pay checks of up to 9,000 kronor net, is not shared by the labor union.

"It is wrong to put any group at a disadvantage. The correct way is to make continuing a career as an officer more attractive from the aspect of pay," says Sune Birke, SACO/SR.

On one point the officers' unions hold divergent opinions. This involves the Navy leadership's and the supreme commander's implementations of the regulations which apply to incident preparedness, within the antisubmarine organization.

#### Difficult to Interpret

"We believe that the Navy chief, CM, is not handling this very well. Instead of paying out incident compensation they invent other preparedness rules in order to save money. The personnel is given to know that they can do what they want on board but that the ship is expected to leave within 5 minutes. No compensation is paid. This has created irritation among our members," says Gunnar Rosen, TCO-S.

At the other officers' union, SACO/SR, the situation regarding incident compensation is blamed on the fact that the rules are difficult to interpret.

"We take a positive view of a joint solution with the employer on this," says Sune Birke, SACO/SR.

The Navy labor union picture is complicated. The Navy chief is both employer and military commander.

11949  
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## MYTH OF SCHLUTER'S ECONOMIC POLICY CONFLICTS WITH REALITY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Oct 85 p 16

[Op Ed Article by Jens Maigaard, candidate for parliament, Social Democratic Party: "Poul Schluter Not at All the Blessing People Are to Believe"]

[Text] From as far away as Singapore, the prime minister reports that the government adheres to its objective of achieving a balance of payments equilibrium by 1988. It is quite understandable that, shortly before the municipal elections, Poul Schluter will seek to keep alive one of the myths supporting his government. But that myth is becoming increasingly worn, and the attempts at keeping it alive increasingly unconvincing.

The myth supporting the government consists of two elements: (I) The sanguine Social Democrats were in the process of taking the country beyond the brink of the abyss before they were good enough to leave the government benches in 1982. Actually, it is not surprising, for the Social Democrats have never been capable of handling money, certainly not the money of other people. (II) When Poul Schluter took over, the situation was straightened out, and new objectives were aimed at.

The said myth forms a decisive part of the government's conception of itself and of the way in which it presents itself to the public.

What is the relation of this myth to the actual situation? Summed up briefly, the situation may be presented as follows:

(a) The years of crisis 1978-82 were hard on the Danish economy. That cannot be otherwise in a country where the international trade conditions are more important than the color of the government. But that is not the entire story. It is an interesting feature of the economic policy pursued during those years that it became possible to carry through a line which improved the country's competitiveness.

(b) This became important when the international upswing occurred in 1982. Denmark was in a good position to take advantage of it. The indisputably good results which have been achieved of recent years in the economic area would not have occurred if it had not been for the preparatory work in the preceding

years. When comparing Denmark's situation to that of the Netherlands, this state of affairs becomes quite apparent.

(c) The government's most important contribution in the economic policy area has been a strict incomes policy and budgetary restraints in the area of public expenditures. What has been its effect on the balance of payments trend? Well, the trend of the deficit has been as follows:

1982: 19.2 billion kroner  
1983: 11.1 billion kroner  
1984: 16.9 billion kroner  
1985: 20.0 billion kroner  
1986: 15.5 billion kroner.

(The estimate of the deficit for the latter two years was made by the Economic Secretariat. The estimate by the Central Bank is more pessimistic.)

The result is that, whereas the foreign debt in 1982 amounted to 150 billion kroner or 32 percent of the national product, it today amounts to 220 billion kroner or 36 percent of the national product. Nevertheless, a myth has been created that the nonsocialist government has put the country back on its feet.

It is this myth which is being examined during these months. And that is important if one wants to tackle the extremely difficult problem which the growth in our foreign debt naturally constitutes.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that incomes policy and budgetary restraints alone will not solve the problem. It would be a good thing if the government parties recognized that the problems are so fundamental that the shift to a nonsocialist government far from solves it. In order for the problems to be solved, long-term efforts are needed which will create drastic changes in the economic structure. But will a government which has hardly been able to control a boom, be in a position to create such fundamental changes?

It is at any rate important for efforts to be made in such areas as the following:

- (1) The rates of savings and investments will have to be increased. This element will have to form part of the upcoming negotiations on a pensions reform.
- (2) The research efforts will have to be reinforced. We are at the bottom level within the EC, as far as funds spent on research are concerned.
- (3) The education policy will have to be reorganized. Already today, we have got bottleneck problems in the EDP area and within the metal industries.
- (4) The technological level will have to be increased. The recommendation by the Independent Economic Advisory Council that the low technological level

within the Danish production sector ought to be followed up by public efforts to counter this fundamental trend.

(5) Many--but not all--of the traditional small and medium-sized Danish enterprises find it difficult to get into or hold their own in the export market. They ought to be supported.

(6) The incomes policy will have to be secured by way of profit sharing and co-ownership. The government's present position on profit sharing undermines the incomes policy, one of the main elements of its economic policy. For it would be irresponsible to believe that the course of collective labor agreements from 1985 may be repeated.

Instead of maintaining that it was the country's fortune that Poul Schluter took over, the interest ought to concentrate on problems such as the above. Since myths are hard to kill, it will take some time. We, therefore, probably have to prepare ourselves for a policy which is insufficient, and which, therefore, will have the effect that, following the municipal elections, we shall experience a traditional tightening of the fiscal policy, the subsequent result of which will be that the objective of a balance of payments equilibrium in 1988 will have to be given up.

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## KIEL INSTITUTE TAKES CONTROVERSIAL STANCE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 21 Oct 85 pp 115-126

[Article by Dieter Kampe: "'Everyone Knows What's Coming'"]

[Text] In recent years, no other institution influenced economic policy debates in the FRG as much as the Kiel Institute for World Economy. Because wages are too high and state influence too great--so goes the Kielers' Song of Songs--the FRG is going downhill. "More market" is to bring salvation. The opinion-forming work of the professors no longer has much in common with science.

The man up front at the dark brown speaker's desk does not have to worry about being contradicted. Vehement nodding of heads, approving mumbles and table rapping confirm that the speaker is talking to sympathizers.

The speaker says, for example: "Wage costs are taboo in this society. But I consider that unbearable. Many jobs remain uncreated because wage demands are too high." Vehement rapping.

The speaker is Professor Norbert Walter of the Institute for World Economy (IfW) in Kiel. His audience are 150 master craftsmen from Gifhorn and Braunschweig.

On Friday evening in the lecture hall of the Gifhorn Savings Bank, the world economist tells the provincial entrepreneurs what's what: evil does not let the good ones act. It is soon clear what is meant by that. Norbert Walter conjures up "the terrible bureaucracy," "taxes and levies that are practically paralyzing," the "exaggerated amount of unemployment payments which stultifies motivation," the "disastrous road to shorter working hours," and "too-high apprenticeship pay."

After an hour-long speech, the professor, neat looking despite a beard, swims on a wave of sympathy. He expresses so beautifully what everyone present has always thought. But now they know. The professor confirmed it.

In the subsequent discussion, one of them wants to know even more details: what would have to be done to get out of the mess? What are the profes-

sor's views about the cost of fringe benefits? The 41-year-old Kieler begins cautiously: "I already addressed this point once, this year. That turned out to be a greater security risk than I had thought." In April 1985, a BJLD-AM-SONNTAG interview had led to outraged reader reactions and finally to the banner headline in the same paper: "Walter is Nuts..." So his boss recommended greater reserve.

But here, among friends, Walter cannot hold himself back. Tersely, he outlines his economic and social policy ideas: in health insurance, he wants noticeable cost-sharing, and classification into risk groups ("as with cars"), reduction of continued wage payments in case of illness, lower unemployment payments, loosening the provisions of collective wage agreements, stronger differences between the individual wage groups.

Norbert Walter speaks clearly, simply, almost like a poster. Still, during the ensuing cold buffet, one master craftsman criticizes that he did not understand everything. "But in principle," he adds quickly, "he is completely right, of course."

The firm represented by Norbert Walter, star salesman of a free market economy, is the "Institute for World Economy." The firm is doing a good business, its product, "free market economy," is in demand.

When associations of medium-sized enterprises are looking for a skilled lecturer who will explain something without offending them--they take a Kieler. When the five big economic research institutes deliver their joint economic prognosis this Monday, then the spokesman for these experts will be--a Kieler. When the World Bank sent off a country mission to analyze Peru's economy and prepare recommendations for that country, it was headed by a Kiel world economist. And when Argentine president Raoul Alfonsin wanted to switch his debt-ridden country to market economy, the Kiel people wrote the new economic program for him.

Be it the NDR Talk Show, WISO-magazine or WELT AM SONNTAG; be it the World Bank, the Ministry for Economics or an expert council--the Kiel people are always in on it.

And if not in person, at least in spirit. Like no other scientific institute, the economists from Kiel symbolize the slogan, "More Market, Less State." And since this is the refrain of the present economic hit song, most of the economic policy papers of the turnabout government breathe the spirit of Kiel.

Organizer, representative and intellectual "super-father" of this school is Herbert Giersch, since 1969 president of the Institute for World Economy. He was able to maintain the high prestige of the institute. But Professor Giersch has changed drastically the scientific profile of the think tank on the Kiel bay.

Its founder, Bernhard Harms, was still proud that there was no "Kiel line." He wanted to research on a broad base, be open to the dispute of viewpoints, give every good man scope for scientific work.

Giersch is different. He has trimmed the institute to a line--namely his.

The research place has turned into a prescription factory. All economic policy recommendations and proposals of the IfW show the same handwriting. The "Kiel" trademark guarantees clean products: flawless market economy. With it, Giersch established for himself and his institute a solid body of regular customers. And also much protest.

This has never bothered the chief economist, now 64 years old. Year after year, the Silesian farmer's son adds to the number of his opponents. He took on the CDU when it insisted on firm exchange rates for the D-Mark in 1968-69. He had fights with SPD economics minister Schiller on the amount of government spending, and later on with chancellor Schmidt on all basic principles. He constantly reviled the trade unions as pursuing the wrong wage policies. The turnaround government of Kohl and Stoltenberg incurred his ire because it is not implementing subsidy reductions and free trade. Now and then, he also accused entrepreneurs of greed for subsidies and hesitant investment attitude.

A nuisance to everyone? The pugnacity of the dynamic and omnipresent economics professor cannot hide the fact that he hits out primarily in one direction: against employees and the trade unions which want to gain higher wages for their followers.

High wages--that is the first fundamental tenet in Herbert Giersch's creed--are the source of all evil. Since he came on the economic policy scene in the early 1960's, Giersch has not tired of preaching this tenet and of developing variations of this leitmotif. At times, it was a "wage policy consonant with stabilization," later a "wage policy not affecting costs," lastly an "employment-neutral wage policy." The message was always the same: a waiver of wage increases.

While the subject of wages has recurred in his lectures and publications of the past 20 years like a refrain, other positions of his have fallen into oblivion. Criticism of power-play markets, where entrepreneurs do not pass on possible price drops, is no longer part of his lectures today. The plea for expansive economic measures by the state, which he co-signed in the special expert opinion of the Board of Experts in March 1967, already was an embarrassment to him two months later. He quickly stepped back from it and declared it all to be a misunderstanding.

His demands for radical inheritance and gift taxes, formulated in 1969, and the introduction of an anti-monopoly commission, show Giersch at that time as a resolute and honest market economist, a man who wants to reduce privilege and power in the interest of comprehensive competition. But the fact that monopolistic power exists not only in trade unions (as representatives of the interests of wage earners), but also in enterprises

which dominate the markets as monopolists or oligopolists--this was no longer a subject for Herbert Giersch by the mid-Seventies.

By then, his picture of the world had already shrunk to the sum and substance of five tenets:

--"The high wage level and legal minimum wages are the cause of unemployment";

--Citizens know better than the state what is good for them;"

--The population must "hold back on consumption," so that the funds thus freed "as profit, can become an incentive for entrepreneurs;"

--"Excessive social security" creates the "mentality of a people's home, a partial deprivation of the citizens' legal capacity, and paralyzes the driving economic forces;"

--"Shorter working hours--a joke."

Professor Giersch summarized these viewpoints in one doctrine: "The self-healing forces of the marketplace are strong when not pinned down."

With this, Herbert Giersch had arrived where Adam Smith had been 200 years before him: namely, faith in "laissez-faire," in the stable, constantly self-redeeming marketplace.

It is doubtful whether this return to the forefathers of classical economic theory is worthy of a Nobel prize, as Hans Barbier, a Giersch student and fan, and also the Bonn economic correspondent of the SÜD-DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, has tried to tell his readers.

After all, confidence in the almighty marketplace has been shaken frequently and lastingly during the past 100 years. Ever since the most obvious market failure, the world economic crisis of 1929, economists have been thinking about economic steering and avoidance of crises. In England, it was John Maynard Keynes who presented a complete concept. In the Germany of the 1920's, there were economic scientists Adolph Loewe, Gerhard Colm and Hans Neisser--three outstanding economists who had been called by Bernhard Holms, a genius of research organization, to the very Institute of World Economy over which Herbert Giersch presides today.

The tradition of these Kiel economists, namely, to think about meaningful state intervention, is being hushed up today. Herbert Giersch preaches only the advantages of the marketplace and hits any and all who are not willing to follow him in this.

In conversation, however, this influential economist acts more tolerantly, pleading for understanding, than his writings would indicate. The head of the institute, giving an impression of vitality and concentration despite his age, charmingly describes his activity on the Bonn board of experts in the 1960's. At that time, he himself was still a Keynesian and considered it necessary to steer market forces. "At that time, I still believed that economic crises were avoidable through clever economic steering. I thought that if everyone knew the model and stuck to it, then it had to succeed."

But getting the state, Bundesbank, and employers and employed on the right track did not work out. In retrospect, Herbert Giersch reports: "The experience of talking till your mouth was dry, without getting people to the point of acting as they sensibly should, was a traumatic experience for me." Long before the world crises of the 1970's made evident the limitations of the Keynesian set of instruments, for Herbert Giersch "the theory of state interventionism was falsified" on the basis of his personal experience.

His deduction: if the state can't do it, then the bearers of free enterprise, the entrepreneurs, must take it on themselves. Since then, he has been fighting for "improved conditions of offers, deregulation and open markets; in a word: for more liberalism."

Giersch does not want to acknowledge that, lately, his liberalism has become one-sided, that it is primarily directed against the interests of the employed and against the social welfare state, ignoring mistakes on the part of employers. At most, he admits that his picture of the entrepreneur is idealized. "Perhaps, by describing time and again the ideal entrepreneur, these capabilities and values can become reality."

This narrowing of Giersch's view of the world to a few doctrines has not been without consequence for the Kiel institute. Even the research results from the Kiel institute, "the most beautiful institute on earth" (Schlumpeter, 1935), run on a narrower track. "One can hardly await Kiel studies with any curiosity any more, one almost always knows beforehand what will come out of it," says structural researcher Frank Stille of the German Institute for Economic Research. And Professor Fritz Scharpf of the Berlin Science Center comments: "With all respect for the empirical work of the Kielers, in economic policy discussions they demonstrate a striking naivete in simplifying their fundamental premises. But in a political advisory capacity, there is a responsibility for greater balance. In this respect, the Kielers abuse their scientific standing."

One single economic school dominates Giersch's research institute. As in Scholasticism, theoretic progress consists only in refinements of one's own premise, not in confronting other schools of thought. Only those international controversies are picked up that suit their own business; all others are brushed off with polemics, or ignored. Even conservative colleagues such as economist Harald Gerfin of Constance criticize this as a "partial analytical view." Spelled out, it means: facts that are unpleasant to the Kiel people are simply faded out.

This simplistic view of the world suits the needs of many German citizens. They want to understand something about "economy," but they only get confused by what they read and hear. Supposedly, the price of gold and gasoline depends on the dollar exchange rate, but daily practice teaches the opposite. In the 1983 election campaign, the CDU depicted the national debt as a dangerous threat to national life. But the finance minister is not doing anything different from his predecessor. How does that go together?



In view of complicated circumstances, contradictory political judgments and almost incomprehensible contexts, a simplistic economic view of the world can relieve and calm. The Kiel people provide such a view. That is why they have so many adherents.

Nobody denies the fact that the new spirit introduced into the Kiel Institute by Herbert Giersch in 1969 at first enlivened the FRG economic scene. Precise cost studies for individual sectors of industry and computations on international competitiveness, carried out by the Kiel people following the U.S. model, were new to German economists. The analyses and prognoses of structural changes in German industry due to a changed global division of labor were trailblazing. In data collecting and mathematical processing, the KIELERS set milestones. Computer mock-ups and detailed studies brought them great esteem in the early 1970's.

"But in their obsession with numbers, they then lost sight of the limitations of this methodical approach," criticizes Dr Wilhelm Hummen of the German Institute for Development Policies in Berlin. In other words: the concept was played to death.

The many young university graduates brought by Giersch into the institute, which is independent but affiliated with Kiel University, were satisfied. Within the existing intellectual framework, and secured by federal and laender institute financing, they could rapidly prepare their own studies by transferring the proven method to other areas. The fact that no one was interested in the results, since everyone already knew what would come out of it, was immaterial. They basked in the fame of their "doctoral father" Giersch who was held in highest regard everywhere.

Giersch, although feared by students as a hard examiner, was and is a popular university teacher. His lectures are lively and well-prepared, they "always have a whiff of the great wide world," one Giersch student recalls. "He tells how he discussed something on the plane with a World Bank director, and everyone believes: if I say something clever now, he'll call the Economics Minister tonight and tell him about it."

Giersch is a patriarch, authoritarian and protective at the same time. "Whoever climbs into my boat, I'll safely put on land," Kiel founding father Bernhard Harms established as the motto of his institute. Giersch, also, takes care of his own. The first circle of colleagues from Saarbruecken moved into leadership positions in Kiel. For some of his faithful, such as Norbert Walter, he obtained the title of professor by political means. Giersch disciple Olaf Sievert first became secretary general of the Board of Experts, then its chairman. Giersch adherent Gerhard Fels heads the Cologne Institute of German Economy. Giersch disciples occupy seats in the Bonn Economics Ministry, OECD, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and many German academic chairs.

The size of this worldwide club is one reason why there is hardly any public criticism of Giersch and the Kiel school. Gratitude unites.

The second support column of the continued renown of the Kiel school is the institute apparatus with its research and promotion facilities. The Kiel people have the largest specialized library in the world for economic sciences (1.7 million books, 19,000 current journals, more than 130 employees); with attractive stipends they attract prestigious researchers to the institute; they hold large conferences; they themselves are represented at all important international meetings, and they maintain close contacts with influential organizations. The Kiel Institute is still a good stepping stone to rise in the conservative-minded establishment of national and international bureaucracies.

The close ties to government circles and the heroes of private industry make up for the loss of scientific renown.

The scientific decline of the institute was hidden by the turnaround in Bonn. The triumvirate of Kohl/Stoltenberg/Lambsdorff reduced government economic policy to a few guidelines: wage increases below the productivity growth rate, tax relief for business incomes, fewer government expenditures. This was ideally identical with the Kiel principles. Thus the Kiel people found themselves confirmed by the Bonn crowd. And the politicians invited the scientists to announce throughout the lands that the present do-nothing policy was not the expression of helplessness, but rather was in accord with scientific theories.

This attitude makes it possible for the Kiel people to ignore discussions within their own field and to present their viewpoints in a ritualistic manner. The scientific approach frequently is limited to the Morgenstern theorem that, what must not be, cannot be.

World economic studies, for example, are reduced to the recommendation to imitate in all developing countries, if possible, the industrialization strategy of Singapore, Hongkong, Taiwan and South Korea: opening up markets, export orientation, and capital formation in enterprises. One does not want to hear in Kiel that the strategy, successful in East Asia, cannot be transferred as a patent prescription to 120 other developing countries. Although export orientation fails in many countries today because buyer markets in industrial nations are already taken or are cut down by customs restrictions, the Kiel group still sells this recommendation as a "hot tip." The Giersch team recommends that Third World countries remove all their customs restrictions. Kiel generously overlooks the fact that in Chile, where this very thing was done on the recommendation of market dogmatist Milton Friedman, more than half of the domestic enterprises collapsed.

Rajan Malaviya, formerly spokesman of the association of developing countries, the "Group of 77" at Unctad, opines: "The Kiel group are ideologically biased in the interest of industrial countries. They have no relation to the real political and economic conditions in developing countries." German colleagues also criticize the world economic studies from Kiel as "eternally the same litany." Michael Hofmann of the German

Institute for Development Policy says: "The Kiel team argues in a 'woodcut' fashion where in reality, differentiated and country-specific approaches would be appropriate."

The Giersch party also tries for simplicity in FRG economic debates. With the slogan, "Minimum Wage--Unemployment," the chief had prescribed the direction: wages are costs. They determine the competitiveness of an enterprise, and if they are too high, they cause unemployment through one's own fault.

The dual character of wages, i.e., being a cost item as well as the means for demand, is overlooked by the Kiel group or, if mentioned, is played down. Thus they make themselves into partisans of one side of the management-labor parties. In scientific terms, such a one-track approach is untenable. And so the Kiel team is isolated even in the camp of conservative neoclassical economists.

Harald Gerfin, member of the scientific advisory council of the Federal Ministry for Economics, does not find convincing the Kiel attempts to prove why lower wages would bring higher employment. After all, recent years had shown that, despite declining real wages, no measurable positive employment effects were created, the Constance economics professor writes.

The inflexibility of the Kiel group is particularly provocative for experts because there had been a broad scientific debate on the connection between amount of wages and employment as early as the 1920's. At that time, it was the Kiel scientists Adolph Loewe, Gerhard Colm and Hans Neisser who, at the side of Emil Lederer of Heidelberg, argued vehemently against Bruening's policy of lowering wages: they proved--alas, in vain--that these measures would only aggravate the crisis.

In 1931, Lederer wrote: "The primitive notion that, every time there is unemployment, one could restore the balance by lowering wages, belongs in the junk room of theory." Today, this tradition is passed over silently in Kiel. One prefers to reach into the junk room of theory.

In addition to Norbert Walter, one of the main propagandists of the Giersch school is Juergen Donges, vice president of the institute. In his mid-forties, he dresses correctly and in gray, like a Prussian civil servant, and comes on fighting like a macho Argentine hacendero: "That somebody gets angry at us," he says, "I consider a quality sign of our work."

Donges has no doubts about where to look for the causes of the growth crisis: "It is because of institutional rigidity, of Euro-sclerosis. Everywhere, market forces are being hemmed in. Naturally there can be no upswing."

In the certainty of possessing the best of all explanations of the world with the neoclassical model, the professor is not bothered by the fact that his institute is increasingly beset by attacks and enmities: "We are

not squeamish when we dish out criticism. So we also have to be able to take it."

This fresh and merry self-assurance of the Kiel opinion formers is extraordinarily useful when it is a matter of smoothing away disturbing facts. For example, it does not fit into the Kiel world economists' view of life that unemployment could also be a result of labor-saving technical progress. For Giersch and company, efficiency measures have nothing to do with technical changes, only with wage development.

Instead of analyses on technological unemployment, out of Kiel come only accusations of lacking wage flexibility farther down. Actually, an entire scientific branch has developed meanwhile, analysing causes and conditions of technical progress and recognizing the sporadic appearance of innovations. But none of that has reached Kiel.


Wearing such blinders, one can easily get entangled in contradictions. In their studies on division of labor in the world, the Kiel team recommends that industrial countries concentrate increasingly on scientific and capital-intensive production sectors. They accuse FRG industry of continuing to "apply overly labor-intensive production methods." At the same time they recommend that, through lower wages, German workers prevent production from becoming even more capital-intensive. Although this can't be reduced to a common denominator, each recommendation individually sounds wonderfully like free market economy.

That's the way it is with recommendations from Kiel. They warm the cockles of the heart of free market theory ideologues; but they are neither conclusive, nor do they produce a rounded economic policy concept. Slogans such as "adaptation log-jam," "growth slow down," "institutional sclerosis," or "political hindrances," which are employed in explaining crises and lack of growth, indicate that the authors still attribute miraculous powers to the free market.

But what good is it to anybody? The prescriptions "revitalization of industry" and "deregulation", derived from the diagnosis, remain abstract. They leave aside the reality of economic life. Part of this reality is also social peace, a balance of labor-management interests, and the fact that the FRG has a mixed economy in which state activity uses almost half of the gross national product.

The Kiel team and its propaganda is of no real help to entrepreneurs, to whom they feel so close, in questions of economic policy. It is only useful as a political instrument. "None of us want what they demand," comments an employers' representative on the Giersch-Walter demands for wage drops and reductions in social services. "But it's good that they write that. That puts fear into the labor unions and the SPD."

Table



Key:

1. Wages, Cost Too High?
2. Development of unit wage costs by international comparison (adjusted for changes in currency exchange rates; index 1975 = 100)
3. First through third quarter
4. Average income of employees in FRG (real net income, in percent compared to each previous year)
5. Estimated

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## SIEMENS INVESTS IN NEW CONSTRUCTION, HIRING

## Augsburg Factory Premises Doubled

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 4 Oct 85 p 37

[Text] One of the largest real estate deals in Augsburg's post-war history now permits the Siemens AG, Munich, to more than double the current factory premises of its systems plant in Augsburg and thus make it possible to expand its capacity. In addition to its current 280,000 square meter plant, it has purchased another 290,000 square meters from the City of Augsburg--at a fixed price, in line with the usual terms for industrial sites. The firm holds the option for an additional 40,000 square meters.

As plant manager Hartwig Rogge stated in a press conference the day after the City Council had given its blessing to the real estate transaction, "small and large central units" will be built on the present plant site. On the other hand, products to be manufactured in larger quantities--particularly personal computers and video display terminals--are going to be built in a new plant, the construction of which will begin next spring.

The reason for the transaction, Rogge noted, was the sales increase over the past few years. Sales rose threefold in three years and now total about DM 1.4 billion (according to internal Siemens prices). Employment has also grown in line with sales. Within two years, more than 1,000 new positions were created in the plant, which now employs 4,750 workers, 389 in part-time jobs. In contrast to regions such as Munich, where industry is scrambling for workers, it is relatively easy to get qualified labor in Augsburg, said head of personnel Alfred Ruhland. Nevertheless, he sometimes has "to beat the big drum" in other regions. Ruhland attributes the availability of workers in the Augsburg labor market, among other things, to computer science courses, co-sponsored by Siemens A.G., now being taught at Augsburg's advanced professional school, and to computer science courses applied to economics at Augsburg University. In the near future, the company wants to support the establishment of a chair for applied physics at the university.

Obviously, Siemens's activities in Augsburg have by no means come to an end with the current expansion. No thought has been given to consolidating the design department, now split between Munich-Neuperlach and Augsburg, by combining the workforce in Augsburg (at the moment, that department has 200 employees in Augsburg and 500 in Munich). However, according to Rogge, the decision has been made that future new activities in this area will be "started and continued" only in Augsburg. This means the Munich design department will shrink by attrition, while the one in Augsburg will expand.

Heavy investments are being made for the expansion in Augsburg. The investment budget, with DM 66 million in fiscal year 83/84, has been increased to more than DM 200 million for 84/85. Reportedly it will again be close to DM 200 million in fiscal year 85/86.

#### Regensburg Creates 850 Positions

Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 21 Oct 85 p 24

[TEXT] The Siemens AG, Munich, will create 850 new positions in Regensburg within the next few years. The company states that, in addition to the 350 jobs in the computer components plant presently under construction, the Regensburg equipment factory is to be expanded in 1986 at a cost of DM 35 million. In the long term, this will mean jobs for an additional 500 persons. The expansion is to meet the growing demand for electronic motor vehicles components. In the past, Siemens has achieved significant increases in its market share of automobile electronics and, in recent years, has hired 700 new employees in its Regensburg equipment plant.

#### Nuremberg Building Site Purchased

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Oct 85 p 16

[Text] The Siemens AG in Nuremberg-Moorenbrunn has completed, on its company-owned, 200,000 square meters area, the first section of construction for a new site. In close to two years of construction, three new office buildings and several smaller structures, totaling 27,000 square meters, were completed. The second section will have a training center covering more than 9,000 square meters that will be ready for occupancy next summer. Expenditures for the two sections, including development, total about DM 130 million. The Siemens manufacturing sector Energy and Automation Technology plans to consolidate a significant part of its activities in the area of industrial automation at its new Moorenbrunn site. The new buildings are scheduled to house some 1,000 employees and will use the most advanced office technologies directly at the work place.

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## RAU BRINGS TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH TO RUHR

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 18 Oct 85 p 41

[Article by Uwe Knuepfer: "Ideasmiths in the Coal Scuttle--Johannes Rau Attempts the Modernization of the Ruhr"]

[Text] At Muelheim, along a side arm of the Ruhr River flowing through rich greenery, there stands a villa which has undergone a change similar to the one planned by the Social-Democrat Land Government for all of North Rhine-Westphalia. The Villa Julia Thyssen, which is named after its former inhabitant, was, until not too long ago, a bourgeois residence, a neofeudalist city palace of the kind the steel magnates of the Ruhr used to like to locate in the prettiest scenic areas of the industrial region between Duisburg and Dortmund: gloomy and magnificent, representative and bleak.

For a good year now, the villa has had a new renter. ZENIT resides here--the "Zentrum in Nordrhein-Westfalen fuer Innovation und Technik" [the Center in North Rhine-Westphalia for Innovation and Technology], which was established in July 1984. The facade of the house--as the sole architectonic component obligated to human measure--has remained as it was. But right behind the heavy entrance door a new world begins. All is bright, large-format oil paintings of the young wilderness bedeck the once superhigh walls, the old luxurious chandeliers now illuminate furniture in the classic modern style. Slender, young, chic people animate the ambience. Their desks hold the finest of high-tech equipment for offices.

ZENIT, this staff headquarters for technology in North Rhine-Westphalia, which is unprecedented in the Federal Republic, is a joint child of politics and home-style economy, which was born with the hesitant midwifery help of the credit economy. It is a limited joint stock company with a budget of DM 2 million, owned one-third by the land, one-third by the West German Landesbank, and one-third by the ZENIT Holding Company which currently has about 50 establishments as members. A good dozen diplomate physicists, engineers, and economists work here who outwardly fully correspond to the cliché picture of young, dynamic entrepreneurs [young upwardly mobile professionals?]: a loose posture wrapped in fine cloth. North Rhine-Westphalian economics minister, Reimut Jochimsen, appeared so impressed by the curricula of his new staff coworkers during the inauguration of ZENIT that he almost became rapturous and promised that this is where he would want to come in the future if ever he had to refuel spiritually.

The fact that the Rau government is able to persuade part of the economy to publicly pull at the same rope with it is essentially due to one committed drummer for the Free Democrats: Peter Dietz--an idea-rich picture-book middle-ranker from Muelheim, who is the spiritual father of ZENIT. He had knocked on the doors of industry so long until hardly anybody dared not to at least show goodwill with respect to participation in this "great joint effort."

It is the mission of ZENIT to do everything it can to finally put to rest the onerous talk of the federal German north-south cultural differences. The idea forge is expected to make it clear that North Rhine-Westphalia is anything but that notorious scrap heap of which Norbert Bluem spoke so deprecatingly during the election campaign. ZENIT business manager, Dirk Beckerhoff, is convinced that it is precisely the Ruhr area which is "technologically massively underestimated." He explains this by invoking the high standard of precision, reliability, and service-friendliness of the local mid-level suppliers for the mining and steel industry.

Similarly structured enterprises at Baden-Wuerttemberg, where the traditional suppliers for the automobile industry are at home, never saw themselves compelled to hew to such a standard.

Before he allowed himself to be hired by Dietz and Jochimsen, Beckerhoff worked, among others, for the Battelle Research Institute, for the McKinsey Consultant Enterprise, and for the federal government. In addition, he also made a name for himself as a reorganizer of a sick machinebuilding enterprise. As a first step, he organized the ZENIT traveling exhibit. This was intended to show intermediate suppliers who had something to do with sensors for temperature and pressures what was available with respect to new developments. Beckerhoff knew that in the early summer the Bavarian State Government had dispatched a bus full of electronic sensors made in Bavaria to the villages. He wanted to charter this bus and then pass on its elucidative work in the Rhine and Ruhr areas. However, according to Beckerhoff, the colleagues from the south proved to be immoderate with respect to their demands for honoraria. It was only then that he says he checked to see whether producers of advanced technology in this particular area existed in North Rhine-Westphalia. Now, the ZENIT traveling exhibit consists exclusively of products of that particular state; some 30 firms are showing what they are able to accomplish.

In the picturesque language of soccer: Team Rau has taken the field in order to prevent its demotion from the first league of the industrial regions, but also in order to surprisingly make up the apparently enormous gap between it and the top club leader, Fortuna Spaeth. ZENIT is the trainer.

A soccer trainer in a similar situation forces follow-on work, studies the tactics of the others, copies them where they are successful, saws away at the technical dexterities of his team, and raises their morale. If his management is behind him, he keeps proven stars, even though it may be expensive, and buys new ones.

ZENIT organizes seminars for artisans and young entrepreneurs, offers "small and middle-size enterprises with innovation interests" participation in

creativity training, and attempts to provide insight for them in the proliferating jungle of the high-tech market; assists them with introducing computer-supported development and design (CAD and CNC). However, ZENIT also attempts to press claims for public development funds or favorable loans from one of the many European Economic Community, federal, or state pots. ZENIT collaborators by now have made hundreds of visits to enterprises and familiarize the small entrepreneur from Detmold, who is fumbling along in solitude, with his unknown fellow combatant in Siegburg for purposes of exchanging experiences.

At first, the newcomers in Muelheim encountered quite a bit of resentment. Quite a few people muttered that the establishment of this thing was as unnecessary as a goiter. Insiders referred to the fact that the more significant industry and trade chambers had been doing what ZENIT has in mind for a long time. The nonstate large-scale banks, which were heavily courted, exercised magnificent restraint during the establishment of the limited company.

Although there are still skeptics to be found today, loud criticism has fallen conspicuously silent. Fifteen of the sixteen North Rhine-Westphalia parliamentary districts have now presented the ZENIT-initiated traveling exhibit with great fanfare and good attendance by the specialized public.

Most of the machine- and installation-building industries in the Ruhr area once had a clearly visible but firm group of customers in the coal and steel industry. Coal and steel were part of the fabric, advertising was barely necessary. And that is why, according to Dirk Beckerhoff, marketing has remained a foreign word for many of them to this day. When they now try to leave their region in order to attract new customers honestly and coyly, "any alert Harvard type dressed in fashionable clothes who happens to have quickly opened a firm in Boeblingen and jabbars something about chips" is able to take the butter from their bread. "The enterprises of the Ruhr have no technical problem, but rather a marketing problem," judges Beckerhoff.

The Rau government seems wildly determined to create a "modern North Rhine-Westphalia" and set forth a DM 400 million program of "future technologies" last year. Almost every advanced school in the state has a transfer position involving the adjacent economy. Three functioning technology centers were established most recently in Aachen, Dortmund, and Essen. The state government energetically resisted the Bonn request to move the biotechnology process out of the Juelich Nuclear Research Facility in order to concentrate all peak research activity of this type at Braunschweig, and thus in Lower Saxony. And as, once more, an internationally esteemed natural scientist, robotics expert Eckhard Freund, was about to let himself be lured to California, the state gave him his own robotics institute in Dortmund.

Completely in the spirit of the Rau pronouncement: "We will not let our country be spoiled!" the Ruhr Communal Association (KVR)--an agglomeration of cities and communities within the confines of the black coal region--has now decided to help the coal bucket finally become a new shining image on a federal basis. Expensive double-page color advertisements in supraregional magazines are expected to silence scoffers in Hamburg, Munich, and elsewhere.



They show, for example, a stylized stage setting from Bochum, a dramatically illuminated Duisburg harbor, or a Lower Rhine bucolic scene populated by grazing cows and subtitled "Which way to the Ruhr area?" The answer says--and who would have thought so--"You are right in the middle of it."

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## GOVERNMENT FINANCES RETURN OF GUEST WORKERS TO HOMELAND

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 18 Oct 85 p 38

/Article by Irina Ludat: "A Question of Which Is the Greater Fear"<sup>7</sup>

[Text] Guest Workers

It was almost like a state visit on that 10 September 1964 as the Cologne-Deutz railroad station: The train from Portugal pulls in; the country's national anthem is struck up; the city's dignitaries are waiting at the platform. Big to-do for Armando Sa Rodriguez, the one-millionth "guest worker" in the Federal Republic. He gets a motor scooter, flowers, and a diploma.

Twenty years later at the Frankfurt airport: Suitcases, boxes, bags, and a painful crush at the windows of the Turkish travel agencies, long lines waiting in front of the container office of the Federal Border Guard. Here, overworked agents stamp "border-crossing certificates" and invalidate the residence permits on Turkish passports. For the passengers of this charter flight, this means saying farewell to Germany, once and for all and irrevocably.

This time, of course, the dignitaries stayed away from the event and politicians in distant Bonn celebrated the return-ticket subsidy law as a "success of our policy."

When Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl took office, he promised to cut the number of foreigners living here in half. A federal-state commission, chaired by Friedrich Zimmermann, was to submit proposals--but coalition squabbles so far have not allowed the federal interior minister to do his job.

This was the time to look into the files of the predecessors in which the Christian-Liberal coalition discovered the draft of a return-ticket subsidy law which--with minor amendments--was passed on 29 November 1983. "Our concern accompanies the returnees," said Federal Labor Minister Norbert Blum at that time.

With a time limit of 8 months, the law, under certain conditions, called for the payment of "return aid" in the amount of DM10,500 to unemployed aliens or those with only short-time employment; it offered above all Turks and the Portuguese an opportunity to get their employee contributions to their annuity insurance paid out immediately.

Shortly after the law's passage, headlines such as these began to turn up in the press: "Half Want to Go Back Home"--"One Third Wants to Leave This Year." After the expiration of the application deadlines, the following was announced officially in July: "Three hundred thousand foreigners left the Federal Republic with return aid." Today, a year after the expiration of the exit deadline (cutoff date: 30 September 1984) it is however still not clear how many aliens actually availed themselves of the provisions of the return ticket subsidy law and how many the law persuaded to go back home. This, at any rate, is the bottom line worked out by a conference of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation on "The New Alien Policy in Western Europe." Bonn now speaks more softly also unofficially.

This brings up two questions: Did the expectations connected with the return ticket subsidy law materialize? And: Do specifically goal-oriented repatriation measures constitute an adequate "solution to the alien problem?"

First of all, let us explain a concept here; the term "return aid" is one among several measures in the return subsidy law and refers to the one time payment of DM10,500 (plus DM1,500 for each child).

It was not 300,000 aliens who left the country on the basis of "return aid"--as was stated quite consciously or mistakenly a year ago--but rather precisely 13,716 aliens of whom 94.2 percent had a special work permit. This means that they would, in addition, also have been entitled to unemployment compensation if they had remained in the country after their unemployment benefits had run out. Their renunciation saves the Federal Labor Institute around DM330 million.

Bonn prettied up the balance sheet also regarding the number of those who left the country after applying for a refund of their retirement contributions. Returnees have always been able to request refund of their retirement contributions (instead of drawing retirement pay from Germany later on), of course only after a 2-year waiting period which always is and was an important grace period. But since Bonn's success statistics contained all repayment applications from the time the return ticket subsidy law was in effect, the figures simply also include those applications from around 30,000 Turks which have been received in the meantime--the only thing is that those Turks returned long ago to live back home.

In contrast to "return aid," far more than 55,000 aliens--as Bonn had estimated in the beginning--filed an application for early refund. But nobody knows the precise figure, according to Elmar Hoenekopp of the IAB (Labor Market and Occupational Research Institute) at the Ebert Foundation Conference. His institute, he indicated, calculated about 100,000 applications, at any rate, 40,000 less than the federal government had maintained a year ago. Because only employee contributions were refunded--without interest--this eliminates DM4 billion

of otherwise later-due retirement payments going abroad--a sum which now helps secure German retirement benefits.

This statistical numbers game is nothing but sleight of hand for Elmar Hoenekopp and Ursula Mehrlaender who work in the Ebert Foundation's research institute; instead, this introduced some basic doubts as to the law's effectiveness. Return subsidies, to be sure, did influence the timing of the person's return but hardly the total number of returnees. An average of around 300,000 aliens returned to their home countries each year already since 1966; last year, when the law was in force, the figure was only 55,000. According to these two scientists, the reason for the decline in the number of aliens is not the return subsidy law but rather the drastic decline of alien emigration into the Federal Republic.

Because of the many different restrictions--with emphasis above all on the very narrow group of people concerned and the time limit--the law was, from the very first draft on, not suitable for launching the return of a larger number of aliens. It is, for example, quite obvious that a person needs a minimum of time to think after having stayed in Germany for 20 years. But the federal government demanded that the tents be struck within 4 weeks--otherwise there would be deductions from this "aid," specifically, DM1,500 for each month in excess.

The unspoken hope of being able to make jobs available for German unemployed with the help of this alien policy did not materialize. Anybody who leaves the country with "return aid" after a company has failed or after a plant has been closed down--and that was true of the majority of cases--is not making a job available. And the jobs of those who quit on their own and started home were difficult to fill. Whether it was in fish processing or in the slaughterhouse--the Germans whom the employment agency sent mostly quickly threw the towel in again.

German replacement workers were not skilled enough for Howaldtwerke-Deutsche Werft. The alien affairs officer of the city of Kiel reported that HDW /Howaldtwerke-Deutsche Werft/ desperately ran after the Turkish welders who, being specialists in special welding techniques for submarine construction, could not be replaced on short notice.

There were also bottlenecks at the biggest employer for Turks, Ruhrkohle AG /Inc./ in Duisburg. When 2,700 Turkish miners left there, this resulted in disadvantages for the German work force: It meant more work and less chance for early retirement.

The country between the Rhine and the Ruhr by the way was the regional center of the returnee merry-go-round. According to IAB calculations, most "return aid" applications came from the iron and steel industries, from mining and energy. This is no surprise because firms such as Hoesch, Thyssen, Mannesmann, and others used the Bonn model for their enterprise personnel policy. After all, the law was just about an invitation for "attrition" and "adaptation"--in other words, personnel cutbacks.

IAB calculations document the situation: In 68.7 percent of all applications, the return bonus was paid on the basis of enterprise closings; in the mining industry, the figure was 98.5 percent and in the iron and steel industry it was 96.5 percent.

Let us take Huettenheim as an example: Platoons of reporters turned up there when 900 Turks were "transferred" from the enterprise and were given a "return bonus" as part of a concerted effort by the Mannesmann business management, the shop union, and the Labor Office. This was a fortunate coincidence of the return subsidy law and company strategy; on the computer sheets, the company was able to print out the figures for "aid" and contribution refunding from annuity insurance along with the enterprise severance pay. Turkish male family heads had become "weak by the dozens," argued BR /worker council/ member Mahler--although he failed to note that the employee representatives and the German personnel force had their fingers in the pie.

When management at Mannesmann stopped early retirement pay programs only for Turkish employees and when a whole series of Turks over the age of 55 found it impossible to use this method of leaving the enterprise, there was hardly any resistance from the employee representatives. Faced with the alternative of being out in the cold with or without severance pay, the Turks finally signed the "offer" to the "foreign fellow citizens" which had been drafted by Mannesmann and by the federal labor minister--and that also meant their hasty return.

State Secretary Vogt, of the Federal Labor Ministry, also had to admit recently that the return of alien workers only made very few jobs available for Germans. Jobs held by aliens--according to Vogt in talking to the press--primarily fell victim to rationalization.

This leaves us with the question as to why Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in talking to the employee committees of the CDU /Christian Democratic Union/ in Saarbruecken, among other things blamed the still rather high unemployment figures on the fact that "too many jobs are still held by guest workers"--a remark to which the press paid little attention.

If we investigate the political effect of the return subsidy law, we get four important aspects:

First: "Return aid" presupposes structural coercion, that is to say, the real or threatening loss of the job.

Second: The time limit on the law was designed to force alien workers to make their decision.

Third: "Return aid" forced the alien worker to leave the Federal Republic, along with his dependents, irrevocably and forever, even if re-integration back home later on proved to be impossible.



Fourth: As for the public, it was not so much the fact that the "aid" involved claims based on work and contributions that was so effective but rather the impression that these were "bonuses," in other words, gifts to unemployed foreigners. The law thus helped strengthen prejudices and an anti-alien attitude and it boosted the social compulsion exerted upon foreign families.

Felix Rodriguez, a Spanish clergyman, described this compulsion in one sentence: "If a foreigner is more afraid of being here than of going home, then he will return 'voluntarily.'"

Fear of the future back home is even greater: 4.3 million aliens continue to live in the Federal Republic and politicians know that specifically goal-oriented return measures at best can only slightly increase the number of persons who would go back home anyway.

Return subsidy programs--and this was also touched on at the Ebert Foundation's conference--primarily have symbolic significance because they fool the advocates of a tough alien policy into thinking that something is being done. But at some point in time, this idea faded away and at some point in time the consolation aspect becomes obvious. That leaves us with three possibilities:

The first one would be to tighten the return program in the form of a large-scale forced repatriation. This is unlikely in spite of current debates on making the alien law tougher. International considerations, treaties between countries, and economic factors provide hardly any action leeway. The outward political damage done by the return subsidy law already lastingly burdens relations between Southern European countries and the Federal Republic. The law had not been coordinated with the countries from whom the aliens had come.

The second possibility would be to recognize that the undoubtedly existing problems of the aliens cannot "be returned by means of subsidies" but can only be solved here. In the opinion of Ursula Mehrlaender, of the Ebert Foundation, this includes the recognition of aliens as "durable newcomers" or "immigrants." This is being formulated more cautiously at this time by the Hessian state government whose Interior Minister Horst Winterstein, in response to an inquiry from the Union in the State Assembly, declared that "return aid" could not be the central instrument of alien policy "also because of fundamental considerations."

Said Winterstein: "The children who were born here or who were brought here later will remain here because they have no relationship or hardly any relationship to their parents' country of origin."

The third possibility is presently the most likely one: The talk about returning will continue. This is already taken care of by the "Draft of a Law on Reintegration Aid in Housing Construction for Returning Aliens" which is still being debated in Parliament but which is to take effect as law already on 1 January 1986. According to that law, returnees can use a home-building savings contract, without tax or bonus penalty, in their home countries if at the same time they pledge to return there at the very latest within 4 years after the loan was paid out.

And so the figure juggling begins again: According to the Federal Government, the law could be applied to 185,000 foreign home-building savers (including 130,000 Turks). Once again, speeches are being written for the Lower House. Said Norbert Bluem about home-building and German-Turkish friendship: "That will stand for all time and will remind all generations that the father and the grand-father worked in Germany once upon a time. That could be a contribution to friendship--could it not?"

If this policy is pursued seriously--and no change in the trend is in sight--then conflicts will continue to become more acute.

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